
New Tariffs of Up to 50% Take Effect Worldwide, Impacting Nearly Everyone
Worldwide trade tariffs being implemented on a global scale. Key trading partners including the EU, Japan and South Korea were able to secure reduced rates of approximately 15% in last-minute negotiations. But others were hit hard: nations including Brazil and India faced maximum global tariffs at a whopping 50%. Several others, including Switzerland and Canada, were hit with significant tariffs on their goods; the tax on Swiss goods stands at 39%, and non USMCA compliant Canadian products are now at 35%.
These new import tariffs 2025 have increased fears about affectation as import costs rise, prices for consumers will probably follow. Economists have advised that the global economic impact of these measures will include a range of negative goods similar as disintegrated force chains, elided manufacturing exertion, and increased product costs.
World leaders and business directors are keeping a close eye on the fallout of this tariff hike news. Under pressure, several countries are considering joint responses or further negotiations. The landscape of international trade war updates is changing almost overnight, and the stakes in a trade war are being raised.
At the heart of these measures are significant shifts in U.S. trade policy, an aggressive trouble to remake global trade on its own terms. As the world adapts, one moping question remains can the global profitable impact of these changes be absorbed without major dislocation?

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Time of India
2 hours ago
- Time of India
Symbol of India-Russia ties takes a hard hit! How Russia-backed Indian refinery Nayara Energy is navigating a perfect storm - big hurdles challenge growth
Nayara Energy is responsible for approximately 8% of India's refining capacity and 7% of its retail fuel station network. (AI image) Nayara Energy, the Russia-backed Indian refinery, is facing a perfect storm - hit by European Union sanctions, currently faces multiple challenges: disrupted global shipping, domestic regulatory constraints, changes in leadership and concerns regarding digital infrastructure. Nayara Energy, responsible for approximately 8% of India's refining capacity and 7% of its retail fuel station network, these difficulties are testing both the company's adaptability and its future planning. Nayara Energy operates India's second-largest private refinery, alongside its oil storage terminal, port facilities, infrastructure and a network exceeding 6,000 petrol stations, according to an ET report. Its ambitious growth trajectory now faces significant uncertainty. EU sanctions impact on Nayara Energy On July 18, the EU implemented its 18th sanctions package against Russia, with restrictions on fuel imports refined from Russian crude, reducing the Russian oil price cap to $47.6 per barrel from $60 and addressing the shadow fleet involved in transportation. The price cap becomes effective September 3. Additionally, US President Donald Trump has imposed 50% duties on Indian imports, alleging India's support for Moscow's Ukrainian campaign through oil purchases. Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like This new air conditioner cools down a room in just seconds News of the Discovery Undo by Taboola by Taboola Also Read | Donald Trump tariffs: How much will India's fuel bill rise if it stops Russian crude oil imports & where would it buy from? Explained Despite avoiding direct sanctions, Nayara's substantial Russian ownership has resulted in progressive complications. Shortly after the latest EU sanctions were implemented, Alessandro Des Dorides stepped down as Nayara Energy's chief executive, with Sergey Denisov, a company veteran since 2017, taking the helm. On July 28, Nayara Energy faced a significant challenge when Microsoft blocked their access to data, tools and products, despite having valid paid licences. Although services were restored following legal action by Nayara, the incident highlighted the gravity of their situation. A trader with knowledge of the situation was quoted as saying, "Nayara's troubles have just begun. It is not only barred from exporting refined products to Europe, but fearing penalties, shipping companies are pulling back from transporting its products. Insurers and trade finance providers are wary." The source indicated this has limited the company's ability to service export markets in Europe, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa. According to Care Ratings' July assessment, exports represented 25-30% of