Pakistan ramps up defence spending by 20 percent after India conflict
Pakistan has announced a major boost to defence spending in its new budget, just weeks after coming to the brink of a fifth war with archrival India.
The budget for the fiscal year 2025-2026, announced by the government on Tuesday, ramps up defence spending to 2.55 trillion rupees ($9bn), up 20 percent from the current fiscal year, which ends this month.
The hike in defence expenditures comes amid a cut in overall spending, which is shrinking by 7 percent to 17.57 trillion rupees ($62bn).
The budget reflects Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's goals of spurring growth while boosting Pakistan's military in the wake of the most serious conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours in nearly three decades.
The bitter foes attacked each other with fighter jets, missiles, drones and artillery for several days in May before a ceasefire was declared.
The hostilities were triggered by a deadly attack by gunmen in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, which India accused Pakistan of supporting. Pakistan denied any role in the attack.
A 20 percent boost in defence spending had been expected by economists, who said it would likely be offset by cuts in development spending, the Reuters news agency reported.
India's defence spending in its 2025-2026 fiscal year, running from April to March, was set at $78.7bn, up nearly 10 percent from the previous year, and it has indicated it will ramp up its spending further in future budgets.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Qatar Tribune
an hour ago
- Qatar Tribune
Cabinet approves draft law on unified system for volunteering in GCC
QNA Doha The Cabinet has approved — in principle — a draft law issuing a unified system (law) for volunteering work in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and a draft of its executive regulations. The two drafts' preparation comes within the framework of the Ministry of Social Development and Family's strategy, which aims to enhance social responsibility, spread the culture of volunteering in society, organise volunteering work, ensure its practice with freedom and choice, preserve the rights of volunteers and volunteering organisations, and define the duties of each of them. The Cabinet, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs HE Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan Al Thani, took the decision at its regular meeting on Wednesday. The Cabinet also approved the draft Cabinet Decision to add a member to the Steering Committee of the Qatar Internet Exchange Point project, established by Decision No (24) of 2018. Prepared by the Communications Regulatory Authority, the draft aims to connect financial institutions subject to the supervision of the Qatar Central Bank to the Internet Exchange Point, in a way that ensures business continuity in the financial sector and supports its vital requirements. The Cabinet approved a draft agreement between the Government of the State of Qatar and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) regarding the establishment and financing of a regional office for UNITAR in the State of Qatar; a draft core contribution agreement between the Qatar Fund for Development of the State of Qatar and the United Nations World Food Programme for multilateral funding for the years 2025-2026; and a draft letter of intent between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation in the field of mediation and facilitation. The Cabinet also approved a draft memorandum of understanding in the field of Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic affairs between the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs of the State of Qatar and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and a draft air services agreement between the Government of the State of Qatar and the Government of the Republic of Nauru. The Cabinet concluded the weekly meeting by reviewing a report on the outcomes of the participation of Qatar's delegation, headed by the Minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, in the 16th International Economic Forum Russia-Islamic World: Kazan Forum (Republic of Tatarstan - May 2025), regarding which it took the appropriate decision.
Al Jazeera
9 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
In India, war came dressed in feminist camouflage
When two female officers of the Indian armed forces – one Hindu, one Muslim – took centre stage to announce Operation Sindoor, the government celebrated it as a landmark moment for gender inclusion. The image of uniformed women addressing the media from the front lines, avenging the deaths of 26 civilians, all men, and symbolically restoring the sindoor (vermilion) of widowhood, was widely praised as feminist iconography in service of the nation. The moment echoed a historical parallel: during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was famously likened to the Hindu warrior Goddess Durga, a symbol of feminine power and nationalist resolve, in recognition of her decisive role in the creation of Bangladesh. That invocation of Durga underscored how Indian political power is often framed through a gendered and mythologised lens, blending statecraft with religious symbolism. But can women leading war be inherently feminist? Nation-building, as feminist scholars have long warned, is not a gender-neutral project. It reconfigures women into roles that serve its ends: sacrificial mothers, grieving widows, or militant daughters of the nation. Scholars like Nira Yuval-Davis argue that women are positioned as symbolic bearers of the nation's honour and cultural authenticity but rarely as its political agents. In the Indian context, scholars like Samita Sen and Maitrayee Chaudhuri remind us that women's public roles have historically been framed not in terms of autonomy, but duty to patriarchal structures. Therefore, the mere presence of women in public or political spheres does not automatically equate to gender justice. Representation must also be interrogated for its objectifying function. Today's military feminism, in