How will Russia respond to the Israel-Iran conflict?

Al Jazeera

9 hours ago

After Israel launched what it described as 'preventive' attacks on Iranian military and nuclear targets last week, Russia's position appeared clear.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow condemned what it called 'unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign UN member state', referring to Iran.
The Kremlin, whose partnership with Iran dates back many years, has urged a diplomatic solution to the crisis.
Since the hostilities began on Friday, more than 220 people have been killed in Israeli attacks on Iran while 24 people have been killed in Iranian counterstrikes.
Both Iran and Russia shared an ally in former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and intervened on his behalf in the Syrian war until his eventual defeat late last year. Iran has supplied Russia with Shahed kamikaze drones to be used on Ukrainian targets, and last year, there were reports that Russia received hundreds of Fath-360 ballistic missiles from Iran, which are known to be accurate at short range.
'Of course, Russia should be friends with Iran because, in politics and in life, everything is very simple,' hawkish Russian TV personality Sergey Mardan commented after the latest Middle East crisis escalated. 'If you have an enemy and your enemy has partners and allies, his partners and allies are automatically your enemies.
'There are no illusions about this, and there can't be any. Since Israel is a key ally of the United States; … of course, we are interested in the weakening of Israel and helping its adversaries.'
While Russia might be sympathetic to Iran, the extent of their relationship should not be overstated, said independent Middle East specialist Ruslan Suleymanov, who is based in Baku, Azerbaijan.
Russia now manufactures its own Shahed drones under licence, so its own combat capabilities are unlikely to be affected by the Iran-Israel conflict, he said.
'The Iranians, in turn, expected more from Russia. They expected a much larger amount of aircraft, military, space technologies, not to mention nuclear,' Suleymanov told Al Jazeera.
'But Russia did not rush to share because it is very important for Moscow to maintain a balance in the Middle East and maintain relations with Israel. And if Russia begins to supply arms to Iran, no one excludes the fact that these weapons can be directed at Israel, and the Kremlin does not want this.'
Although a strategic partnership agreement was signed between Moscow and Tehran this year, Suleymanov noted it does not mean Russia is obliged to step up to defend Iran.
'It is obvious that at any vote of the UN Security Council, Russia, along with China, will stand on the side of the Islamic Republic [of Iran],' he said. 'However, we should not expect anything more.'
While the Western-oriented liberal opposition has been largely supportive of Israel, Russia is treading a fine line to uphold its ties with the administration of President Benjamin Netanyahu.
'One monkey got his grenade taken away. We're waiting for the other one,' exiled Russian politician Dmitry Gudkov wrote on social media, referring to the Iranian and Russian leadership, respectively.
'Does Israel (or any country, for that matter) have the legal right to try to knock a nuclear grenade out of the hands of a big monkey playing with it next to it? And one that constantly growls in your direction? I think the answer is obvious.'
Russia's relations with Israel are complicated.
Although the Soviet Union initially supported the creation of the state of Israel, it soon threw its weight behind Arab nations and backed the Palestinian cause.
Today, Russia refuses to blacklist Hamas as a 'terrorist organisation' although its support for Palestine is balanced by its relationship with Israel. Israel, meanwhile, is concerned with the safety and survival of Russia's Jewish community.
Regarding Syria, Russia and Israel shared an understanding whereby Moscow tacitly overlooked Israeli operations targeting its ally, Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Israel, for its part, avoided antagonising or sanctioning Moscow and arming Ukraine. However, the collapse of al-Assad's regime has changed this calculus.
'Russia and Israel, by and large, proceed from different interests in Syria,' observed Alexey Malinin, founder of the Moscow-based Center for International Interaction and Cooperation and a member of the Digoria Expert Club.
'If Russia had the goal of ensuring the safety of Syrian citizens, ensuring the stability of legitimate power, then Israel sets itself the goal of maximally protecting itself from potential threats from Syria, not paying attention to the legality and legitimacy of such decisions. Therefore, Israel calmly went beyond the buffer zone on the Golan Heights and de facto occupied the territory of Syria after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.'
'It was really important for Russia to have contact with Israel, being in Syria, because without interaction with Tel Aviv, it was very difficult to carry out any manoeuvres on Syrian territory,' Suleymanov added. 'But now such a need simply does not exist. Russia does not require any close coordination with [Israel].'
Still, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Netanyahu have in the past enjoyed a friendly relationship, even being spotted at a ballet performance together in 2016.
Some analysts believe the Israel-Iran crisis provides Putin with an opportunity to flex his diplomatic muscle.
'Vladimir Putin has already offered mediation, and Russia is objectively one of the platforms most open to compromise due to constructive relations with both countries,' Malinin stated.
However, Suleymanov said, the Kremlin's influence over the Middle East has waned since the change of power in Syria and it already has its hands full.
'Russia itself needs intermediaries in Ukraine,' he said.
'The situation in the Middle East will not directly affect the war in Ukraine. But for the Kremlin, it is undoubtedly beneficial that the attention of the world community, starting with the West, is now diverted from Ukraine. Against this background, Putin can move on to a further offensive in Ukraine.'
Malinin acknowledged that Western support for Kyiv could drop in the short term 'in favour of Israel'.
'But it is unlikely that in this context we can talk about something serious and large scale.'