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Decolonise the mind to power a green future

Decolonise the mind to power a green future

Mail & Guardian25-04-2025

Extraction: Among the green minerals is copper, which is mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, South Africa and Namibia.
As the global race for critical minerals intensifies, from lithium in Zimbabwe to cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa finds itself, once again, rich in resources but poor in power. Green industrialisation is being touted as the continent's opportunity to move beyond extraction to manufacture green goods.
But this opportunity will pass us by if African leadership continues to be held hostage by the psychosocial legacies of colonialism.
This is not just about policy. It's about consciousness. Philosopher and anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon warned us that colonialism doesn't end when the colonisers leave. It lingers in the psyche.
In Black Skin, White Masks, he wrote about how colonised people internalise the logic of their oppressors, aspiring to hold the power of the oppressor, governing in ways that serve global capital rather than their own people. He argues that this becomes a major obstacle to genuine liberation.
Across Africa, post-independence elites often reproduce colonial power structures preserving extractive economies, obeying the rules of the global capitalist order and prioritising the needs of foreign investors over their own citizens.
As South African analyst William Gumede has pointed out, South Africa remains a 'postcolony', politically independent, but still economically manipulated. The apartheid-era structures of racialised accumulation remain intact, simply rebranded for the global neoliberal order.
South Africa, like many other African states, once aspired to become a developmental state, a model that channels state resources, market incentives and civil society mobilisation to uplift the population. But those ambitions have been steadily eroded by a fear of capital flight, the discipline of debt and an elite class too comfortable with the status quo. The result? A state that protects monopoly and financial capital while failing to deliver justice, dignity or economic inclusion for the majority.
This mindset is evident in the budget crisis, where the ANC insisted that increasing VAT was the only viable way to raise revenue, while rejecting the option of raising wealth or corporate taxes, citing fears that the wealthy would exploit loopholes or withdraw investment.
This fear is not simply political. It is psychological. It is the 'colonial wound' Fanon described, the inability to see ourselves as agents of our own futures. This matters because African green industrialisation is not just about climate. For Africa, it offers an opportunity to break with patterns of extraction that have served external interests, and instead pursue a path that centres sovereignty, justice and economic transformation.
Green industrialisation means using Africa's mineral wealth not simply for export, but as strategic leverage to build domestic and regional value chains. This demands that we rethink the logic that underpin industrial development, moving beyond linear models focused on capital gains, and toward approaches that are regenerative, redistributive, circular and socially embedded.
Africa's green industrialisation can follow different pathways, from mainstream strategies to transformative ones including decarbonising industries such as construction, infrastructure and renewable energy generation, developing domestic processing and manufacturing capabilities of critical minerals such as in battery technology, public transport systems and energy-efficient appliances tailored to African contexts.
Transformative strategies challenge extractivism and embrace ecological, socially owned and circular models. These may include large-scale recycling, repurposing and urban mining of metals and minerals already in circulation to reduce the demand for new extraction; transitioning agriculture and agro-processing away from industrial inputs and fossil fuel dependencies toward agroecological systems that restore soils, enhance biodiversity and build food sovereignty; community and socially owned renewable energy production, ensuring energy transitions serve public needs and are not captured by corporate or elite interests and democratising ownership and decision-making in green industries.
If scaled, these efforts can do more than boost national economies, they can transform lives. Locally rooted manufacturing and processing will create jobs, support small businesses and build skills in communities. Cleaner energy systems will lower household energy costs and reduce environmental harm.
Most importantly, this shift can create a future where development is people-centred, less dependent on volatile global markets and driven by Africa's needs and capacities.
As highlighted in the Alternative Information and Development Centre's report The Controversy of Green Energy: Unmasking Southern Africa's Critical Mineral Sacrifice Zones, the expansion of green energy and green industrialisation, must not replicate the injustices of past and present mining regimes.
But none of this is guaranteed. Without a conscious political project, and leaders willing to resist neo-colonial pressures, we risk simply greening the same extractive, unequal and externally-dependent model we've been trapped in for decades.
In recent months, US President Donald Trump has proposed sweeping new tariffs. Framed as a strategy to protect American workers and reduce reliance on China, these protectionist measures aim to promote domestic industry, assert US economic sovereignty and reconfigure global trade in favour of American interests.
The proposals have not been universally welcomed. Allies and rivals alike have raised concerns, and many economists warn of rising global trade tensions. Yet few countries have the leverage to meaningfully resist or retaliate. Only large power blocs — such as the European Union or China — have the capacity to push back. The rest, particularly in the Global South, are often left managing the ripple effects of such shifts, with limited room to shield their economies from external shocks.