Nayara's total revenue, with domestic Indian sales accounting for the remainder. Despite minimal direct EU exports, with most international sales occurring through traders serving various markets, Nayara is actively seeking alternative payment arrangements as EU sanctions loom. Reports suggest the company is looking to partner with a local bank to handle crude oil import payments and receive funds for refined fuel exports. Sanctions fallout Under the weight of sanctions, Rosneft has been unable to transfer profits from Nayara Energy in recent years. According to informed sources, this inability to move earnings from the company is considered a primary factor in its consideration to divest the Indian operation. The recent wave of sanctions has created additional obstacles to this process. Discussions have occurred with Indian business groups, with valuations exceeding $20 billion. In a parallel development, UCP Investment Group, a prominent Russian financial investment organisation, seeks to dispose of its Nayara Energy holding for more than $5 billion. This follows Trafigura's divestment of its 24.5% ownership to Hara Capital Sarl, a fully-owned subsidiary of Italian energy investment company Mareterra Group Holding, in January 2023. Industry experts suggest that sanctions could reduce Nayara's market value, potentially making it an appealing prospect for international investors. History of Nayara Energy In August 2017, following the acquisition of Essar Oil's 20-mtpa Vadinar refinery (Gujarat) by a Rosneft-led consortium, the entity was rebranded as Nayara Energy. The name combines 'Naya' (Hindi for new) and 'Era', reflecting the shareholders' aspirations for the asset's future development. The establishment of Nayara coincided with significant reforms in India's petroleum sector, where the government's deregulation of fuel retail prices created equal opportunities for private retailers like Nayara to expand their network, according to the ET report. This liberalisation caused considerable anxiety among state-operated oil marketing companies, which had previously maintained a stronghold over fuel retailing. Their primary concern was the potential loss of market share to private entities such as Nayara and Reliance Industries, the report said. Also Read | India-US trade deal: With Donald Trump's 50% tariffs looming, India reviews market access offers for US; three-pronged strategy to protect exporters Nayara has seen steady growth until it encountered difficulties from sanctions imposed by the United States and EU, aimed at targeting Russia following its Ukraine war. The company's oil and energy revenue has become particularly vulnerable. The acquisition of the Essar facility by Russia's state energy corporation and an international investor consortium comprising Trafigura and UCP Investment Group was valued at $12.9 billion. This represented Rosneft's most substantial overseas investment in India's refining industry, securing access to one of the world's rapidly expanding markets. Nayara Energy's focus on domestic market Nayara Energy has been compelled to focus on domestic markets due to international constraints. Recently, the company approached government-owned refineries, proposing to sell them its export-designated petrol and diesel quantities to avoid stockpiling. The shift towards domestic sales provides temporary respite but affects profitability. European markets traditionally yielded higher returns compared to domestic sales. Competition within India, particularly from government-owned fuel retailers, restricts pricing autonomy and adaptability. Also Read | Explainer: Donald Trump's 50% tariffs - will India budge on Russia crude oil trade? This situation emerged precisely when Nayara Energy was preparing for substantial expansion. The company had declared intentions to invest more than ₹70,000 crore in various sectors including petrochemicals, ethanol production facilities and retail infrastructure development. Since August 2017, it had already invested over ₹14,000 crore in Indian projects, encompassing refinery upgrades, a petrochemical facility and infrastructure developments. The sanctions now threaten to disrupt technical assistance from European technology providers, essential for refinery operations. The critical consideration remains whether Nayara can maintain its diversification strategy while its primary refining-export operations face challenges under western restrictions. Stay informed with the latest business news, updates on bank holidays , public holidays , current gold rate and silver price .


