India, Russia Reaffirm Commitment To Enhance Defence Ties Amid Trump Threat
India and Russia on Tuesday reaffirmed their commitment to boost bilateral defence cooperation during a meeting between Indian Ambassador Vinay Kumar and Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Alexander Fomin.
According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Indian envoy called on Col-Gen Fomin, who is in charge of international defence cooperation, and the meeting was held in a "warm and friendly atmosphere, customary for Russian-Indian ties".
"During the conversation, the sides discussed in detail the pertinent issues of bilateral interaction in the sphere of defence and confirmed their intent toward the further strengthening of relevant cooperation in the spirit of particularly privileged strategic partnership," said the statement.
The meeting took place amid US President Donald Trump's threats to slap harsh sanctions on India for buying crude oil from Russia.
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The Print
19 minutes ago
- The Print
Buying Russian oil, misreading Trump—3 points will define India's next energy strategy
While public commentary has focused heavily on Trump, tariffs, and New Delhi's indignation, the more pressing task is to interrogate the rationale behind these choices. That balance is now under pressure from Donald Trump's 50 per cent tariff offensive, aimed selectively at India and leaving little ambiguity about his objectives—and in Trump's world, what he wants, he usually gets. Yet the national debate has taken too many assumptions for granted. It is worth applying a deconstruction approach to India's famous oil bargains with Russia—a decision once hailed as tactical brilliance, but one now risking entanglement in overlapping economic and diplomatic challenges. India's crude oil trade has evolved from a purely economic exchange into both a geopolitical test of strategic autonomy and a measure of the constraints in its energy policy. Over the past three years, India has gone from being a marginal buyer of Russian crude to one of its largest importers, carefully balancing ties with the US, Europe, and shifting global energy markets. To navigate the road ahead, India must revisit three fundamentals: why it embraced Russian oil, how it misread Trump's European recalibration, and where future India–Russia energy engagement should head. Clarity on these three points may well define the next chapter of India's energy strategy. Also read: Trump tariff forces India to shed illusion. Stop conflating status with power 50 shades of discounts Despite close political ties and deep defence cooperation, India and Russia were never bound by energy dependence. Even with India's heavy reliance on imports—currently 88 per cent of its daily crude requirement of 5.5 million barrels—its primary suppliers have traditionally been Gulf countries. The earlier chapter of India capitulating to Trump 1.0's sanctions on Iran and Venezuela is well known; today, however, the challenge is starker. Russia entered India's energy equation only after the geopolitical earthquake of President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine. That act shattered the European order painstakingly built since the Second World War and crystallised after the Soviet Union's collapse. Central to this upheaval was Putin's weaponisation of energy: Europe's decades-long dependence on cheap Russian oil and gas became a vulnerability. In response, Europe diversified away from Russia, while the G7 imposed a $60 per-barrel price cap on Russian crude in December 2022. The logic was clear: as one of the world's top three oil producers, Russia could not be cut off overnight. The aim was instead to squeeze Moscow's revenues, which were funding its war machine, while keeping prices stable and securing alternative supplies for Europe. India saw opportunity in this upheaval. With vast import needs, it began rerouting Russian oil at supposedly lower prices, rejecting G7 sanctions and arranging direct and indirect deals through intermediaries. Early reports spoke of a 'free on board' discount of 30 per cent, though never confirmed. Brent crude fell from $86.51 in January 2022 to $80.92 in December, peaking briefly at about $90 in June 2023 before sliding again. While some credit India's purchases with stabilising prices, Russian oil for India almost always remained above the $60 price cap. The critical question is whether India ever bought below that threshold. Reports suggest an average discount of only $5 per barrel—hardly transformative—and potentially offset by hidden costs and middlemen's surcharges. Even so, large volumes (peaking at over 2 million barrels per day before dropping to 1.5 million) meant cumulative savings. But if cheap oil was the goal, why not join or informally align with the price cap, securing crude closer to $60 without the complications of shadow fleets and sanctions risks? In July 2025, the EU lowered the cap to about $47 while Brent traded around $65. This offered another opportunity for cheaper imports, yet India stayed outside the framework, maintaining minimal discounts and ultimately seeing one of its companies sanctioned—for 'strategic autonomy.' Government claims of passing benefits to consumers are unconvincing: petrol prices hit Rs 105 per litre in 2025 versus Rs 95 in 2022. Recent relief correlates more with global declines—12 per cent over the past six months—than with Russian discounts. Savings estimates of $25 billion are offset by projections of $9–10 billion in potential losses if imports shift away from Russia, and much of the gain may reflect global oversupply rather than uniquely favourable Russian terms. From a taxpayer's perspective, why not secure far greater savings by pressing Moscow for prices nearer the cap while sustaining high volumes? This would have preserved strategic autonomy while serving economic logic. Instead, India paid more, absorbed sanctions, and missed chances for deeper cost benefits. Now Trump's 50 per cent tariffs on India are unrelated to the EU's cap. His pivot