Malaysian sports minister wants football clubs to be run better so investment will flow in
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Youth and Sports Minister Hannah Yeoh said the failure of some domestic clubs to manage fundamental responsibilities, such as paying salaries, has probably undermined efforts to attract and retain sponsors to support Malaysia's football development, state news agency Bernama reported.
'Football has a large audience, which is why I believe that to convince sponsors, all they want to see is how a club is run, how they pay salaries or look after the welfare of players,' Yeoh was quoted as saying.
'I urge that those who are not capable should not touch it – let others take over. Sometimes, there are those who cannot manage but still want to hold on to power, preventing others from stepping in.'
Hannah Yeoh says there are managers 'who cannot manage but still want to hold on to power'. Photo: Handout
Malaysian football has suffered financial hardships in recent years, leading to some clubs being penalised, relegated or withdrawing from the league. The Professional Footballers Association of Malaysia has said many professional clubs struggle to pay salaries on time.
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AllAfrica
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AllAfrica
2 days ago
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ASEAN must therefore find ways to reframe these exercises so that they contribute to security without heightening tensions. Indonesia offers an instructive model. Its naval exercises often incorporate humanitarian dimensions—disaster relief simulations, search and rescue drills and medical evacuation scenarios. These activities are not only less confrontational but also deeply relevant in a region prone to typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis. A naval fleet preparing to save lives, rather than just project power, demonstrates tangible value to the public and fosters habits of cooperation even among rival navies. If ASEAN could institutionalize such humanitarian exercises, it would transform the narrative of naval presence. Exercises would still hone skills and display readiness, but they would also build trust and confidence across divides. Humanitarian drills provide a rare platform for Chinese, American, and ASEAN naval personnel to interact in non-hostile settings—a confidence-building measure often missing in the security domain. The South China Sea is more than a theater of rivalry. It is the artery through which one-third of global trade flows. Energy supplies from the Middle East to Northeast Asia pass through its waters, as do critical components in the global supply chain. For ASEAN, the stakes are existential. Stability in the South China Sea underpins not just sovereignty but economic survival. This makes ASEAN centrality not an abstract diplomatic slogan but a structural necessity. Without ASEAN as a convener, the South China Sea risks becoming a playground for external powers. ASEAN's role must be to insist on inclusive, rule-based management of disputes while ensuring its member states do not become pawns in a wider geopolitical contest. The challenge now is to convert these principles into practice. A binding Code of Conduct is the first step, but it must be complemented by habits of quiet diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation. All sides—including the US, China, Australia and Japan—must recognize that loud, combative postures are counterproductive. Quiet diplomacy does not erase differences, but it prevents those differences from erupting into clashes. The tragedy of the South China Sea is that a miscalculation—an accidental collision, an overzealous response—could spiral into a wider, devastating conflict. The antidote is not megaphone diplomacy but patient, discreet engagement. As Anwar has argued, the best order for ASEAN is one that is calm, quiet and unassuming. Behind the quietness lies strength: the ability to channel disputes into dialogue, to manage competition without catastrophe, and to build resilience through cooperation. Avoiding more clashes in the South China Sea, like those between China and the Philippines, is not a matter of silencing legitimate concerns but of addressing them with composure. A legally binding Code of Conduct, paired with discreet diplomacy and humanitarian naval cooperation, offers ASEAN and its partners the best chance of preserving stability. The world must recognize that the South China Sea is not simply contested territory; it is a shared lifeline. Protecting it requires not bravado but balance through quiet strength. In the end, it is the art of silence—disciplined, deliberate and purposeful—that may prove to be ASEAN's most powerful tool in ensuring peace on the open seas. Phar Kim Beng is professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and director of the Institute of Internationalization and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS).
RTHK
07-08-2025
- RTHK
Asean to monitor Thai-Cambodian ceasefire
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