This geopolitical asymmetry is further illustrated by recent policy developments in the European Union. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), for example, imposes carbon-related tariffs on imported goods such as steel, aluminium and cement. While presented as a climate policy, The CBAM risks penalising developing countries that lack the resources to decarbonise at the same pace as Europe, which will affect our ability to green industrialise. Instead of supporting low-carbon transitions in the Global South, it is more likely to entrench global trade hierarchies under the guise of climate justice.
Similarly, the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act identifies strategic minerals essential for Europe's green transition and sets targets to secure them through domestic extraction and 'strategic partnerships' abroad. African countries are expected to supply these materials under conditions dictated by European industrial needs, not African development priorities as in the case of Namibia's green hydrogen projects. This reinforces an externalisation of ecological and social costs — where Africa provides the inputs for a green transition it is largely excluded from shaping or benefiting from.
Yet when African governments adopt similar tools to assert their interests — through export bans, local content requirements, beneficiation mandates or industrial tariffs — they face strong resistance. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank warn of 'market distortions'. Investors threaten divestment. Commentators label such measures 'protectionist' or 'populist', even when they are embedded in democratic development agendas.
What emerges is not simply a contradiction, but a structural reality: the rules of global trade and investment are shaped by power, and power determines who can bend or rewrite those rules. When large economies intervene to protect or reindustrialise, it is accepted as strategic. When African states seek to do the same, they are expected to remain 'open' and 'market friendly'.
This is why African countries must build the political and institutional power to define their development paths, not by mimicking the West, but by advancing decolonial and redistributive alternatives.
Regional solidarity, democratic control over resources and policies grounded in the realities of African economies must be central to that project.
To succeed, Africa must delink from exploitative global systems — whether controlled by Washington, Brussels or Beijing — and build robust, pan-African institutions and markets. This means deepening continental trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area, harmonising industrial policies, and investing in shared infrastructure and research systems.
But it also means reclaiming ideological ground. Development cannot simply be about GDP growth or investor confidence. It must be about dignity, equality, ecological sustainability and the right of people to decide their own futures.
Fanon believed freedom wasn't just about ending colonial rule — it was about freeing the mind. Gumede, echoing this, argued that the path to African emancipation requires 'a self-awareness of the subservient position that the continent occupies in the global matrix of power', and a conscious break from the 'socio-economic and political structures that make exploitation and domination possible'.
Africa's green transition won't succeed with leaders afraid to act, to disrupt, to imagine differently. It won't succeed with extractive elites beholden to foreign capital. It will only succeed if we decolonise not just our economies, but our consciousness.
And that is the hardest revolution of all.
Charlize Tomaselli is a senior researcher at the Alternative Information and Development Centre.

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The challenge is to ensure that the prejudices of the most jaundiced of jingoists are not internalised. There is thus no need to invent cultural histories or celebrate the achievements by, specifically, members of former colonised people. Yet, it is precisely this need to disprove all the dogmas that is daily on display. Hindu nationalism is a prime example of this from Asia. Pranay Somayajula reminds us that, in their calls for a return to an imagined Hindu civilisational glory, a 'golden age', current Hindu leaders frequently invoke the language of overcoming a 'colonised mindset' and reviving so-called 'Indic consciousness' — the array of 'indigenous' philosophies, cosmologies, and epistemologies supposedly suppressed by centuries of Islamic and British colonisation alike. In its most exaggerated form, this atavism can be observed in the viral memes claiming that ancient Indians invented everything from aircraft to nuclear weapons to the internet. This need to invent their own culture or achievements resulted in Afro-Americans inventing their own Christmas, Kwanzaa, in 1966, with twenty-first century estimates of the number of Americans who celebrate Kwanzaa being between 500,000 and 2,000,000. Expressing the same need, African nationalists claimed — some still do — that the Pyramids and the Sphinx were built by black Africans, not Egyptian Arabs, with the Sphinx having been deliberately bombed in order to remove a characteristically African nose. Some black Africans, including those of African descent worldwide, of the Christian faith argue that Jesus was black. Moving on to South Africa, decolonisation hit us, from seemingly nowhere, when a few students at the University of Cape Town threw shit at a statue of Cecil John Rhodes in March 2015. Since then, it has blown across the whole of South Africa to be inhaled as fresh air. Conferences on the subject are big business; there's even a Decolonisation Foundation. To be anything less than exhilarated by the whirlwind is to run the risk of