Postwar Liberia still struggles with corruption and impunity
On 23 April, Liberia's supreme court affirmed the legitimacy of the Speaker of the House of Representatives Jonathan Fonati Koffa. This followed months of legislative impasse and political crisis triggered by rival legislators' vote to remove Koffa over alleged budget manipulations, overruns and a conflict of interest involving his law firm and government agencies.
The legislators, forming the 'Majority Bloc', had voted to elect Richard Koon to replace Koffa. They alleged that Koffa's office overspent its allocation of about $1.5-million by more than $4-million in 2022 and about $3-million in 2023. These amounts, they said, could not be accounted for.
The situation disrupted legislative business, provoking protests and apparently causing fires to be set in the Capitol Building. Importantly, it highlights the country's struggle to break from one of the direct causes of its 1989-2003 civil war – corruption and impunity – and the need for renewed and sustained anti-corruption efforts.
Among the key objectives of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the conflict, was combating corruption and institutionalising good governance. These were reinforced by recommendations of the truth and reconciliation commission, and successive postwar governments have – at least officially – made them key components of their governance agenda.
Key among the several steps taken to achieve these objectives were establishing the Governance Commission in 2007, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission in 2008 and the General Auditing Commission in 2014.
In 2022, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission Act was amended to grant direct prosecutorial powers to the commission, in addition to passing a Whistleblower Act and the Witness Protection Act to facilitate public reporting of corrupt acts.
In April 2024, the legislature voted to approve President Joseph Boakai's proposal to set up a War and Economic Crimes Court to prosecute perpetrators of serious abuses committed during the civil war.
Notwithstanding these efforts, Liberia remains haunted by entrenched corruption, consistently ranking close to the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Its score has been less than 40 and has declined since 2013.
Institute for Security Studies interviews with several stakeholders point to a culture of political patronage and lack of political will to ensure criminal accountability for corruption. Institutional weakness – and often dysfunctionality – is also among the causal factors that have transcended various governments.
These deep-seated challenges were acknowledged in 2016 by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia's first postwar president, but have since persisted. She noted that her government had 'not fully met the anti-corruption pledge… because of the intractability of dependency and dishonesty cultivated from years of deprivation and poor governance'. A succession of corruption scandals rocked her government, including those emanating from General Auditing Commission investigations, but for which there were no prosecutions.
George Weah, who succeeded Sirleaf, faced immense public unease following several scandals involving his appointees. Like in the Sirleaf era, public appointments based on political connections and personal relations under Weah meant appointees were not prosecuted for corruption. Yet some stakeholders still argued that corruption under Weah became insidious and accounted for his electoral defeat in November 2023.
In August 2022, for instance, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Liberian government officials Nathaniel McGill, Sayma Syrenius Cephus and Bill Twehway for graft. Former finance minister Samuel Tweah was also sanctioned in December 2023 alongside two senators and Monrovia's mayor, Jefferson Koijee, for involvement in corruption and, in Koijee's case, human rights abuses.
None of these cases resulted in prosecutions, a situation that has drawn criticism of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission for failing to exercise its prosecutorial powers. However, it reflects the resource and capacity constraints and lack of political and fiscal independence faced by the commission and other anti-corruption institutions, particularly the General Auditing Commission.
Much like his predecessors, Boakai has sought to strike the right tone by promising to fight corruption. In February he suspended more than 450 government officials, including the health and education ministers and high-ranking state institution officials. They were accused of undermining 'national efforts to combat corruption and ensure accountability' by failing to declare assets as required by law.
Yet, the president has been criticised for being selective and politically motivated by suspending certain officials for corrupt acts while leaving others with the same allegations untouched.
Boakai's anti-corruption agenda also faces other challenges. His appointment of Jonathan Massaquoi to head the Office of the War and Economic Crimes Court – the body mandated to prepare the legal grounds for the court's establishment – sparked controversy over Massaquoi's previous legal representation of Agnes Taylor, wife of convicted former president Charles Taylor.
Rooting out corruption and institutionalising good governance remains a vital postwar imperative. Doing so requires far more than setting up anti-corruption frameworks. Stakeholders must tackle the culture of patronage, promote criminal accountability for corrupt acts and remove political and resource impediments to institutional effectiveness.
The current political crisis, rooted in allegations of corruption, also offers a unique opportunity for Liberia to take stock of its good governance and anti-corruption progress and renew its efforts. DM
Sampson Kwarkye, project manager for Littoral West African States, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel.