on Ukraine has hardened US demands that India halt Russian oil imports—demands not pressed on others—hurting New Delhi disproportionately. The real question is why Trump would take such a stance toward a strategic partner his administration once called an ally. Also read: Trump is treating diplomacy like a failed casino deal Misreading Trump's re-pivot to Europe When Donald Trump returned to the White House, India was smug. His criticism of Europe, mocking remarks about Denmark and Canada, and public praise for Putin—especially his Oval Office dressing-down of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—were interpreted in New Delhi as vindication: India stood to benefit from a US policy shift toward Russia. At first, the bilateral climate looked promising. The Trump administration's rhetoric suggested the Indo-Pacific would be his main strategic theatre. Anticipated friction over India's protectionism and trade deficit was being managed, with both sides pursuing a deal. Public displays of camaraderie continued—until 'Operation Sindoor.' That alone, however, was not the turning point. Trump's push to end the war in Ukraine faltered despite carrots for Russia and sticks for Ukraine. In fact, Russian attacks on Ukraine have doubled since Trump took charge in January. Frustrated, he shifted tone, endorsing the Lindsey–Blumenthal bill to sanction countries buying Russian oil, a measure with strong Senate backing. Simultaneously, the April 2 'Liberation Day' tariffs targeted nations with trade deficits with the US, India among them. Trump re-engaged with Europe, supplying Ukraine with weapons and extracting costly commitments: 5 per cent of GDP on defence, a trade deal with 15 per cent tariffs, and pledges of about $600 billion in US investment. Japan followed with similar concessions. Meanwhile, Trump prematurely claimed to have mediated Operation Sindoor, clashing with India's account. The fallout strained personal communication between Modi and Trump—tensions that might have been eased with a symbolic 'thank you' or diplomatic courtesy for facilitating the 'ceasefire.' Also read: India's export basket has no irreplaceables. It's a vulnerability in Trump's power politics What next for India and Russia Now, as India's NSA Ajit Doval visits Moscow in a show of solidarity, the moment calls for more than optics. Three issues must shape discussions with Russia: First — Payments. Confusion surrounds the currency used in the oil trade. The rupee–ruble mechanism has stalled, with billions of rupees stuck in Russian accounts. Russia's war economy leaves little incentive to reinvest in India despite earlier promises. Payments in dirhams have become harder after UAE banks shut Russian accounts under US pressure, and India hardly holds dirham reserves. Yuan payments are strategically risky for India, and gold settlements are not yet viable. Trade experts must directly address these bottlenecks. Second — Discounts. India avoided joining the sanctions regime, yet the discounts it received rarely justified the political and economic risks. With Russian imports already being cut and US crude purchases jumping 51 per cent in days, it is clear the 'discounted' oil was not cheap enough to offset sanctions or tariffs. Russia should now match its discounts to the new $47 price cap for ongoing purchases. Third — Parity with China. China remains Russia's largest energy buyer and reportedly enjoys deeper discounts. India must demand equal treatment for its remaining purchases. The stakes are high: India–US trade totals $212 billion, with $85 billion in Indian exports—40 per cent still exempt from tariffs. Finding workarounds while pursuing overdue structural reforms is essential. Strategic autonomy must be anchored in economic logic, ensuring national interest prevails over symbolic defiance—before multipolarity turns into 'messier-polarity.' Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal. (Edited by Prashant)
New Indian Express
19 minutes ago
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Diplomatic moves that opened the door to possible Trump-Putin meeting on Ukraine
Feb. 28, 2022: Ukrainian and Russian delegations meet in neighboring Belarus for the first time since the invasion. Talks continue for the next two weeks, but no agreements emerge other than a decision to set up humanitarian corridors for civilians. March 21, 2022: Zelenskyy calls for direct talks with Putin but is rebuffed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. A day later, Zelenskyy says he is prepared to discuss a commitment for Ukraine to not to seek NATO membership in exchange for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops and a guarantee of Ukraine's security. March 29, 2022: Talks begin in Istanbul, with Moscow saying it's willing to 'fundamentally cut back' military activity near Kyiv and the northern city of Chernihiv. Kyiv said it was open to discussing neutral status for Ukraine if its security is backed by other nations. April 7, 2022: Lavrov rejects a Ukrainian peace proposal as 'unacceptable." He says Kyiv has walked back on an agreement to exempt the Crimean Peninsula from wider Ukrainian security guarantees. Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. July 22, 2022: Russia and Ukraine, with mediation by Turkey and the UN, agree on a deal to unblock supplies of grain stuck in Ukraine's Black Sea ports, ending a standoff that threatened global food security. The deal expires a year later. Sept. 30, 2022: Russia illegally annexes the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, even though it doesn't fully control any of them. Ukraine responds by applying to join NATO and by enacting a decree that declares negotiations with Putin 'impossible.' Dec. 7, 2024: US President-elect Donald Trump meets Zelenskyy and other European leaders in Paris. Feb 12. 