which women gain visibility in war zones, follows this same path: celebrating women's ability to 'be like men' while leaving untouched the masculine and patriarchal foundations of militarism itself. This can be observed in Operation Sindoor, which projects the spectacle of two women in uniform as feminist optics, while the script they perform remains deeply patriarchal, demanding women prove their worth through masculine-coded nationalism. Such feminist optics align neatly with the ideological framework of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Founded in 1925, the RSS is a Hindu nationalist organisation that serves as the ideological parent of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It envisions India as a Hindu rashtra (nation), advocating cultural nationalism rooted in Hindu traditions and values. Scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot argue that the RSS fosters majoritarianism and undermines India's secular fabric. Its paramilitary structure and emphasis on discipline and nationalism reveal its aim of deepening the hierarchical and patriarchal structure of Indian society. The women's auxiliaries of the RSS – the Rashtra Sevika Samiti and Durga Vahini – reflect and reinforce this patriarchal vision. These groups have long trained women in martial arts and ideological devotion not for feminist liberation, but to protect the Hindu rashtra. The aesthetics of Operation Sindoor – its saffron undertones, warrior femininity, and choreographed resolve – mirror this legacy. As Bina D'Costa's work on gender and war in South Asia underscores, women's bodies often become vehicles of nationalist redemption. The inclusion of a Muslim officer in this tableau may appear to signal secular pluralism. But as D'Costa warns, such inclusions often serve to legitimise exclusionary frameworks. Her presence sanitises a majoritarian script by casting minority visibility as proof of national unity, even as Islamophobic currents persist in broader public discourse. Sindoor – the red vermilion powder traditionally applied by Hindu wives on their head – symbolises marital status, wifely devotion, and the ideal of the 'good' woman. It also invokes Goddess Durga. In Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, historian Tanika Sarkar explores how nationalist discourse fuses the sanctity of the wife with that of the motherland. The very name Operation Sindoor weaponises this metaphor: it promises to avenge broken marital bonds through military strikes on Pakistan, thereby 'restoring' the honour of Hindu widows. Yet this operation also constructs a tableau of women rendered widowed – stripped of their sindoor – whose grief is appropriated as nationalist fuel. As feminist historian Urvashi Butalia reminds us, women's bodies and symbols become 'testimonies of war.' In this context, sindoor represents not what widows possess, but what they have lost: honour, status, and social security. In the imagined redemptive arc of the nation, sindoor is not merely restored – it becomes a badge of nationalist virtue. The two women officers are cast not as autonomous agents, but as foot soldiers of a mythical motherland – extensions of the same patriarchal script that has long confined Indian women to domestic altars. What is celebrated here is not women's liberation, but their assimilation into a militant masculine narrative. Militarised femininity is constructed to legitimise state violence, not resist it. It is crucial to debunk symbols and interrogate the hierarchies they represent. What exactly is being applauded when female officers lead a war? Is it the war itself, or the fact that women are participating in it, that is considered 'feminist'? The gender metaphor in this spectacle casts women into patriarchal frameworks where they must emulate men to legitimise their agency. By celebrating these officers, the state co-opts women's leadership to validate militarism while leaving intact the structures that perpetuate gendered violence. Feminist agency demands that women define the terms of their engagement. Here, those terms are dictated by the patriarchal nationalism of the RSS ideology. The two officers did not challenge gender norms; they stepped into a pre-written script that equates womanhood with wifely duty to the nation. Their exalted martial roles serve to naturalise militarism, even as they are packaged as gender progress. The inclusion of a Muslim officer is not incidental. In the ideological universe of Durga Vahini, non-Hindu women can be co-opted, so long as they defend the Hindu 'family'. This token inclusion supports an illusion of pluralism, while systemic marginalisation of Muslim citizens continues unabated. Feminist movements have historically challenged the logic of war itself, not simply who wages it. If we accept that nation-building is inherently patriarchal, the solution cannot lie in merely enlisting more women into patriarchal institutions. Instead, we must interrogate the very optics of national honour that equate women's value with wifely symbols and martial sacrifice. Feminist politics in war must decentre militarism, prioritise civilian protection, and insist that women's leadership be recognised in peacebuilding, rehabilitation, and policymaking — arenas where the absence of sindoor cannot be remedied by bombs or bravado. True gender justice in national security would uplift dissenting women leaders who refuse to be conscripted into patriarchal metaphors, provide material support to widows, and reject marital symbolism as a proxy for state virtue. Operation Sindoor may make for powerful headlines. But behind the illusion of feminist triumph lies an old patriarchal script: women as metaphors of the motherland, valued only when they serve its wartime needs. Liberation lies not in militarised spectacle, but in dismantling the gendered metaphors that bind women to nationalist rites – and expanding the meaning of agency beyond the theatre of war. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.
Al Jazeera
18 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
Are India and Pakistan preparing for a naval face-off in a future conflict?
