The minerals deal is advantageous for Ukraine – but also for the United States
The 'Art of the Deal' may have been Donald Trump's abiding contribution to literature, but it is Mr Zelensky, it now seems, who used his personal diplomacy with the US president during the funeral for Pope Francis to excellent effect. Free of the barracking and malign influence of vice-president JD Vance – and away from the Russian-inspired propaganda relayed by some of his advisers – Mr Trump was able to listen to his Ukrainian counterpart's case directly.
The deal, as now signed and published, is far superior to earlier versions – not just for Ukraine, but also for the United States. The initial versions were grotesquely exploitative, reducing Ukraine to a vassal state – and so impoverishing and weakening the country that it rendered the agreement unsustainable.
Now, US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent, the man responsible for the negotiations, has said the text 'clearly signals the Trump administration's commitment to a free, sovereign, prosperous Ukraine". In terms of protecting Ukrainian security, those words are probably worth as much as the critical minerals lurking in the subsoil of Ukraine's remaining eastern regions.
It is true that the deal is far from a US security guarantee, which is unlikely to appear even in the final settlement, but as Mr Trump declares: 'We've got an American presence on the site, it helps keep bad actors out of the country or at least out of the area.' 'Bad actors' has not hitherto been Mr Trump's preferred way of referring to Vladimir Putin.
For her part, Mr Bessent's opposite number, Yulia Svyrydenko, is pleased with the agreement and noted that the deal refers to future projects – revenues from existing projects or those already accounted for in the budget will not be included. That adds an incentive to the Americans to make sure that the Russian occupation of the territories rich in these resources under any wider peace accord is minimised.
Gone is the idea that Ukraine owes any inflated financial debt to the US for military assistance freely donated by the previous administration and approved by Congress; or that the Americans would own the mineral resources of another sovereign nation.
The Americans will bring capital and expertise to Ukraine's natural resources sector – and both sides will reap the financial benefits via a shared wealth fund, one that can also help pay for Ukraine's reconstruction. Optimistically, this initiative could lead to closer industrial and technological links with the US – as well as Ukraine potentially joining the European Union, with the transformative effect that implies. A prosperous, powerful Ukraine much more capable of looking after its own defence is the vision.
For now, though, attention turns to the wider peace settlement. In recent weeks, there are hopeful signs that President Putin has made it a little too obvious that he is playing the US along – and that he is as content to continue his war as to sign the deal the Americans have out to him as the basis for negotiation.
Mr Trump has expressed increasing exasperation with the Kremlin, although never quite as viciously as he has with Mr Zelensky. Still, the emphasis once again is on securing the ceasefire the US leader has been seeking for many months as the first move in the peace process – and not in appeasing Russian attempts to gain concessions and dictate preconditions for talks. If Mr Trump's patience is running out with Putin – and he is beginning to understand that he is being manipulated – then that is good news for Ukraine and for European security, too.
Since the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there have been few moments of hope, yet the establishment of the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund is one. It is significant in itself because of its symbolism and because it marks a shift in how Washington perceives Russian intentions.
A long-term partnership with Putin probably remains Mr Trump's goal, despite the contradictions and dangers involved – but there seems to be some increasing realism about whether the Russians can be trusted. Mr Zelensky, who keeps his word and speaks honestly, is proving to be the more cooperative and reliable man to do business with.
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New Statesman
5 minutes ago
- New Statesman
Trump reverses course on Ukraine, again
Photo byIf it wasn't already clear before the events of the past few days, the bad news for Ukraine is that Donald Trump appears to have only the most cursory grasp of the complexities of the existential war it is currently fighting, and a strong proclivity to adopt the views of the person he spoke to last. This is also the good news. Before his much hyped, but ultimately underwhelming, summit with Vladimir Putin last week, Trump was certain that his main objective was to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine, ideally then and there. 'I want to see a ceasefire rapidly,' Trump declared on board Air Force One as he flew to Alaska on 15 August. 'I don't know if it's going to be today, but I'm not going to be happy if it's not today.' This was one of the five key principles he had agreed in an emergency video conference with Volodymyr Zelensky and other key European leaders 48 hours earlier, along with a commitment that territorial concessions could only be negotiated by Ukraine. Yet after three hours with Putin, Trump had dispensed with the idea of a ceasefire altogether. 'It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a Peace Agreement,' Trump wrote on Truth Social on 16 August, 'which would end the war, and not a mere Ceasefire Agreement, which often times do not hold up.' By 'all' he seems to have meant the Russian and American delegations. There were no Ukrainians present. Zelensky was thus, understandably, concerned, when he was summoned to Washington on Monday (18 August) to learn 'all the details,' presumably including how much of his country he would be expected to surrender in exchange for 'peace'. Rumours swirled that Putin was prepared to contemplate freezing the conflict along its current lines if Kyiv surrendered the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk. (Ukraine still controls around a quarter of the Donetsk region, which includes key defensive strongholds and heavily fortified territory that functions as a bulwark against further Russian advances.) His European allies, too, were sufficiently alarmed to rush to the US capital en-masse in an attempt to head off another damaging Oval Office showdown between Zelensky and Trump. Their last White House meeting, six months earlier, had ended with Trump yelling at Zelensky that he did not 'have the cards' and having him removed from the premises. But this time, the encounter went better than any of them could have dared to hope. Zelensky had clearly learned the lessons of his previous experience, when his combat-style fatigues – which he was worn since the start of the conflict in solidarity with the Ukrainian military – seemed to upset the US president. When he stepped out of his motorcade outside the White House wearing in a black suit, specially designed by a Ukrainian tailor, Trump was delighted. 