Economic Times
2 hours ago
- Economic Times
India inked 5 FTAs in past 5 years, negotiations on for a few more: Jitin Prasada apprises Parliament
Synopsis India has boosted its trade relations by signing five Free Trade Agreements. These agreements include deals with Mauritius, UAE, and Australia. Trade data shows mixed results, with growth in some sectors. India is also in talks for new agreements with several countries. Discussions are underway with the EU, Australia, Sri Lanka, and the United States. ANI Jitin Prasada, Minister of State for Commerce and Industry India has strengthened its trade ties over the past five years, signing five major Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and progressing on several new deals, Minister of State for Commerce and Industry Jitin Prasada informed the Rajya Sabha in a written reply this member Jebi Mather Hisham asked the Minister to apprise the House about the number of international trade agreements that have been signed by India in the last five years, besides details of their agreements inked over the past 5 years include the India-Mauritius Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA) implemented in 2021, the India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and the India-Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) in 2022, the India-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) in 2024, and the India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) signed in 2025, which is yet to come into data shared by the Union Minister shows mixed the India-Australia ECTA, exports grew 14 per cent in 2023-24 and 8 per cent in 2024-25, though the trade balance remained negative in both the latest fiscals. The Mauritius trade deal maintained a consistent trade surplus, while trade with the UAE recorded significant growth in both exports and imports, primarily driven by petroleum products. A widening deficit has been noticed vis-a-vis the India-UAE FTA, core imports in 2024-2025 included Petroleum: Crude, Petroleum Products, and other related commodities. India's exports of agricultural products and pharmaceuticals have registered growth."Additionally, the FTA has also led to a significant growth in Foreign Direct Investment," the minister said in his India-European Union Free Trade Association (EFTA) Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) is expected to be implemented later this year once all parties complete their ratification India has concluded negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Oman, and is in advanced talks for several other agreements, including the India-EU FTA, India-Australia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), India-Sri Lanka Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement, India-Peru FTA, India-Chile CEPA, India-New Zealand FTA, and a bilateral trade agreement with the United India is reviewing and upgrading older trade pacts such as the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (2009) and the India-Korea CEPA (2009).


Indian Express
6 hours ago
- Indian Express
How Israel's Gaza war has thrown future of IMEC up in the air
Earlier this week, India's National Security Council Secretariat hosted envoys and officials from the United States, UAE, Saudi Arabia, France, Italy, Germany, Israel, Jordan and the European Union, to discuss progress on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The IMEC was announced during the G20 Summit held in New Delhi in 2023 'to stimulate economic development through enhanced connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe.' The IMEC comprises two corridors — India-Gulf and Gulf-Europe. Its eastern leg will carry container traffic from India's western ports to the UAE, from where high speed freight railway will carry goods across the Arabian peninsula (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan) uptil the port of Haifa in Israel. The second leg will see cargo being shipped from Haifa to ports in Greece and Italy, from where Europe's well-established train networks will take goods to their final destinations across the continent. Overall, the IMEC is expected to cut shipping time from India to Europe by about 40% when compared to the Red Sea route. But since being announced, progress has been limited. What are the corridor's ambitions? What are some key challenges it faces? And what is its future? Sound idea born in rare geopolitical window In September 2023, during India's G20 Presidency, the IMEC's conceptualisation and agreement was a testament to a remarkable period of stability in the Middle East. Years of conflict along ideological and geopolitical lines (Qatar-GCC, Iran-Saudi Arabia, Arab states-Israel) had given way to normalisation agreements and rapprochements that prioritised regional economic growth. The Arab normalisation with Israel, which Saudi Arabia was set to join, was yielding enough geo-economic gains for Arab states to overlook the Palestine question and perhaps even explore minilateral arrangements with Israel (on the lines of the I2U2 with India). This rare geopolitical window allowed India and its Middle Eastern, American, and European partners to envision a new corridor between India and Europe. The economic underpinnings of the idea remain firm. The EU is India's largest trading partner with bilateral trade in FY 2023-24 at $137.41 billion, and non-oil trade between India, the UAE and Saudi Arabia has increased significantly in recent years. The IMEC itself was meant to be more than a trade corridor. Its implementing partners would lay cables for 'electricity and digital connectivity', pipes