Islamabad, Pakistan – When Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh visited the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant on May 30, nearly three weeks after a ceasefire was announced with Pakistan after a four-day conflict, he had stern words for Islamabad. Wearing an Indian Navy baseball cap, with his initial 'R' emblazoned on it, Singh declared that Pakistan was fortunate the Indian Navy had not been called upon during the recent hostilities. 'Despite remaining silent, the Indian Navy succeeded in tying down the Pakistani Army. Just imagine what will happen when someone who can keep a country's army locked in a bottle, even by remaining silent, speaks up?' Singh said, standing in front of a Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jet on the deck of the 262-metre-long (860 feet) ship. Just two days later, on June 1, the Pakistan Navy issued a pointed response. In a message posted on X, it announced a two-day exercise, 'focusing on countering sub-conventional and asymmetric threats across all major ports and harbours of Pakistan'. These symbolic shows of strength followed India's 'Operation Sindoor' and Pakistan's 'Operation Bunyan Marsoos', the countries' respective codenames for the four-day conflict that ended in a ceasefire on May 10. The standoff was triggered by an April 22 attack in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, in which 26 civilians, almost all tourists, were killed. India blamed armed groups allegedly backed by Pakistan, a charge Islamabad denied. On May 7, India launched missile strikes at multiple sites in Pakistan's Punjab province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, killing at least 51 people, including 11 soldiers and several children. Over the next three days, the two countries exchanged artillery and air power, hitting each other's airbases. The 96 hours of conflict brought 1.6 billion people to the brink of war. But while the navies largely remained passive observers, they monitored each other's movements – and were ready for action. Satellite imagery showed that the INS Vikrant moved towards Pakistan soon after the Pahalgam attack and remained deployed for four days in the Arabian Sea before returning to its base in Karnataka. Pakistan also mobilised its fleet, which was bolstered by the docking of a Turkish naval ship in Karachi on May 2. According to the Pakistani Navy, Turkish personnel engaged in 'a series of professional interactions' with their counterparts. Now, even amid the current pause in military tensions, analysts say Singh's remarks and Pakistan's naval drills highlight the growing part that maritime forces could play in the next chapter of their conflict. This is a role the Indian and Pakistani navies are well-versed in. After independence from Britain in August 1947, India inherited two-thirds of British India's naval assets. These saw no use during the first India-Pakistan war in 1947, over the contested Himalayan region of Kashmir. India and Pakistan both administer parts of Kashmir, along with China, which governs two thin strips. India claims all of Kashmir, while Pakistan claims all the parts not controlled by China, its ally. By the 1965 war, also over Kashmir, Pakistan had expanded its fleet with aid from the United States and United Kingdom, its Cold War allies. It had acquired Ghazi, a long-range submarine, giving it an edge over India, which lacked a submarine at the time, though it owned an aircraft carrier. Pakistan, to date, does not have an aircraft carrier. While the land war started on September 6, the Pakistan Navy joined the conflict on the night of September 7-8. A fleet of seven warships and submarine PNS Ghazi left Karachi harbour and made their way towards the Indian naval base of Dwarka in the western state of Gujarat, roughly 350km (217 miles) away. They were tasked with carrying out the 'bombardment of Dwarka about midnight using 50 rounds per ship', according to the Pakistan Navy's official account, targeting the base's radar and other installations. The selection of Dwarka was significant from a historical and strategic perspective. The city is home to one of the most sacred sites for Hindus, the Somnath Temple, on which the Pakistan Navy named its operation. Militarily, the radar installations in Dwarka were used to provide guidance to the Indian Air Force. Knocking them out would have made it harder for India to launch aerial attacks against Pakistani cities, especially Karachi. That, in turn, would have forced India to send out its warships from the nearby port of Bombay (now Mumbai) – and PNS Ghazi, the submarine, could have ambushed them. But the Pakistani plan only partly worked. Many Indian warships were under maintenance, and so the Indian Navy did not send them out to chase the Pakistani fleet. According to the Pakistan Navy's accounts, after firing about 350 rounds, the operation ended in 'four minutes' and all its ships returned safely. Syed Muhammad Obaidullah, a former commodore in the Pakistan Navy, recalled the attack. 'We were able to send eight vessels, seven ships and a submarine – that surprised the Indians, as our ships targeted the radar station used to assist Indian planes,' Obaidullah told Al Jazeera. Muhammad Shareh Qazi, a Lahore-based maritime security expert, added that the operation was a tactical surprise, but did not lead to any gains in territory or of the maritime continental shelf. 