2025: Trump and Putin agree to begin negotiations on ending the Ukraine war in a phone call that ends a three-year US-led effort to isolate Russia over Ukraine. Feb. 18, 2025: Russian and US officials, including Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, meet in Saudi Arabia and agree to work toward ending the war, as well as restoring bilateral ties. Ukrainian officials are not invited. Feb. 28, 2025: Zelenskyy meets with Trump, Rubio and Vice President JD Vance in a contentious session in the Oval Office. A proposed minerals deal between the countries is left unsigned. March 11, 2025: US and Ukrainian officials meet in Saudi Arabia, with American officials putting forward a plan for a 30-day ceasefire. Kyiv agrees to the proposed truce. March 13, 2025: Putin effectively rejects the ceasefire plan, stating certain issues must be resolved. He also meets with US special envoy Steve Witkoff in Moscow. Witkoff would travel to Russia twice more in April to meet Putin. March 18, 2025: A proposal is put forward for a temporary halt on strikes on energy infrastructure. Both sides agree to the plan, but soon accuse each other of violations, and the measure later expires. April 19, 2025: Putin announces a 30-hour ceasefire to mark the Easter holiday, although attacks continue across Ukraine. April 28, 2025: The Kremlin declares a unilateral 72-hour ceasefire starting May 8 to mark Russia's Victory Day celebrating the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Kyiv does not agree, preferring a 30-day truce proposed by US officials. Both sides accuse each other of violating it. May 11, 2025: Putin proposes restarting direct talks with Ukraine in Istanbul 'without preconditions' but does not agree to the 30-day ceasefire. Zelenskyy challenges Putin to meet in Turkey. May 15, 2025: Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet for direct talks in Istanbul for the first time since early 2022. Subsequent meetings are held on June 2 and July 23, but aside from ongoing exchanges of prisoners of war and the bodies of fallen soldiers, no substantive progress is made on key issues. July 14, 2025: Trump says he will implement 'severe tariffs' on Russia and countries that continue to buy Russian oil unless Moscow reaches a peace deal with Ukraine within 50 days. Two weeks later, on July 28, he says that he will shorten that deadline to 10-12 days. Aug. 6, 2025: Witkoff visits Moscow and meets with Putin two days before Trump's deadline. Later that day, a White House official speaking on condition of anonymity in order to discuss internal plans says Trump and Putin could soon meet in person. A day later, the Kremlin confirms the planned meeting but does not set a date.
New Indian Express
19 minutes ago
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Trust in Ukraine's Zelenskyy is diminished even after reversal of anti-corruption law that led to protests
KYIV: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy quickly reversed course last month on a law that would have curbed the independence of the country's anti-corruption watchdogs after widespread protests that threatened the stability of his leadership for the first time since Russia's invasion. It's unlikely that the damage to the president's image can be changed as easily. Zelenskyy's reversal followed years of public discontent that simmered around his inner circle, some of whom have been accused of corruption. But Ukrainians have been largely deferential toward their president in wartime, trusting him to lead the fight against the Kremlin and even acquiescing in the suspension of some civil liberties. The protests showed the limits of that goodwill after the public concluded that Zelenskyy's fast-tracking of the law was a step too far. 'People will support Zelenskyy in whatever he does as it relates to the war. But the previous level of trust 'that he will carry out everything correctly, without outside interests, has been damaged," said Tetiana Shevchuk, a board member of the Ukrainian nonprofit Anti-Corruption Action Center, which fights graft. Zelenskyy "will need to work hard to get it back.' A Gallup poll released Thursday found that about two-thirds of Ukrainians approve of the way Zelenskyy is handling his job as president, down from 84% in 2022. Another poll released Wednesday by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found a similar pattern, with trust in Zelenskyy down from just before the war started and a sharp decrease since after the signing of the law. Both polls were conducted in July and excluded adults living in regions of the country that were not controlled by Ukraine or were under entrenched Russian control. The initial decision to sign the proposal hurt Zelenskyy's standing among Ukrainians, loyal lawmakers and Western allies, including one foreign minister who told The Associated Press that his willingness to backtrack on the law would help restore 'lost trust.' Zelenskyy says bill was designed to root out Russian influence Zelenskyy sparked the outcry when he signed measures to reduce the powers of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, or NABU, and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, or SAPO. Zelenskyy said the initial bill was meant to root out Russian influence in those agencies, but he did not provide evidence to support the claim. The bill became a law so quickly that lawmakers said they barely had time to read it. For the Ukrainian people, patience wore thin. From the outset of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the public tolerated restrictions such as martial law and postponed elections. But critics also argued that the consolidation of the president's authority undermined the country's democratic institutions, along with the checks and balances necessary for transparency. Members of Zelenskyy's inner circle and the corruption allegations fueled public resentment. The resulting anti-corruption protests in July in Kyiv and other cities were among the largest in years, drawing thousands of demonstrators and reflecting widespread public demand for transparency and accountability even during wartime. 'It's not one law that brought people to the streets, but a series of events and mostly an accumulation of feelings and wanting to show the government there are certain red lines,' Shevchuk said.