being roughly attacked as racist or reactionary. The gale has especially shaken universities: their need for a thoroughly decolonised makeover, including what is taught and by whom, is the new orthodoxy. During the student rebellion of 2015-17, those who shouted the loudest often made fools of themselves. The proposed rejection of science as a non-African, white Eurocentric imposition was reported across the world. Less well known but in the same league were the medical students who rejected a practical on ankle injuries because the lecturer, attempting to make it real life, had linked the injury to football and football was deemed to be an alien, non-African colonial import. In a similar vein was — and is — the automatic rejection of reading lists on technical subjects purely because the authors are from Europe or the US. Subjects such as architecture have been disavowed for being non-African. Expressions of this same drive for constantly disproving white prejudice was recognised, along with its implicit rebuke, by Mamphela Ramphele, a noted academic, besides being Steve Biko's one-time partner, who said 'we have largely bought into the lie that black people do not have the capacity to excel'. Exposing the lie is manifested in things such as: The need for street names to show that black people are capable of having their own heroes. The rejection of the Homo Naledi fossils because black people have not evolved from baboons. The national celebration following the first black South African to have climbed Mount Everest, a feat which, according to then president Thabo Mbeki, made all South Africans 'stick out our chests in justifiable pride and wonder'. The ANC Women's League's celebration (without any irony) that President Jacob Zuma had used a 'wholly black-owned' bank to pay his Public Prosecutor-ordered, maleficence-laden Nkandla bill. The league's secretary-general noted that the president's 'confidence in supporting black-owned businesses is humbling'. This bank subsequently turned out to be the notorious VBS! The celebration of 'Ubuntu' as a uniquely black South African contribution to world philosophy and ethics. The then minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, who in 2000 announced that the government wanted to build 'a core of successful black farmers in this country. We want to move away from a perception that only white farmers can make it commercially, and that subsistence farming is only for Africans'. For then president Jacob Zuma it was a case of: 'Let us solve African problems the African way, not the white man's way. Let us not be influenced by other cultures…' The need for black people to be rich to prove black ability and the consequent — and often unconscionable — conspicuous consumption to display black achievement. Thabo Mbeki, the urbane, cosmopolitan, British university-educated intellectual, surprised many by his evident internalisation of the most extreme views of supposedly biologically determined black behaviour. His denial of Aids stands testimony to his fear that the worst of white racism is accurate. Consider the following, for instance, from 11 August 2000: 'The white politician (a reference to Tony Leon who had attacked his Aids denialism) makes bold to speak openly of his disdain and contempt for African solutions to the challenges that face the peoples of our continent. According to him… these solutions, because they are African, could not but consist of pagan, savage, superstitious and unscientific responses typical of the African people, described by the white politician as resorting 'to snake-oil cures and quackery'… This racism has defined us who are African and black as primitive, pagan, slaves to the most irrational superstitions and inherently prone to brute violence.' Or, after referring to medical schools where black people were 'reminded of their role as germ carriers', Mbeki said: 'Thus does it happen that others who consider themselves to be our leaders take to the streets carrying their placards (evidently referring to trade union leaders and Aids activists) to demand that because we are germ carriers, and human beings of a lower order that cannot subject its (sic) passions to reason, we must perforce adopt strange opinions, to save a depraved and diseased people from perishing from self-inflicted disease… Convinced that we are but natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust.' The gruesome reality of Aids rules out any irony in Mbeki's comments. Let me further make explicit and unequivocal that, notwithstanding the above, colonialism was both real and a primary determinant in shaping our history and socioeconomic architecture. In addition, the rediscovery of colonialism is essential to the final burial of the idea that apartheid — the racial organisation and structure of South Africa — began only in 1948, when the Calvinist Afrikaners, unlike the nice, liberal English, took over the running of South Africa. 3 The colonisation supposedly in need of decolonising the mind The left in South Africa, Europe and the US were/are leading advocates of a decolonisation centred on universities and what is taught there. With South Africa this time being the unusual vanguard, meant Britain and the US — particularly since the Black Lives Matter uprisings of summer 2020 — catching up with the demands made by South African students five years earlier. 