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EU top diplomat says US should share ‘burden' of arming Ukraine

EU top diplomat says US should share ‘burden' of arming Ukraine

BRUSSELS: EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas on Tuesday said the United States should 'share the burden' of arming Ukraine, after President Donald Trump said Europe could buy American weaponry for Kyiv.
'We welcome President Trump's announcement to send more weapons to Ukraine, although we would like to see US share the burden,' Kallas said after a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels.
'If you promise to give the weapons, but say that it's somebody else who is going to pay for it, it is not really given by you.'
Trump announced a tougher line on Moscow over its war in Ukraine on Monday as he gave the Kremlin 50 days to end the fighting or face massive new economic sanctions.
With NATO chief Mark Rutte, Trump also unveiled a deal under which European members of the alliance would buy billions of dollars of arms from the United States – including Patriot anti-missile batteries – and send them to Ukraine.
Trump has long railed against what he sees as the outsized role the United States has played in arming Ukraine, even though NATO says Europe is now responsible for the bulk of the weaponry going to Kyiv.
European nations Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have already said they will or are looking to participate in the new US scheme.
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