Why Cambodia nominated Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize
China or Asean, but to
Donald Trump , whose intervention in the kingdom's border dispute with Thailand, he said, merited nothing less
than a Nobel Peace Prize
Far from being a simple act of gratitude, observers say the move reflects
Cambodia 's 'adept ability' to navigate the shifting fault lines of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia – and its determination to avoid overreliance on Beijing.
Speaking in the capital on Friday, Chanthol publicly thanked the US president for his personal involvement in halting the recent deadly border clashes with
Thailand and insisted that Trump deserved the Nobel.
The award, widely regarded as the world's most prestigious peace accolade, is typically bestowed upon individuals or organisations judged to have 'advanced fellowship between nations'.
Cambodia's Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol credited Trump with bringing about the ceasefire. Photo: Reuters
But Sophal Ear, associate professor at Arizona State University's Thunderbird School of Global Management, told This Week in Asia that Cambodia's nomination was less a reflection of Trump's peacemaking credentials than of Phnom Penh's 'strategic positioning'.
'The gesture is largely symbolic, a low-cost, high-profile way to curry favour with a US president who remains unpredictable and transactional,' the Cambodian-American political scientist said.
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