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Daily Maverick
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IOL News
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Qatar Brokered DRC Peace Deal a Bittersweet Moment for Africa
Qatar's chief negotiator Mohammed al-Khulaifi (centre) observes peace mediator Sumbu Sita Mambu, a high representative of the head of state in the Democratic Republic of Congo (left) and Rwanda-backed armed group M23 executive secretary Benjamin Mbonimp (right as they sign a ceasefire deal in Doha on July 19, 2025. Image: AFP Dr. Sizo Nkala The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the rebel group, M23, signed a Declaration of Principles in Support of a Pathway to a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 19th of July under the mediation of Qatar. The DRC government forces and the M23 have been locked in an armed conflict in eastern DRC since 2021. The conflict intensified at the beginning of 2025, which saw the M23 rebels, allegedly supported by Rwanda, go on the offensive and seize huge swathes of territory, including the major cities of Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces, respectively, including two major airports. About 7000 people have reportedly lost their lives, and over a million more have suffered displacement as a result of the escalation. The latest agreement is a major step towards the resolution of a conflict that has defied continental and regional diplomatic and military intervention. The DRC President, Felix Tshisekedi, had vowed never to meet with the M23 leaders. Both the Luanda and Nairobi processes failed to bring the two parties under one roof for negotiations. According to the agreement, the two parties agreed to commit to a permanent ceasefire that will see the cessation of attacks, curbing of hate propaganda, and a freeze on seizing new territories. A verification mechanism will be set up to help with the implementation of the ceasefire. The parties further agreed to an exchange of prisoners and detainees, restoration of state authority over the entire DRC territory, the safe return of displaced people, and protecting the civilian population in cooperation with the United Nations mission. Most importantly, the warring parties undertook to participate in direct negotiations for a peace agreement on the 8th of August with a view to reaching and signing a comprehensive agreement by the 18th of August. Such an agreement would be in line with the terms of the peace deal signed at the end of June between the DRC and Rwanda in Washington. The latest agreement was necessary for the Washington deal to work. Some of the terms of the document signed in Washington included a cessation of hostilities; demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of members of rebel groups in the DRC security forces, and the setting up of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism within 30 days. The purpose of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism is to monitor and verify the disarmament and demobilisation of the rebel groups. The 30-day deadline for its set-up is almost up. While the negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 may, in their own way, take the peace process forward, the necessity of an agreement between them coming after the deal between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda is debatable. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ It is one of the worst-kept secrets that the Rwandan government, led by President Paul Kagame, is the principal of the M23. Reports by the United Nations have confirmed that the Rwandan government is not only funding but also sending its forces to fight alongside the M23 in eastern DRC. As such, Rwanda's signing of the Washington peace deal with the DRC government in June left the M23 with no other option but to toe the line of its benefactor. Hence, these negotiations feel like a duplication. These rather damp-squib negotiations may serve the purpose of perpetuating the illusion that the M23 is an independent entity. The M23 itself had mounted a weak protest against the Washington peace deal, saying that they would not observe or respect an agreement they were not party to. Further, this new layer of negotiations does little to lessen the formidable challenges of implementing a peace deal in the DRC. There is still no credible enforcement mechanism for a ceasefire or disarmament and demobilisation process. The absence of a transparent and effective enforcement mechanism will put the warring parties in a prisoners' dilemma scenario where the most rational action would be non-cooperation. The lack of trust and the mutual hatred between the leaders of the two camps will be an issue that will undermine compliance with the terms of the deal. Previous ceasefire agreements have not been able to stop the two sides from attacking each other. There are no assurances that this one is going to be an exception. Importantly, the latest developments beg the question as to why Qatar, a small state in the Middle East, was able to accomplish what the African Union-sanctioned Luanda process and the East African Community-sanctioned Nairobi process found frustratingly elusive. Why is it that the DRC government and the M23 were willing to sit around the negotiating table in Doha and not in Luanda or Nairobi? How was a continental body with 54 member states representing 1.5 billion people upstaged and outshone by a country of less than 3 million people? These questions make this development a bittersweet moment. While the prospects of real peace in eastern DRC are certainly a cause for celebration, it is troubling that the AU seemingly has less gravitas than Qatar. * Dr. Sizo Nkala is a Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg's Centre for Africa-China Studies. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