'All our ships returned safely, without resistance, but it was only an operational-level success for the PN, not a strategic one,' he said, referring to the Pakistan Navy. Official Indian Navy records claim that most of the shells fired by Pakistani ships caused no damage and remained unexploded. Anjali Ghosh, a professor of international relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, in her book India's Foreign Policy, described the attack as 'daring' but symbolic rather than strategically 1971 war, fought over East Pakistan's secession to become Bangladesh, saw more substantial naval engagements. India launched two operations – Trident and Python – which dealt major blows to Pakistan's Navy, sinking several ships, including the destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz, and destroying fuel tanks at Karachi Harbour. Uday Bhaskar, a former commodore in the Indian Navy, said the navy played a pivotal role in India's 1971 victory. 'The naval role enabled the final outcome on land,' Bhaskar, the current director of the Society for Policy Studies, an independent think tank based in New Delhi, told Al Jazeera. Pakistan also suffered the loss of its prized submarine Ghazi, which sank while laying mines near Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, home to India's Eastern Naval Command. The one major victory for the Pakistani Navy was its torpedoing of the Indian frigate INS Khukri using its submarine Hangor, which killed more than 170 Indian sailors. Qazi, who is also an assistant professor at Lahore's Punjab University, said that the Indian Navy replicated the Pakistani playbook from the 1965 war in the way it surprised the Pakistan Navy. 'India caused a heavy blow to Pakistan and our naval capabilities were severely dented,' he said. Since the 1971 war, India and Pakistan have approached different naval strategies. Obaidullah, who retired from the Pakistan Navy in 2008, said that India has tried to build a 'blue water navy' capable of projecting power across oceans. The idea: 'To assert its dominance in [the] Indian Ocean,' he said. Qazi, the maritime expert, agreed, saying that the Indian Navy has focused not just on building a numerical advantage in its naval assets but also on partnerships with nations such as Russia, which have helped it develop a powerful fleet. 'The Indian Navy now has the ability to conduct missions that can cover long distances, all the way down to Mauritius near southern Africa, or even some adventures in [the] Pacific Ocean as well,' he said. As the world's fifth-largest economy, India has invested heavily in naval development. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based research institute focusing on defence and security issues, India has 29 principal surface combat vessels, including two aircraft carriers, 12 destroyers, 15 frigates and 18 submarines, of which two are nuclear-powered. Pakistan, by contrast, has prioritised its land and air forces. Its navy has grown more slowly, mainly through cooperation with China and Turkiye. It regularly holds major naval exercises with its allies, with the last one taking place in February this year. IISS data shows that Pakistan's navy lacks aircraft carriers and destroyers but includes 11 frigates, eight submarines and at least 21 patrol vessels. Obaidullah explained that Pakistan's naval ambitions and objectives are very different from those of India. 'India aims to project global power. We have a defensive navy to secure our sea lines of communication and deter aggression,' the former naval officer said. With more than 95 percent of Pakistan's trade sea-based, protecting maritime routes is its top priority. Maritime expert Qazi also said that the Pakistani Navy is focused on defending its 'littoral zones'. From a naval perspective, a 'littoral zone' is a critically important area close to coastlines, unlike the open ocean's 'blue water' expanse. It is within this space that countries engage in coastal defence. 'Pakistan has a small economy, and we do not have blue water ambitions. We do not have the capacity to build a fleet, nor [do] we need one,' Qazi said. 'Our defence paradigm is about defending our coastlines, and for that, we have our submarines, which carry cruise missiles.' The latest conflict saw both conventional and modern warfare, including drones used to strike deep inside each other's territory. But Singh's May 30 remarks suggest a more assertive naval posture in future conflicts, say analysts. 'If Pakistan does any unholy act this time, it is possible that the opening will be done by our navy,' Singh said during his speech on May 30. Bhaskar, the Indian commodore who retired in 2007, agreed that future conflicts could see naval escalation. 'If another military conflict escalates, the probability of navies being actively involved is high,' he said. Bashir Ali Abbas, a New Delhi-based maritime affairs expert and former fellow at the Stimson Center, in Washington, DC, said that naval platforms inherently serve multiple roles. Abbas said that warships and submarines can switch from patrolling missions or exercises to operational missions on short notice. But that would carry risks of its own. 'Should the Indian Navy play a substantial role in operations against Pakistan following the next crisis, then the element of escalation control practically disappears. Any ship-on-ship, or ship-on-land engagement will imply that India and Pakistan are at war,' he told Al Jazeera, adding that the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation is also potentially highest in the nuclear domain. Qazi, however, said that Singh's statement was ambiguous about whether the Indian Navy would engage in surveillance or aggression. Any attack on Karachi, Pakistan's economic hub, would provoke a strong response, the Lahore-based analyst said. 'I believe India will choose to play hide and seek like it did this time,' Qazi said. But he added that there was a 'high probability' that India could attack Pakistan's naval installations on land, including its planes and radar stations. And that, he said, was an 'alarming possibility'.
