Opposition in Afghanistan

Express Tribune

16-04-2025

The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at [e-mail] and tweets @20_Inam
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In international relations, states need to 'consolidate' as cohesive units, academically speaking, to become useful members of the international community. Modern states come into existence either from evolution or through revolutions and ultimately must adopt the trappings of modern statehood like elections, executive, judiciary and legislature.
States also have to be sensitive to media, public perceptions and national aspirations like national will, aim, purpose, objectives and interests, vital as well as peripheral. Good governance reflecting sensitivity to citizenry's rights is also a prerequisite for modern states. National governments in violation of any of the above notions are censored internationally.
Afghanistan's modern political dispensation, run by the IEA after seizing power militarily in 2021, is a quasi-tribal arrangement with Pashtun religo-ethnic nationalism as dominant force/strand. Within the IEA, Qandahar represents the puritanical Islamic worldview, wed inextricably to Pashtunwali.
It is the spiritual mover and shaker of the Taliban movement under Moulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada. Qandahar takes a longer religious view of international, foreign relations and domestic policy. It sees everything through a religious angle that is frighteningly rigid for the common Afghans and foreign detractors, as it seems out of sync with modern life.
Within the broader Deobandi-Taqleedi (conformist) schools of Islamic theology, Qandahar wants to turn the clock back to the golden days of Islam, under the Khulafa-e-Rashideen (the Righteous Caliphs). IEA's military successes against the USSR and the US-NATO combine further reinforce this thinking. And this is not changing anytime soon. From a purely religious point of view, it is hard to validate or otherwise, Qandahar's world view.
Loya Paktia in the Zadran-dominated northern Afghanistan under Haqqani suzerainty sees things more pragmatically. Being host to the TTP, Khalifa et al believe in pragmatism, alliances of convenience and power grab. Savvy in PR, they would want to keep Pakistan, the US, West and Arab interlocutors in good humour with or without Qandahar, but under nuances, specific to Afghan sociology.
However, for both the puritanical Qandahar as well as pragmatist Haqqanis, unity is imperative and so is the necessity of presenting a united front to the outside world.
In the Afghan political matrix, the third element remains the joint but discredited opposition to the IEA. This group includes the deposed functionaries of the First Republic under US-NATO; the rank and file of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF); the sleeper cells of CIA and other foreign intelligence services; intelligentsia comprising the intellectual and media cohort opposed to the Taliban rule; ISIK; the foreign Afghan diaspora and the remnants of Northern Alliance (NA), the last being militarily more potent.
NA was formed by retreating members of the government i.e. the ousted president Burhanuddin Rabbani and his defence minister Ahmad Shah Masoud in the mid-1990s in Mazar-e-Sharif (Badakhshan). It was confined to the fabled Panjshir Valley, when IEA forces seized control of Mazar in 1998.
Its new formulation under the Afghan Freedom Front (AFF) is presently led by Yasin Zia, a former Afghan Army CGS; Ahmed Zia Massoud, brother of the slain Ahmed Shah Massoud; and Massoud's only son Ahmed Massoud, a Sandhurst graduate. They receive intelligence attention by the West Plus and moral and material support from Tajikistan due to their Tajik ancestry. Tajiks dominated ANDSF and the first republic.
There were Uzbek opposition groups under Rasheed Dostum, the famous killer of Sheberghan who is a protégé of Turkey. Ismail Khan in Herat, Ustad Atta Muhammad Noor of the Jamiat-e-Islami, Haji Mohaqiq of Hizb-e-Wahdat were some other resistance leaders in opposition to the IEA.
According to the UN, since September 2022, some 22 armed groups are operating against IEA in 26 provinces under the AFF umbrella that is also in alliance with National Resistance Front (NRF) and Afghanistan Liberation Movement (ALM). The Dushanbe-based NRF, led by Ahmed Massoud, claims some territorial control and ability for hit and run guerrilla attacks in parts of Panjshir, Badakhshan, Takhar and Baghlan.
However, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP, ISIS, IS-K, Da'esh) and NRF are two main armed opposition groups that are feeding the twin anti-Taliban insurgencies. Interestingly IS-K also gravitates towards Tajikistan as their recruitment patterns and attacks demonstrate.
But resistance to the IEA is mostly disjointed, lacking harmony, coordination, resources and robust international support. Afghanologist Andrew Watkins conceded to the Swedish Migration Agency that by April 2023, Taliban had unprecedentedly monopolised violence, which also brings to the fore their obligations under international humanitarian law.
Although sporadic reporting indicates less than full control of IEA in the northern Afghanistan. Out of NRF and IS-K, the latter is Kabul's main foe, given its ability to woo IEA and TTP rank and file.
Putting it all together, although no serious challenger to the IEA rule exists now or in near future other than IS-K/NRF, continued disregard to human rights, chasm over female right to education and work, a teetering economy and endemic poverty, and less than wise handling of TTP may tilt the balance of power against the Emirate in the mid to long-term.
As every good thing comes to an end. The perception of the present regime as 'oppressive' may work overtime to undercut its appeal, popular support and cohesion. Internal chasm between Qandahar and Paktia may surface if powerful external forces are unable to steer IEA towards more inclusivity and respect for regional peace by reining in the TTP.
As of now, unity in Afghanistan under any political dispensation seems in the larger regional interest and is especially important to Pakistan. Afghan leadership realises this existential paradox, hence their desire to mend fences quickly as witnessed during Khalifa Siraj Haqqani and Mulla Yaqub's recent chasm with Qandahar. But there are many powerful variables at work to calculate the utility of the present Afghan enterprise in the larger scheme of things.
Revolutionary organisations like the IEA find it perplexing to transit from warfighting to good governance, given the complexity of the undertaking. And that is where such movements are vulnerable to penetration, manipulation and nimble controlling. Success has limited hours and as things change, change is the only constant.
One would hope that there is no more instability in Afghanistan and no more headaches for the region!