Years at work: Which European countries have the longest average working life?
In 2024, the average expected working life in the EU was 37.2 years, according to Eurostat. This represents an increase of 2.4 years, or 7%, compared to 2014, when it was 34.8 years.
Within the EU, expected working life ranges from 32.7 years in Romania to 43.8 years in the Netherlands. When EU candidates and EFTA countries are included, it varies from 30.2 years in Turkey to 46.3 years in Iceland.
But what explains the wide gap in expected working life across Europe?
How many years do Europeans work for?
While there are some exceptions, the expected duration of working life in Europe generally follows geographical patterns. Northern European countries—particularly the Nordic region—lead with the longest working lives. Iceland tops the list, followed by the Netherlands (43.8 years) and Sweden (43 years). Denmark (42.5 years), Norway (41.2 years), and Finland (39.8 years) also report high figures, all ranking in the top 10 of 35 European countries.
Western European countries also tend to have above-average working life durations. Switzerland (42.8 years), Ireland (40.4 years) and Germany (40 years) all exceed 40 years and rank in the top 10. However, France (37.3 years), Belgium (35 years), and Luxembourg (35.6 years) fall closer to, or below, the EU average of 37.2 years.
The most recent available figure for the UK is from 2018, when it was 39.2 years. Considering the rising trend across the EU, the current figure is likely to be higher.
The figures are more mixed in Southern Europe. While Portugal (39.3 years) and Malta (39 years) show relatively long working lives, Italy (32.8 years), Greece (34.8 years), and Spain (36.5 years) are significantly lower.
Eastern European countries mostly fall around or just below the EU average. Hungary (37.4 years) performs moderately, while others—such as Romania (32.7 years) and Bulgaria (34.8 years)—report significantly shorter expected working lives.
The shortest durations are observed in Southeastern Europe and the Balkans, including Turkey (30.2 years), North Macedonia (31.5 years), and Montenegro (32.1 years). All three are EU candidate countries, with the figures for North Macedonia and Montenegro based on 2018 data.
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Why does the average working life differ?
As these figures show, the average expected working life significantly differs across Europe. But, why?
Prof. Moritz Hess from the University of Applied Sciences Niederrhein noted that the duration of working life, as well as labour force participation in Europe, differs due to several reasons. 'First, the demand side plays an important role: if employers need workers, this increases labour force participation and extends the duration of working life,' he told Euronews Business.
'Second, the institutional context matters, particularly in relation to pension and labour market regulations. A key factor in this regard is the official retirement age: the higher it is, the longer the expected duration of working life. The fewer early retirement options a pension system offers, the longer people are likely to remain in the workforce,' he added.
Prof Hess also explained that ageism—discrimination based on age—also plays a role. In countries where older workers are not discriminated against and their contributions are valued, they are more likely to want to continue working, which leads to longer working lives.
Timo Anttila, Senior Lecturer at University of Jyväskylä in Finland, pointed out that the family models of countries, such as single/dual earners, pension systems and family care models are possibly important factors having an impact on work life duration expectancy.
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Labour force participation rate matters
'Most of the duration of working life can be explained by the labour force participation rate,' Eurostat finds. In general, countries with lower participation rates tend to have shorter average working lives.
The chart above illustrates this relationship for the total population, comparing each country's expected working life with its labour force participation rate.
The labour force participation rate explains approximately 81.5% of the variance in expected working life according to Eurostat.
Several countries have already introduced measures to raise the retirement age. By 2060, the OECD estimates that the average retirement age across the EU will be near 67, with some nations expected to exceed 70.
Euronews article —Europe's rising retirement ages— explains the current retirement ages across Europe as well as projections for future increases.
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