Japan Should Avoid Solely Relying on U.S., Engage in Global Diplomacy; Strong Ties with Like-Minded Nations is Vital
Shotaro Yachi
Shotaro Yachi, former secretary general of the National Security Secretariat, said in an interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun that Japan should not rely solely on the United States, but instead increasingly reach out to build stronger ties with other like-minded nations.
The following is excerpted from Yachi's remarks in an interview conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer Yuta Abe.
***
Tariffs have been used as a tool intended to resolve trade and economic disputes since the 19th century. The international community became divided into economic blocks through the imposition of high tariffs during the period between World War I and World War II. We must deal with contemporary problems by learning lessons from those bitter experiences.
Japan has constantly championed free trade. Continuing the free flow of trade will also benefit nations around the world. During negotiations with the United States over its tariff measures, adopting an approach of seeking respite [from the levies] only for Japan is not the way to go.
Japan has been instrumental in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which the United States has pulled out. Many nations feel they could be left in a tight spot unless Japan exercises leadership in the political and economic realms. It should be possible to search for areas of cooperation between TPP member nations and the European Union.
With regard to the United States, sincerely dealing with issues raised by President Donald Trump will be crucial. This means not sidestepping these issues or attempting to divert attention to other matters. Instead, Japan must face up to these issues head-on and directly explain Japan's position and circumstances. Trump likes making deals and prizes tangible benefits, so Japan will need to conduct sensible discussions grounded in reality.
Take, for instance, the purchase of defense equipment from the United States. Japan should not take up this idea simply to eliminate the trade deficit. Buying such hardware from the United States during the process of strengthening Japan's defense capabilities might, in the end, become a useful bargaining chip to some extent, but our thinking must be that we purchase items Japan needs. The nation's contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. military forces in Japan is already above the international standard.
In a bid to bolster Japan's defense capabilities, the government plans to increase its expenditure on security-related costs, including defense spending, to 2% of gross domestic product. Even if the nation ultimately exceeds that figure, it should not initially set out to reach 3% as a given, as some officials in the U.S. government have demanded.
The United States still possesses the world's most powerful military and strongest economy. However, it is undeniable that other countries will start to catch up, and U.S. national power and international standing is declining in relative terms. The United States also might have grown tired of providing a giant market for other countries and shouldering the burden of defending those nations.
As we look at the international situation, Japan should not stick to the conventional 'U.S.-centric approach' that assumed everything would be fine provided it stayed on good terms with Washington. Instead, Japan needs to start reaching out more to other nations. While the premise that the Japan-U.S. alliance remains the foundation of Japan's diplomacy remains, it is vital that Japan builds strong relations with like-minded European nations, Australia, India, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and countries of the Global South. This would be in line with the 'diplomacy with a global perspective' advocated by the cabinet of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Shotaro Yachi
Yachi, 81, completed his master's degree at the University of Tokyo. He joined the Foreign Ministry in 1969 and held posts including head of the Foreign Policy Bureau and vice foreign minister before being appointed as the first secretary general of the National Security Secretariat, an entity launched in 2014 during the second administration of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He held that role until 2019. Yachi currently is chairman of the Fujitsu Future Studies Center think tank.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Diplomat
14 hours ago
- The Diplomat
‘Stable Instability': China-Japan Dilemmas in the Shadow of Sino-American Rivalry
Three enduring dilemmas define the complex relationship between Asia's two largest economies as they mark the 80th anniversary of World War II's end. Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (left) meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru, Nov. 15, 2024. As Asia-Pacific nations grapple with an increasingly complex security environment, Japan and China find themselves locked in what can be described as 'stable instability' – a relationship characterized by sustained economic engagement alongside persistent political mistrust and security tensions. This paradoxical state has become the defining feature of bilateral relations between Asia's two largest economies, particularly as they commemorate the 80th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II in 2025. Despite strong economic ties, with bilateral trade reaching $292.6 billion in 2024, China-Japan relations remain strained by geopolitical disputes, wartime history, and territorial issues. This economic interdependence coexists uneasily with deep-seated public mistrust and strategic competition, creating a relationship that defies simple categorization as either cooperative or adversarial. Understanding this complex dynamic requires examining three structural dilemmas that have come to define contemporary China-Japan relations. These enduring challenges reveal why the relationship has settled into its current state of stable instability and what this means for regional security and prosperity. Interdependence vs Security: The First Dilemma The first dilemma centers on the tension between economic interdependence and security vulnerabilities. Japan and China have developed one of the world's most extensive economic relationships, with deeply integrated supply chains spanning automotive parts, semiconductor materials, and consumer electronics. China remains Japan's largest trading partner, a position that has persisted despite periodic political tensions and calls for economic decoupling. However, this economic intimacy has increasingly become a source of strategic anxiety rather than just mutual benefit. The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' as described by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in their seminal work on how global economic networks shape state coercion, perfectly captures this dilemma. Dependencies on critical materials, advanced technologies, and production networks that once represented pure economic efficiency now carry potential security risks and political leverage. Japan's concerns have been amplified by China's use of economic tools for political purposes, such as restrictions on Japanese seafood imports following the Fukushima wastewater release. China announced in June this year that it would resume imports of some Japanese seafood products that had been suspended due to the discharge of treated water from Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, but seafood from 10 prefectures, including Fukushima, remains subject to import bans. Such incidents underscore how economic relationships can quickly become instruments of political pressure. This dynamic has led Japan to pursue what it terms 'economic security' – a policy framework formally integrated into its 2022 National Security Strategy. The strategy defines Japan's economic security as ensuring 'Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures,' reflecting a recognition