for 'clean hydrogen export', to 'increase efficiencies, reduce costs, enhance economic unity, generate jobs, and lower greenhouse gas emissions.' From the perspective of trade facilitation and accessibility, the IMEC was meant to address several issues that continue to persist till date, including no corridor-wide tariff standardisation and low financial integration among corridor partners, lack of corridor-wide insurance, and widely differing port capacities. The ambitious cross-Saudi/UAE railway meant to transit goods between the corridor's sea-legs was also significantly under-developed. However, these presented benign modality and sustainability challenges which could be mitigated through commitment and investment from all stakeholders. Indeed, in September 2023, participants explicitly agreed to meet within sixty days 'to develop and commit to an action plan with relevant timetables.' Less than a month later, the Middle East plunged into an unprecedented conflict that continues till date, and the intended stakeholder meeting never occurred. Gaza poses fundamental challenges The underlying economic logic of the IMEC remains. However, its challenges have evolved from reconcilable to fundamental. The single most important issue is Israel's increasingly unpopular war on Gaza, which has killed at least 61,000 people thus far. The IMEC's cornerstone is the 'Middle East-Europe' connection, between Jordan and Israel. Unlike in 2023, Jordan-Israel relations are presently at a significant low, and are worsening due to the Israeli-American push for Jordan to absorb more of the Palestinian population. Similarly, the potential for Saudi-Israel normalisation is much lower today than in 2023. Riyadh has doubled down on the need for Israeli concessions towards Palestine while Israel's appetite to concede a Palestinian state is at a historic low. In fact, Israel is presently focused on formally re-occupying and potentially re-settling the Gaza Strip, despite intensifying global opposition. The direct downstream impact of Israel's seemingly endless war is the worsening of even those challenges which could be mitigated through reconciled trade practices between stakeholders. For instance, while the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping (which carries the bulk of Europe's trade) vindicated the need for the IMEC as a more secure alternative, the expansion of Israel's war (into Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and with Iran) bodes high insurance premiums for any trade transiting the region. That said, the corridor remains vital for Israel even as it continues to hinder its implementation. For Israel, the IMEC represents the pinnacle of its economic integration into a region where it has historically fought for acceptance and recognition. In September, 2024, Benjamin Netanyahu held up a map at the UN showing states on the IMEC route as 'blessed' with those in Iran's Axis as 'cursed' — reflecting the IMEC's role as an invaluable adhesive to bind Israel with the Arab world, minus Palestine. While the western leg of the corridor is unlikely to materialise in the near future, the IMEC's eastern leg benefits from the strategic partnerships that India has forged with the Arab states. While India's economic and strategic relationship with the UAE has the most depth, India is Saudi Arabia's second largest trading partner and both states have had a strategic partnership since 2010. These partnerships have yielded several instruments to bolster connectivity. For instance, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi both also allow the use of UPI for fund transfers and remittance payments, improving the potential for digital connectivity along the IMEC route. Consequently, for India, progress on the IMEC corridor is very much possible. This is despite internecine issues between Arab states over trade modalities. The Saudi need to undercut the Emirati economic dominance of the region continues. For example, in 2021, Riyadh imposed new tariffs specifically on those GCC states that have 'free zones' offering preferential tax and customs treatments. Objectively, this is standard economic competition between two Gulf powerhouses competing for influence and investments. But for a broader corridor that requires a common vision, this is a strong hindrance. In the long term, for the IMEC to be realised in its originally envisioned form, a secure and stable Middle East is an imperative. This implies that if the IMEC was seen as the fruit of the region's unprecedented stability in 2023, the regional architecture that brought about this stability will have to be recreated. Since that architecture failed to endure, it is now evident that as long as principal issues such as that of Palestinian statehood are not addressed, any regional connectivity plan will inevitably be susceptible to renewed conflict. Global recognition of the unsustainability of Israel's war is now apparent with more Western states both recognising the Palestinian state as well as reconsidering the terms of their support to Israel. Germany's decision to halt weapons shipments that Israel can use in Gaza, in response to Israel considering a broader re-occupation of the Strip, is a case in point. Given both its scale and scope, the IMEC is essentially now a 'day-after' plan — waiting for the resolution of the Middle East's oldest conflict. Until then, efforts like the August meeting in New Delhi can only focus on modalities and trade facilitation, with implementation being contingent on conflict resolution. Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi