The Baltics are building a defensive line against Russia. Can they do it fast enough?

Yahoo

07-04-2025

'From the first metre' is how Nato plans to fight a Russian invasion of the Baltic states.
At the crux of this plan is the 'Baltic Defence Line', Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's joint project to fortify a 600-mile stretch of their borders with Russia and Belarus, the most exposed part of Nato's eastern flank.
The core elements, first announced in January 2024, include 1,000 concrete bunkers – 600 in Estonia – paired with trenches, anti-tank ditches, ammunition depots and supply shelters.
Construction is moving at speed, but estimates suggest it could take a decade to complete. Baltic officials fear they are running out of time.
'Ten years is needed for us to prepare to face the Russian threat. Putin is not going to let us wait those 10 years,' warned Gabrielius Landsbergis, who served as Lithuania's foreign minister until November.
'The most dangerous time for the Baltics will be immediately after a ceasefire in Ukraine,' he said.
The small former Soviet states are keenly aware that Russia, with its economy already on a war footing, has laid out plans to ramp up military production and send additional troops to their borders in the event of a pause in the war in Ukraine.
And as security concerns mount, the countries announced last month they would withdraw from an international treaty banning anti-personnel landmines.
Poland and Finland have joined them. Lithuania also abandoned a cluster bomb treaty in March. They all say they want freedom of choice to use new weapons systems to counter the threat on their eastern borders.
The 'strategic message', according to Dovilė Šakalienė, Lithuania's defence minister, is that 'we are prepared to use absolutely everything' to defend against an invasion.
A recent Danish intelligence report stated that once the war stops or freezes in Ukraine, Russia will be able to rapidly re-arm, re-group and wage war on Nato.
It estimates that in six months, Moscow could 'fight a local war in a country bordering Russia'. In two years, it will 'be ready for a regional war against several countries in the Baltic Sea region'. In five, it will be able to fight 'a large-scale war' in Europe (without US involvement).
Nato, stirred by the catastrophic destruction in Ukraine and atrocities committed on civilians in occupied cities, signed a plan in 2023 to defend 'every inch' of the Baltics, with lines of reinforcement from Finland, Poland and Germany.
Currently, the alliance deploys battalion-sized multinational forces on a rotational basis in each Baltic state to act as a 'tripwire' defence strategy to deter Russia.
Latvia is defended by a Canadian-led international force, a German brigade safeguards Lithuania and around 1,000 British troops protect Estonia.
But Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius who fear a lightning invasion, want more: the 'tripwire' battlegroups replaced with combat-ready brigades and a permanent Nato presence.
In the first months of full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia managed to occupy up to 54,000 square miles – over twice the territory of Lithuania. About 6.5 to 7 million live in the Baltic states combined. By comparison, Ukraine had a pre-war population of 41 million.
'We lack the strategic depth. Russians could move through the whole country in hours, if not, days, this is why we defend from the first inch,' said Mr Landsbergis. 'Look at Ukraine and at their reconquered cities, what they took back was a wasteland.'
Put simply, the goal of the new defensive line is to prevent Baltic cities and towns suffering the same fate as those razed to the ground in Ukraine.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will each spend £60 million on it, a huge chunk of their defence budgets, which relative to GDP are the highest in Europe after Poland.
Mr Landsbergis said the message received from Nato was 'how much are you doing yourself before you ask for our help – when will you start digging trenches and mining your border?'
'We are there now. We are sending a message,' he said. 'I hope that we use every minute that the Ukrainians are giving us in order to prepare.'
Raimond Kaljulaid, the head of Estonia's delegation to Nato, said 'good progress' was being made on the defensive line.
'The Baltic states are doing this together, there is no alternative, we need to build strong regional cooperation,' he said.
In reference to the Baltic states decision to leave the 1997 Ottawa landmine treaty: 'We cannot fight Russia with one hand tied behind our backs,' he said. 'We must be able to hold the line, make sure Russia does not get inside but we must also be able to take the fight to the enemy.'
Pointing out how quickly Russia hardened its defensive positions, making counter-attacks near-impossible without a huge loss of life, Mr Kaljulaid added: 'It proves that war is not really about cyber, robots and drones, you need physical barriers, infrastructure on the ground.'
