The best Trump can hope for in Alaska
Consider his experience dealing with corrupt local governments, corrupt labor union bosses and the mafia itself during his years as a real estate developer. The Trump administration no doubt has all the advice it needs for how to handle Putin and what sort of deal to cut, if any.
But us outside observers can at least do our own handicapping. Perhaps the best and only 'deliverable' to come out of the Alaska meeting should be a ceasefire in place.
Avoid, delay and temporize any permanent peace treaty. Do not waste the time and political capital; Putin will disregard it anyway. A Ukraine peace deal is beyond reach until Russia has a change in leadership.
And no redrawing of boundaries on a map (as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain did with Hitler, or President Roosevelt and Churchill did with Stalin at Yalta). Once that happens, they will only be redrawn with great effort and misery. And they will be a constant source of trouble.
One need only look at Putin's 'M/O', which is the proper mafia type expression to describe him. He invades and seizes territory with complete illegitimacy, and then settles into a ceasefire. Georgia is the classic example.
Do not legitimize his invasion by any formal recognition of changed boundaries. The terms to use are a ceasefire that glumly accepts the territory physically occupied by Russian forces 'de facto' – without attempting to regain Ukrainian control by renewal of conflict.
And never accept 'de jure' in a formal peace treaty that the boundaries will be permanently changed. That would legitimize aggression for Russia (and soon Chinese aggression towards Taiwan and others).
Do not preclude Ukraine from joining NATO. It is necessary to keep that threat if Putin continues to threaten, which he will. And never agree to a limitation of Ukraine rearming. It's insanity to rely on future Russian goodwill towards Ukraine (or anyone else).
Don't discuss Russian reparations for their appalling destruction in Ukraine. The Russians will never agree to pay reparations voluntarily. Therefore, do not waste time attempting to wrest the concession.
Instead, the European governments that have frozen funds owned by the Russian government need to develop a legal mechanism to transfer them into a reconstruction fund for Ukraine unilaterally.
Only execute this transfer after the ceasefire, since it will have a chilling effect on the atmosphere (the Russians will once again claim that they have been robbed).
The reason for doing this is not just to 'punish' the Russian government for aggression, but because reconstruction will be tremendously expensive, and frankly, Ukraine and the Europeans need these funds to get started.
Immediately after a ceasefire is in place, fast-track Ukraine's joining the European Union (EU) and start reconstruction. The best hope for the next generation of Russians may well be the example of a Slavic, orthodox, democratic Ukraine as an equal member state within the European community.
The schism Putin has caused with what should be Russia's closest ally will take decades to mend, if ever. Russia will once again be a truncated vassal state to a rising China.
If Trump can extract a ceasefire to this bloody stalemate, then he will have accomplished more than every international institution and European government. That should suffice.
The rest can get 'bogged down' in endless negotiations, but at least the destruction and carnage will cease. And Putin will have squandered as many as half a million Russian lives for very little in return.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute, and the author of ' When China Attacks: A Warning to America .' Follow him on X @NewshamGrant
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