'Among the most visible targets' of this catching up, Pranay Somayajula notes, 'were intellectual and cultural institutions — universities, museums, archives, and the like — which came under pressure to 'decolonise' through gestures such as land acknowledgments, renaming buildings, repatriating looted artifacts, and reworking curricula to more adequately 'centre' black and indigenous voices.' This forced European institutions to reckon with their complicity in nineteenth- and twentieth-century empires, North American institutions to reckon with their complicity in settler-colonial violence against the continent's indigenous peoples, and institutions to reckon with their complicity in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Somayajula's conclusion is that this focus 'on the institutions that function as pillars of Western knowledge production constitutes in many ways an indictment of Western epistemology itself… Implicit in this critique of dominant forms of knowledge production is a call to uplift in their place the indigenous ways of knowing and being that have been suppressed by the same processes of colonial violence and dispossession in which these institutions were (and are) complicit.' South Africa's student rebellion of 2015-17 provides a case study of what this means in practice. The student who threw the poo at Rhodes' statue that sparked the rebellion came dressed as a mine worker. The Marikana Massacre of 2012 is a stark reminder that the problem is not colonialism, or Rhodes' dead legacy, but the awful power of his very-much-alive mining descendants, for whom colonialism is rightly history. The exclusive focusing on the colonial insult symbolised by Rhodes' statue leaves this living legacy untouched. Shouting for the removal of other 'white colonial' names — like in 'Jameson' Hall — makes it very easy for the university authorities to agree. It is easy for them to do so for it serves as a distractive anachronism. Focusing on our formal colonial past obscures the inconvenient present and its truth that UCT is heavily reliant on the various post-colonial forms of Rhodes' legacy for its current funding; a reliance reflected in so many of the corporate names that now festoon supposed 'academic' buildings. Indeed, the entire corporate takeover of all universities, not just UCT, is the living legacy of Rhodes, the mining magnate/politician. This ought to be a prime focus of students who describe themselves as radical. Instead, they divided themselves on so-called 'racial' lines and, as a final mocking irony, did so using the 'races' Rhodes did so much to institutionalise as part of his divide-and-rule legacy. His contribution to the forced creation of an African working class with a ready and self-replenishing supply of dirt-cheap labour for his gold mines is a prominent feature of his legacy. The supposedly 'black students' demanding the removal of the offending statue bring warmth to the coffins containing the heroes of the apartheid pantheon, beginning with Dr Hendrik Verwoerd. These apartheid architects argued that the four 'races' of apartheid South Africa reflected a natural order in which each 'race' had to live separate from the others because of their natural differences and in-born wishes. 'Coloureds' and 'Indians' are not black, according to the students who accused the formerly white universities of still being predominately 'white'. Students were not welcome at some of the student gatherings because of their 'whiteness', even though they fully supported the 'black' campaign to remove Rhodes from UCT as part of the decolonisation campaign that swept the country. Rhodes, too, would have greatly enjoyed this spectacle of how students allowed the 'races' he helped manufacture to divide themselves, even while campaigning against his 'colonial' legacy of dispossession and subjugation. Colour-coding access to scarce resources is the main hallmark of the new, post-apartheid, non-racial South Africa. We'll be returning to this issue in due course. The right wing has also been prolific in its understanding of what decolonising means. The well-known academic, Professor William Gumede, of Wits University, provides one such example in his 2022 Daily Maverick article, ' African economic transformation demands a radical shock to failed post-colonial system '. His article begins: 'Several types of collective mindset changes drove the astonishing industrial transformation of the East Asian developmental states from similar poverty levels to their African and developing country peers, to levels of development similar to or better than those of their former colonial occupiers.' And ends: 'If… South Africa and other African and developing countries want to mimic the extraordinary and radical economic transformation of the East Asian tiger economies, (they) will have to undergo drastic individual and collective mindset changes, and overhaul old institutions, behaviours and customs. Without such a shock to thinking patterns, they will stay locked in mass underdevelopment, poverty and instability.' A single word defines his remedy: entrepreneurship. It is this, he contends, that has transformed all four of the countries he mentions: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. What he singularly fails to mention is that the first three countries all owe their good fortune to the privileges the US allowed them as an integral part of the post-World War 2 challenge posed by both the Soviet Union and the then China. Highly selective perception is required to see Singapore as a success story, as detailed in 'Singapore — little to sing about despite Greg Mills' call for encores', my January 2024 response to a Daily Maverick article by Greg Mills. (This response is the only one never published by the Daily Maverick but is available on request.) Franz Fanon now enters the story with his seminal book, first published in 1952, Black Skin, White Masks. Many worldwide have long attributed the need to decolonise the mind to this book. Yet 'decolonise' does not appear in the book, not even once. It is, indeed, part of his book, The Wretched of the Earth. This difference is not an academic quibble. It alerts us to the confusions caused by the misuse of colonialism and why that matters. Considerably.

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