Ukraine confused by Trump's Patriot claim
When Trump made the statement during his meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Monday, he said a European member of the bloc would supply the American-made air defense systems, but did not specify if he was talking about whole batteries or separate launchers. The next day, the US president claimed that the Patriots 'are already being shipped. They are coming in from Germany and then replaced by Germany.'
Skibitsky told The Guardian on Tuesday that Kiev reacted 'positively' to Trump's statement and that it was grateful for US military aid.
However, he stressed that it was not clear to them how many Patriot systems Ukraine would be receiving. 'We do not know exactly,' the HUR deputy chief said.
According to Skibitsky, '17 is a huge number if we are talking about batteries. If it is launchers, that is possible.'
'The US administration and the Pentagon will give us further details,' he added.
A Patriot battery usually consists of six to eight launchers, a phased-array radar, a control station and a power generation station, with all of the hardware being mounted on trucks or trailers.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told the Financial Times at the weekend that Ukraine has only six Patriot batteries left, which is 'too few.'
Russia has recently ramped up its missile and drone strikes on Ukraine, which it insists only hit military-related targets. According to Moscow, the bombardment is also retaliation for Kiev's attacks on Russian territory, often targeting civilians, residential buildings, and critical infrastructure.
Russian officials have stressed that no amount of Western military aid to Ukraine can change the course of the conflict but only serves to prolong the bloodshed and increase the chances of a direct clash between Moscow and NATO.
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