How Do Cyprus and Croatia Fit Into India's Europe Strategy?
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Cyprus, Canada, and Croatia earlier this month was significant in many ways. Notably, it was the first foreign trip by the Indian prime minister after India's Operation Sindoor.
The visit to Canada as part of India's G-7 partnership monopolized most analysts' attention. It signaled a thaw in relationship between the two countries, which had soured in the last year. Nevertheless, the G-7 could not produce tangible results in its 50th anniversary, and a rupture in the Western world was visible with U.S. President Donald Trump leaving the summit early.
The other two countries on Modi's itinerary – Cyprus, which Modi visited en route to Canada and Croatia, where he stopped on his way back to India– deserve a closer look.
India quickly established diplomatic relations from the moment Cyprus acquired freedom in 1960, molded by the shared experience of anti-colonial struggle – the British had colonized both countries – and a mutual commitment to non-alignment. Following U.N. resolutions and opposing any legitimization of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, India firmly established its support of Cyprus's sovereignty, and deepened the relationship after the 1974 Turkish invasion.
This was not only solidarity amid the Cold War. Supporting Cyprus, for India, has long represented its belief in the dignity of international law, its resistance to foreign intervention, and its voice for the post-colonial Global South. In turn, Cyprus has been a consistent friend, supporting India's U.N. Security Council ambitions, standing with New Delhi in several multilateral venues, and backing India's stance on Kashmir.
But the relationship has lagged amid shifting geopolitical conditions. The Eastern Mediterranean is now a theater for energy politics, maritime rivalry, and EU border security, not a passive space. Although Cyprus is not a significant EU power, its location and its foreign policy approach make it a perfect partner for India in influencing debates on the rule of law, maritime order, and the course of multilateralism. Cyprus will also hold the Council of Europe rotating chair for the first six months of 2026, helping India reap dividends from this relationship.
The unwavering support that Pakistan got from Turkiye after the Pahalgam terror incident also arguably had something to do with Modi's visit to Cyprus. India may be signaling to Turkiye that it will also support its adversaries, just as Ankara supported Islamabad.
Modi's visit to Croatia was the first such visit by an Indian prime minister since the Balkan country gained independence from the disintegrated Yugoslavia in 1991. Yugoslavia has been a torchbearer alongside India in the Non-Aligned Movement. With a considerable soft power presence in Croatia, which has a strong tradition of Indology and a fondness for Sanskrit literature, India wants to extend these cultural linkages to economic and political spheres. In 2019, then-Indian President Ram Nath Kovind headed a delegation-level talks with Croatia; however, much of its focus was mainly on cultural, educational and tourism ties.
There has been a steady growth in trade between India and Croatia, from $204.15 million in 2019-20 to $291.36 million in 2023-24. Croatia, located around the Adriatic Sea, provides an ample opportunity for the India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Other than that, it also provides India with much-needed access to Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, providing a link to an effective network of European road transport. India currently uses the Hamburg and Rotterdam ports, which are already very busy. The Croatian ports of Rijeka, Ploce, and Zadar can be good choices to divert some trade volumes.
Modi's talks with his Croatian counterpart focused mainly on discussion involving 'trade and investment, science and technology, defense and security, space, cultural cooperation, and people-to-people ties.' According to India's Ministry of External Affairs, 'The two leaders agreed that there were significant opportunities for increased cooperation in sectors such as infrastructure, ports and shipping, digitization, AI, renewable energy, Pharma and tourism and hospitality.' Other than that, the two leaders have also focused on enhanced business-to-business ties between the two countries.
The liberal free market idea suggests that the growth of unregulated markets produces a bigger pie, which can be divided among all concerned parties. In a time when free markets are disturbed by tariffs, regional conflicts, and states' weaponization of supply chains, it makes perfect sense for India to increasingly engage with big players in Europe and smaller ones with considerable heft in European political affairs.
In a fractured Western world, where apparent differences are visible between the United States and continental Europe, the latter is also searching for like-minded partners that can be relied on in turbulent times. For Cyprus and Croatia, there is also a balance to be found between India and China, embracing greater relations with the former to avoid overdependence on the latter. Nevertheless, India needs to extend this momentum to other states lying between the Adriatic and Baltic Sea regions. Only then can some tangible outcome can be expected for India's European strategy.
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