that economic and security considerations can no longer be separated. The challenge lies in maintaining the benefits of economic cooperation while mitigating the vulnerabilities that come with interdependence. Neither complete decoupling nor naive trust represents a viable path forward, forcing both nations to navigate an uncomfortable middle ground where economic collaboration must coexist with strategic hedging. Alliance Strengthening vs Regional Leadership: The Second Dilemma Japan's second structural dilemma involves balancing its deepening alliance with the United States against its aspirations to play a constructive role in regional stability. This tension has been thrown into sharp relief by Japan's dramatic defense transformation, outlined in this same 2022 National Security Strategy and accompanying documents. The National Security Strategy pledges to increase defense spending from roughly 1 percent of GDP to 2 percent by fiscal year 2027 and calls for Japan's armed forces to acquire counterstrike missile capabilities. These changes represent the most significant shift in Japan's defense posture since World War II, effectively moving beyond the constraints of purely defensive capabilities. From China's perspective, these developments appear to confirm fears of Japan's participation in the U.S.-led containment strategy. The East China Sea remains a flashpoint due to territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu in China, with China's growing military presence raising concerns in Tokyo. Recent incidents, including a Chinese JH-7 fighter-bomber flying within 30 meters of a Japanese intelligence aircraft in July 2025, illustrate how quickly tensions can escalate. Yet Japan simultaneously seeks to position itself as a responsible stakeholder in the regional order. Through initiatives like the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) and its engagement with ASEAN, Japan attempts to demonstrate that its enhanced defense capabilities serve regional stability rather than destabilization. Recent diplomatic initiatives, including the meeting between Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during ASEAN-related foreign ministers' meetings in Malaysia on July 10, suggest both sides recognize the need for dialogue even amid strategic competition. This balancing act reflects Japan's broader strategic challenge: how to fulfill alliance commitments while maintaining the flexibility to engage constructively with all regional stakeholders. The Trump administration's unpredictable approach to China adds another layer of complexity, as Japan seeks to influence how China-U.S. competition develops while emphasizing to Washington that Japan cannot completely sever ties with its largest neighbor and trading partner. Mutual Understanding vs Emotional Reactions: The Third Dilemma The third dilemma involves the growing disconnect between the imperative for mutual understanding and the emotional polarization amplified by digital media. Social media algorithms and online echo chambers have created information environments that often prioritize sensationalism over nuance, making thoughtful dialogue more difficult even as its importance grows. Public opinion data reveals the depth of this challenge. Japanese surveys consistently show that those who feel 'no affinity' toward China significantly outnumber those who think positively about the relationship. Today, 84.7 percent of Japanese respondents express that they 'do not feel close' to China – a dramatic reversal from the early post-normalization period, when favorable sentiment reached nearly 80 percent. This shift reflects not just policy disagreements but the accumulation of negative impressions reinforced by digital media consumption patterns. The problem extends beyond public opinion to the operational level of crisis management. While a China-Japan defense hotline was established in 2023, its effectiveness remains untested in severe crises. The rapid pace of military encounters in the East China Sea, where split-second decisions can escalate tensions, demands robust communication mechanisms backed by mutual trust, precisely what remains in short supply. Paradoxically, people-to-people exchanges have shown resilience. Tourism and educational exchanges have rebounded from pandemic lows, with China easing its stance on various issues, including the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish and the reinstatement of visa-free entry. However, these positive developments at the societal level have not translated into improved political relations or reduced strategic mistrust. The challenge is compounded by the reality that both governments face domestic political pressures that reward tough rhetoric toward the other country. With Japan's House of Councillors election having taken place in July 2025, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru continues to face constraints, given that the majority of the Japanese population is critical of China. Similar dynamics operate in China, where nationalist sentiment limits leaders' flexibility in making concessions. Embracing 'Stable Instability': The Art of Perpetual Management These three dilemmas illustrate why China-Japan relations have settled into their current pattern of stable instability. Rather than representing a temporary phase that will eventually resolve into clear cooperation or confrontation, this may be the enduring character of the relationship – one that requires constant management rather than definitive resolution. As reflected in their November 2024 meeting, Ishiba and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed that Japan and China continue to share a broad direction of comprehensively promoting a 'Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests' and building 'constructive and stable Japan-China relations.' The 80th anniversary of World War II's end provides a symbolic opportunity for both nations to demonstrate mature leadership, but the structural factors driving stable instability remain powerful. Success will likely depend on both countries' ability to compartmentalize different aspects of their relationship. Economic cooperation, climate change mitigation, pandemic preparedness, and cultural exchange can proceed even when security competition continues. Recent examples include the renewal of the bilateral currency swap deal worth 200 billion yuan (about $28.13 billion) and a Japanese business delegation visiting China for the first time since 2019. The path forward requires acknowledging that China-Japan relations exist in a multipolar context where neither country can afford to view the other purely through the lens of bilateral dynamics. Regional institutions, global challenges, and third-party relationships all shape the bilateral relationship in ways that create both constraints and opportunities. Rather than seeking to resolve the fundamental tensions that define the relationship, both countries might be better served by establishing mechanisms to manage these tensions constructively. This means strengthening crisis communication channels, maintaining economic dialogue even during periods of political dispute, and creating space for civil society exchanges that can withstand periodic government tensions. The concept of stable instability, uncomfortable as it may be, offers a more realistic framework for understanding China-Japan relations than expectations of either strategic partnership or inevitable conflict. In an era of growing global complexity, managing such relationships may be among the most essential diplomatic skills both nations can develop. As Japan and China navigate the remainder of 2025, their ability to demonstrate that major powers can maintain stable relationships despite fundamental differences will have implications far beyond Northeast Asia. In a world increasingly characterized by multiple centers of power and persistent areas of competition, the China-Japan model of stable instability may prove more relevant than traditional notions of either alliance or rivalry.