In the event of an invasion 'we will be able to fortify and man that line in a fast manner'.
As part of stage one, Latvia and Lithuania have already installed fields of concrete pyramids known as dragon's teeth to obstruct armoured vehicles along their borders.
In Estonia, its reinforced bunkers – which should withstand artillery strikes – have been tested and positions picked.
By autumn, the first stretch of what its military calls 'defensive strongpoints' will be completed, said the Estonia Centre for Defence Investments.
The country has also procured large quantities of different barrier wires, large 1.5-ton dragon's teeth and two-ton concrete 'Lego blocks', as well as T-wall roadblocks.
'This way, the defence forces, together with allies, can halt the adversary from the very first metres,' the spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said.
A major lesson from the high-attrition warfare in Ukraine has been the importance of deep defences and countering enemy mobility.
'The great advantage in modern warfare is defence,' said Michael DiCianna, a research fellow at the Institute for World Politics.
'New drones and satellite imagery have allowed persistent overhead surveillance in Ukraine. You always know the positions of the enemy,' he said.
'Manoeuvrable warfare is not dead, but has become drastically harder, so unmoveable fortifications take on new importance.'
But it would be wrong to compare the Baltic's new defensive line to the Maginot Line, the solid defence barriers built by France in the 1930s that failed to prevent a German invasion.
'It is not a wall or a solid line of fortifications, it is a more flexible, mobile and modern means of increasing defence and deterrence,' said Marta Kepe, a senior defence analyst at the Rand think tank.
The aim is to shape the invasion by channelling enemy forces into streams that can be attacked.
'It is another arrow in the quiver of Baltic defence that cannot operate passively on its own,' Ms Kepe cautioned, saying it will need to be paired with military and artillery units, advanced reconnaissance capabilities and early-warning systems.
Poland last year also began construction of its £1.9 billion 'East Shield' – a vast line of layered defence infrastructure and high-end surveillance systems along its border with Russia and Belarus. This month, its military said plans were under way to start mining its eastern frontier.
'Nato is pivoting its posture of 'deterrence by punishment' to 'deterrence by denial' by stopping the enemy at the border,' said Minna Alander, associate fellow at Chatham House's defence and security programme.
Amid concerns of receding US interest in European security, Ms Alander said the future of Baltic defence is hinged on what is left of the alliance.
Despite concerns, Karolis Aleksa, Lithuania's vice-minister for defence, is cautiously optimistic that the Baltic region is ready to withstand a Russian assault.
'We are ready right now to defend for the first centimetre, we have no other choice,' he said, describing the Baltic Defence Line as an 'integral part' of the country's defence plans.
Lithuania has added vulnerability to the other Baltic states as its hostile border includes the Russian military stronghold of Kaliningrad to its south west, adding 171 miles to its defensive problem.
The country of 2.8 million is also the principal defender of the Suwałki Gap, a narrow corridor between Lithuania and Poland that forms the shortest landbridge between Belarus and Kaliningrad.
Both Kaliningrad and the Suwałki Gap are considered a major liability that Russia could use to cut the Baltic states off from the rest of Europe by land and then blockade them from the sea.
However, Mr Aleksa said Finland and Sweden's joining Nato brought a 'better strategic picture' to the region, helping to turn the Baltic Sea into a so-called 'Nato lake'.
'Our goal is to deter first of all, the more we build now, the stronger the signal we will send to Russia,' he said. 'But we should be more ready. We need the defence strategy strengthened across Europe and Nato.'
Key areas that Lithuania, and indeed the region, are focused on are procuring air-defence systems – which are in short supply across Europe – and increasing their long-range strike capabilities.
However, beyond the threat of a Russian invasion, the Baltics are facing intensifying hybrid attacks from Russia.
Amid the Ukraine war, one of the most attractive fields for Russia to play in is in the shadows, in the grey zone,' Mr Aleksa said, citing acts of sabotage on undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, cyberattacks, and disinformation. 'We have to be resilient, we have to be better prepared.'
But will they be ready?
'It is a race against time,' Mr Kaljulaid, of Estonia's Nato delegation, said. 'One big question the Kremlin might ask is why give Europe time to re-arm, re-supply, organise their defence?
'We cannot discount the possibility that Russia will make a catastrophic miscalculation.'
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