The 'Macron Doctrine' goes to Asia: Autonomy with partners, steady on China
He presented a vision that he has consistently held since taking office in 2017 — restoring France and Europe's global influence and relevance amid the great power competition through 'strategic autonomy' — a term he repeated more than 10 times in his speech. This ambition, termed by some analysts as the "Macron Doctrine," is based on a sense of deep crisis since the establishment of the post-1945 world order.
Strategic autonomy
In Singapore, he has anchored his vision in both the Gaullist legacy and Asian strategic culture. He recalled Gen. de Gaulle's historic 1966 speech in Phnom Penh, where the general championed the independence of nations, particularly Cambodia, within the Cold War context. Macron also referenced the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, the birthplace of the Non-Aligned Movement.
In the context of escalating U.S.-China rivalry, the fragmentation of the global order emerges as the primary risk. To counter this destabilizing trend, Europeans and Asians must find new ways to resist. While nonalignment is not an option, Macron advocated for forging an alliance to resist pressures and 'spheres of coercion' and forming a coalition for independence. This vision also stemmed from the growing interconnection between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters — a point that garnered consensus among the state delegates.
The idea resonated with the regional audience, particularly as Southeast Asian nations have historically rejected bloc mentality and resisted pressure to take sides. Notably, Singapore's newly appointed defense minister, Chan Chun Sing, commended Macron's emphasis on strategic autonomy and sovereignty.
Even Gen Nakatani, Japan's defense minister and a supporter of Japan-U.S. relations, acknowledged that "strategic autonomy is essential." Macron's approach was thus perceived as more of a common sense strategy compared to the confrontational and "brutal love" stance advocated by U.S. Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth, who, ironically, claimed to champion a common sense approach.
A demanding friendship
Macron affirmed that "France is a friend and ally of the United States, and a friend that cooperates — even if we sometimes disagree and compete — with China'. While he aired implicit criticism to the U.S., deploring 'countries that want to impose on free countries their foreign-policy choices or prejudice their alliances', his most pointed remarks were directed at China.
In his effort to underscore the interconnected security environment and the linkages between European and Asian theaters, Macron made a bold comparison by likening the context of Russia and Ukraine to potential actions by China regarding Taiwan and the Philippines. His point was to demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not merely a European issue — it threatens international law and sets a dangerous precedent for powerful states to seize territory by force, including in Asia. This position is fully aligned with France's core diplomatic principle: opposing any unilateral change to the status quo through force.
However, this broad analogy may raise questions — or even unease — among some Asian partners, who could see the comparison as irrelevant, unhelpful or even counterproductive, as it risks inflaming regional tensions. This concern was notably echoed by Singapore's defense minister the following day. The remark could even be interpreted as a shift in France's posture on Taiwan, though that was not the intended message. Nevertheless, it triggered a strong diplomatic reaction from China, which dismissed the comparison as clumsy and unfounded.
At the same time, during the question and answer session, Macron stated that if China were to take action against another country in the region, France would be very cautious to intervene from day one. This remark sparked speculation over whether Paris was implicitly signaling that it might refrain from acting in the event of a crisis in the contested seas. In reality, the comment was intended to maintain strategic ambiguity, reflecting a deliberately cautious stance that any response would depend entirely on the specific circumstances of the crisis — an approach shared by many nations.
On another point, Macron reaffirmed France's position on NATO, stressing that 'NA' stands for North Atlantic. He reiterated his opposition to turning the alliance into an Indo-Pacific actor, yet pointedly warned that if China refuses to take responsibility and fails to rein in North Korea's presence on European soil, it could open the door to NATO engagement in the region. Far from signaling a policy shift, the remark was rather intended to pressure Beijing into action.
Overall, the remarks underscored a strong continuity in France's approach to the Indo-Pacific and to China, reaffirming its pursuit of a balanced 'third way.' Macron paired blunt messaging toward Beijing with a deliberate effort to sustain top-level engagement. In March, France's foreign minister traveled to China. By May, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng was in Paris, Macron and Chinese leader Xi Jinping spoke by phone and France's defense minister met his Chinese counterpart, Dong Jun — whose absence from the summit did not go unnoticed.
Of course, France's approach comes with diplomatic friction. Macron's candor toward Beijing walks a fine line — sharp enough to show resolve yet calibrated to keep communication open. Some may see ambiguity on Taiwan or NATO as softness; others will recognize it as strategic restraint. Amid growing geopolitical strain, the ability to pair clear principles with nuanced diplomacy is a rare asset.
The long-game vision
Macron's speech may not have broken new ground, but it did something arguably more important: It offered a consistent alternative to the binary thinking gripping international politics. Strategic autonomy is often misunderstood as a retreat from alliances or neutrality; instead, it is a proposition for shared sovereignty among willing partners. In today's multipolar world, middle powers must not only hedge — they must lead. Macron's call for issue-based coalitions rooted in international law gives those countries a workable path forward.
In the end, Macron's Indo-Pacific messaging is less about immediate deliverables and more about shaping the long game. The challenge now is turning this vision into concrete action and influence — not just through high-level visits and dialogue, but through sustained, visible partnerships on the ground. The region is watching closely and will expect more than words.
Celine Pajon is Head of Japan and Indo-Pacific Research in Ifri's Center for Asian Studies.
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