Japan Times
19 hours ago
- Japan Times
80 years on: Tokyo prospers while local revitalization still insufficient
After its devastation in World War II, Tokyo saw a rapid population inflow in the 1960s on the back of Japan's strong economic recovery, and some 14 million people now live in the Japanese capital. Meanwhile, the Japanese government in fiscal 2015 started to work on a comprehensive strategy for local revitalization to help stem depopulation in regional areas and rev up their economies. As the population concentration in Tokyo has accelerated since then, however, the government began to take a different approach in the current fiscal 2025 in anticipation of a population decline. Experts stress the importance of setting up a system in which industrial resources are circulated locally in order to create a sustainable society. World War II claimed the lives of about 3.1 million people, including civilians. Large cities were hit by heavy air raids by the Allied powers, and the population of Tokyo fell to 3.49 million in 1945, when the war ended, from 7.35 million in 1940. After the postwar turmoil subsided, Japan entered a period of strong economic expansion, backed by the growth of steelmakers, machinery makers and other heavy industries. Industrial cities that were scattered around the country gradually declined, while functions to control factories that mass-produce automobiles, household appliances and other products were concentrated in urban cities. According to internal affairs ministry data based on the basic resident register, the Tokyo metropolitan area logged a record net population inflow of 388,000 in 1962. Other areas recorded a net population decrease of 651,000 in 1961. As urban overcrowding became a problem, the second cabinet of then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda drew up a plan in 1962 to promote the relocation of factories to regional areas. Economic turmoil caused by the oil crises in the 1970s and the collapse of the speculation-driven bubble economy in the early 1990s temporarily curbed population inflows into urban areas. Naohiko Jinno, honorary professor at the University of Tokyo, said: "The oil crises were a warning that the era of the heavy industries was over. However, Japan did not change its industrial structure, with companies moving their factories overseas in search of cheap labor and control functions being concentrated in Tokyo as a result." In fiscal 2015, the cabinet of then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched a regional revitalization program featuring measures to promote migrations to regional areas in an effort to halt the concentration in Tokyo and a drop in Japan's population. But the situation is serious. According to the internal affairs ministry, Japan's population stood at 120.65 million as of January this year, down by 900,000 from a year before. Of Japan's 47 prefectures, only Tokyo continues to enjoy population growth. A senior Cabinet Secretariat official said, "We may not have faced up to the scenario that the country's population would decrease so rapidly." Learning lessons from this, the government of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba adopted in June this year a basic concept for the Regional Revitalization 2.0 initiative. Measures in the initiative will be implemented over the next 10 years to make sure that local communities continue to exist even if the population continues to decline. Through the initiative, the government aims to double the proportion of young people moving out of the Tokyo area to rural areas and increase the connected population, or nonresidents who steadily interact with regional areas, to a total of 100 million. Jinno said, "People who know well about their own communities must think about how to develop the areas," rather than attracting factories that have nothing to do with the regions. "The risk of war will become very high if confrontations between countries increase and military buildups create a very tense situation," Jinno said, expressing concern over countries' possible tilting to the right. "Life will be threatened by global events unless each region creates a society in which life and industries circulate," he warned.
2 days ago
80 Years On: Tokyo Prospers While Local Revitalization Still Insufficient
News from Japan Society Aug 17, 2025 14:24 (JST) Tokyo, Aug. 17 (Jiji Press)--After its devastation in World War II, Tokyo saw a rapid population inflow in the 1960s on the back of Japan's strong economic recovery, and some 14 million people now live in the Japanese capital. Meanwhile, the Japanese government in fiscal 2015 started to work on a comprehensive strategy for local revitalization to help stem depopulation in regional areas and rev up their economies. As the population concentration in Tokyo has accelerated since then, however, the government began to take a different approach in the current fiscal 2025 in anticipation of a population decline. An expert stresses the importance of setting up a system in which industrial resources are circulated locally in order to create a sustainable society. [Copyright The Jiji Press, Ltd.] Jiji Press
