How South Korea's ‘MASGA' Proposal Could Reshape US Shipbuilding

The Diplomat

5 days ago

South Korea offered in trade negotiations to 'Make American Shipbuilding Great Again.' It could mark a new phase for the alliance.
When the United States threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on South Korean exports in mid-2025, the dispute appeared set to become another flashpoint in the alliance, highlighting the current U.S. administration's transactional approach to both trade and security. The stakes were high: tariffs at that level would have disrupted billions of dollars in goods, strained political trust, and reinforced the perception that even close allies were not exempt from the United States' protectionist turn.
The eventual compromise, reached just before the August 1 deadline, cut tariffs to 15 percent in exchange for a sweeping economic and industrial package from Seoul. At the center of that package was an initiative that quickly captured media attention and political imagination – 'Make American Shipbuilding Great Again' (MASGA).
MASGA proposes $150 billion in investments from South Korea's world-class shipbuilders into the U.S. maritime sector. This would include upgrading U.S. shipyards, training U.S. workers, supporting U.S. Navy maintenance backlogs, and co-producing vessels on U.S. soil.
The branding was deliberate: borrowing from U.S. President Donald Trump's 'Make America Great Again' slogan, MASGA appealed directly to the White House's political messaging while offering substantive industrial cooperation. The sight of red MASGA hats at the negotiation table underscored Seoul's deft use of symbolic diplomacy.
A Structural Problem Meets a Willing Partner
The United States has been grappling with a long-term erosion of its shipbuilding base. Since the end of the Cold War, consolidation in the sector has left only a handful of major shipyards. These yards face aging infrastructure, shortages of skilled labor, and program delays that have pushed naval construction timelines into the realm of decades rather than years.
Even as the Pentagon and Congress debate fleet expansion – most recently aiming for a 355-ship navy – U.S. shipyards are already at capacity, struggling to meet existing orders. Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities face their own crisis, with warships idled for months awaiting work.
By contrast, South Korea remains a global shipbuilding powerhouse. Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean, and Samsung Heavy Industries lead in commercial tonnage, advanced modular construction, and digitalized production systems. Korean shipyards routinely deliver complex vessels – both military and civilian – on time and within budget. For Washington, tapping this capacity could help bridge a dangerous gap between naval ambition and industrial reality.
MASGA is not about importing foreign-built ships into U.S. service – something prohibited for domestic routes under the Jones Act and restricted for defense programs under Buy American rules. Instead, it proposes onshore investment by Korean firms in partnership with U.S. yards, combining the strengths of both countries through joint ventures, licensed production, technology transfer, and workforce development.
Korean shipbuilders would partner with U.S. companies to share design, project management, and production methods, while U.S. yards could build Korean-designed vessels domestically, in full compliance with U.S. content laws. The Korean investments would introduce advanced modular construction techniques, automation systems, and integrated supply chain management to improve efficiency; U.S. workers would receive training in proven Korean shipbuilding methods through exchange programs and on-site instruction.
The investment would be distributed across multiple U.S. shipyards – both naval and commercial – targeting bottlenecks in the construction of auxiliary vessels, logistics ships, smaller combatants, and unmanned surface platforms, with the aim of increasing output, reducing delays, and modernizing facilities without compromising U.S. control over sensitive capabilities.
Looking at the U.S. shipbuilding sector, the U.S. Navy's MRO backlog is a persistent and costly problem. Delays in scheduled maintenance mean fewer ships are available for deployment, undermining fleet readiness. South Korean shipyards, with their proven ability to service advanced warships and large commercial vessels, could provide relief in several ways.
One model would see Korean firms upgrade and operate MRO facilities on U.S. soil, applying their efficiency-focused processes to U.S. platforms. Another would allow Korean yards to handle non-sensitive maintenance overseas, freeing up U.S. facilities for high-priority or classified work. Both approaches would reduce downtime and extend the operational life of the fleet.
This component of MASGA is particularly attractive to the Pentagon, as it addresses a short-term readiness issue without requiring entirely new construction – something Congress may find easier to approve.
From Trade Concession to Strategic Integration
What makes MASGA significant is its potential to turn a contentious trade negotiation into a blueprint for long-term alliance integration. Shipbuilding is not just another industrial sector – it is a strategic asset. Control over production timelines, maintenance schedules, and technology flows directly affects a nation's ability to project power and respond to crises.
By embedding South Korean firms in the U.S. shipbuilding ecosystem, MASGA would create a form of industrial interdependence that strengthens the alliance. It would also lock in long-term cooperation, making the economic and security costs of alliance friction higher for both sides.
For Washington, MASGA represents a politically palatable solution: it expands domestic capacity while creating U.S. jobs, deflecting charges of outsourcing. For Seoul, it offers access to a market that has historically been closed to foreign shipbuilders, along with a seat at the table in shaping future maritime strategies.
The geopolitical implications are also significant. The Indo-Pacific maritime balance is shifting rapidly. China's shipyards are producing warships at a pace unmatched in peacetime history, while also expanding their commercial dominance. For the United States and its allies, matching this surge is as much about industrial mobilization as it is about naval doctrine.
MASGA aligns with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy by ensuring that allied capacity – not just U.S. capacity – underpins forward presence in the region. In a crisis, an integrated South Korean-U.S. shipbuilding base could surge production, repair battle-damaged vessels more quickly, and sustain logistics flows.
This fits into a broader trend of allies contributing niche industrial strengths to collective deterrence. Just as Japan's advanced electronics feed into missile defense and Australia's shipyards support regional patrol fleets, South Korea's shipbuilding prowess could become a core enabler of allied maritime power.
Navigating Domestic Politics
Despite its strategic logic, MASGA faces significant political headwinds in the United States. Shipyard operators and labor unions have historically resisted foreign participation, fearing competition and job losses. Congressional protectionists could seek to tighten Buy American provisions, limiting the scope of cooperation.
To overcome this, MASGA must be framed not as an outsourcing arrangement but as capacity-building within the United States. Korean firms would need to invest visibly in U.S. facilities, hire U.S. workers, and ensure that intellectual property and sensitive technologies remain under U.S. control.
The aerospace sector of the defense industry offers a precedent. Co-production programs such as the F-35 have shown that carefully structured international partnerships can be politically acceptable while meeting industrial goals. MASGA's success may hinge on adopting a similar model.
The genius of MASGA lies in its dual identity. On one level, it is a tactical concession, designed to ease tariff pressure and satisfy U.S. political optics. On another, it is a strategic vision for integrating two advanced shipbuilding nations in ways that bolster both economic and military strength.
If fully realized, MASGA could help reverse decades of U.S. shipbuilding decline, accelerate naval modernization, and reinforce the industrial foundation of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. For the United States, that would mean a stronger maritime posture in the Indo-Pacific and globally. For South Korea, it would mean deeper integration into the supply chains and decision-making processes that shape allied naval power.
In an era where industrial capacity is a decisive element of strategic competition, MASGA offers something rare: a solution that addresses domestic political imperatives while delivering genuine alliance capability. Turning the slogan into reality will not be easy, but if Seoul and Washington can navigate the political shoals, MASGA could yet become a defining success story of 21st-century alliance management.