Swiss president blamed for ‘disastrous' deal with Trump
Trump announced a 39% levy – one of the highest globally – on Swiss goods on Friday, coinciding with Switzerland's national day.
According to the FT report published on Sunday, Swiss negotiators believed they had secured a provisional deal for a 10% tariff, similar to the UK's arrangement. In exchange, Bern pledged nearly $150 billion in US-bound investment and remained in regular contact with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The offer was approved in early July, with Swiss officials convinced it only awaited Trump's signature.
Keller-Sutter, who also serves as finance minister under the country's rotating presidency, had publicly stated last month that she had gained rare 'access to Trump.' However, during a 30-minute call on Thursday – described by sources as 'disastrous' – the US leader reportedly rejected the offer and instead focused on Switzerland's $39 billion trade surplus.
'The call did not go well, in the sense that from the very first minute Trump made it clear 10 per cent was not enough, and all he could focus on was Switzerland stealing money from the US. There was nothing Keller-Sutter could say,' one source told FT. Trump reportedly asked what more the 'very wealthy' Alpine country could offer.
Swiss media called the outcome Keller-Sutter's 'biggest fiasco,' with tabloid Blick likening it to the country's worst defeat since 1515, when Swiss troops lost to France at the Battle of Marignano.
Greer later denied that a final deal had been secured, telling Bloomberg: 'Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.'
The tariff hike followed Trump's 'Liberation Day' speech announcing a global trade overhaul on April 2. After multiple delays and a series of negotiations, a revised executive order signed last week adjusted rates based on 'trade imbalances,' with the tariffs now set to enter into force on August 7.
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