'I can't believe it,' he exclaimed, gesturing at Zelensky. 'I love it!' Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe The meeting itself, at least the part in front of the cameras, was perfectly cordial. Zelensky kept his answers short, taking every available opportunity to compliment Trump, and skirted around any difficult questions. The Ukrainian president's priority was clearly to shower Trump with praise and gratitude, and to take him up on what seemed to be the nascent suggestion, emerging in the days since the Alaska summit, that the US might be prepared to offer some sort of security guarantees for Ukraine as part of any peace deal. Zelensky mentioned this multiple times, making sure also to echo Trump's recent calls for a trilateral meeting with Putin, which he knew the Russian president would be reluctant to grant. Trump appears suddenly to have warmed to the prospect of US involvement in providing security guarantees, which he had previously seemed to reject, presumably wary of drawing the country into another open-ended commitment when he has styled himself as a president who ends 'forever wars'. 'There's going to be a lot of help,' he assured Zelensky during their meeting. The European forces would be the 'first line of defence,' Trump said. 'But we are going to help them out. We are going to be involved.' During the wider meeting that afternoon in the East Room – attended by British prime minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French president Emmanuel Macron, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish president Alexander Stubb, Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte, and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen – the European leaders reinforced Zelensky's call for security guarantees. One after the other, they praised Trump's leadership and then repeated, mantra-like, the need to 'stop the killing' by providing strong security guarantees to Ukraine. (Only Merz and Macron dared also to push for a ceasefire.) By this stage in the second Trump presidency, the world's diplomats are already fluent in the required terms of flattery, where it is safer to err of the side of extreme obsequiousness and the only limit is one's own dignity. Putin, in Alaska, supposedly told Trump that he had made America as 'hot as a pistol'. Von der Leyen duly began her remarks by reminding Trump that they had just completed the 'largest trade deal ever agreed'. She then delivered a moving appeal, 'as a mother and a grandmother,' for the assembled leaders to prioritise returning the thousands of Ukrainian children who are believed to have been abducted and taken to Russia. But when she finished speaking, it was the size of the trade deal that Trump remarked upon. The reason for Trump's apparent volte-face on the issue security guarantees is difficult to parse, but probably best explained by his sense that a deal to end the war is finally within reach. By his own, questionable account, he has resolved six wars in a little over six months and has his now sights set on a seventh, and the Nobel peace prize that he has long suggested should rightly then follow. (Trump's claim to have stopped six wars is heavily disputed.) He seems to believe that he has already pulled off a masterstroke by convincing Putin to meet him in Alaska, when in fact, the Russian president had been hinting they should meet since January. And while Putin appears to have quickly dismissed the possibility of a ceasefire during their meeting, he is said to have agreed that the US and Europe could provide 'Article Five-like' security guarantees to Ukraine. (It is worth noting that this claim seems to have originated with Steve Witkoff, Trump's roaming special envoy, who has form for delivering confusing – and confused – accounts of meetings with Putin.) So perhaps Trump genuinely believes that this is an uncontroversial issue for the Russian side, and an area for possible compromise. The only problem is that even as Trump and the Europeans were discussing the importance of security guarantees at the White House, the Russian foreign ministry issued a statement making clear that it had repeatedly and strenuously objected to the idea of any troops from Nato countries being deployed in Ukraine. 'We reaffirm our repeatedly stated position of categorical rejection of any scenarios involving the presence of a military contingent from Nato countries in Ukraine,' said the foreign ministry statement on 18 August. Russia has also previously demanded to a halt to western military aid to Ukraine as a condition for any potential peace deal, along with strict limits on the size of Ukraine's military and the abandonment of its goal to join Nato. It is not clear whether the Kremlin is prepared to negotiate on these terms. Pressed later that evening on what form any western security guarantees might take given these conditions, Rutte, Nato's secretary-general, was noncommittal in an interview on Fox News. 'What it will exactly mean' and the question of US involvement, he said, would be 'discussed in the coming days'. Trump left the meeting for around 40 minutes at one point to call Putin, as one does, while the other leaders waited in the White House. Rutte later claimed that in the course of that call, Trump had persuaded Putin to agree to a meeting with Zelensky, which would then be followed by a three-way meeting hosted by the US president. Merz said Putin and Zelensky could meet within the next two weeks. But at the time of writing, the Kremlin had yet to confirm Putin would take part, merely noting that the Russian president had 'discussed the idea of raising the level of direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.' It is possible we are now headed towards a rapid series of summits between Putin, Zelensky and Trump that could yield an imminent end to the fighting and a genuine peace deal. In which case, Trump might finally be able to begin preparing his Nobel prize speech. But it is equally possible that the US president's sudden mad dash for peace, accompanied by none of the preparation and little understanding of the complex issues and historical fault lines behind this conflict, will just as quickly fizzle out when it becomes clear how far apart the two sides really are, and whether or not Putin was ever really interested in peace. At a time when the Russian leader believes his forces are winning on the battlefield and time is on his side, it seems unlikely that he will agree to abandon his longstanding mission to subjugate Ukraine just to placate his 'dear friend'. This may well just be an effort to string out a putative peace process and keep Trump on side, while the Russian military grinds ahead. Given that Trump has, so far, shown little sign of following through on his threats to impose greater consequences for Putin's actions, what is to stop Russia fighting on through the rest of this year and then pushing for a peace deal on more advantageous terms next year, when the US president is likely to be even more desperate for a win ahead of the coming mid-terms? Others, too, are sceptical. 'I am not convinced that President Putin also wants peace,' Macron said at a press conference as he left Washington. 'His ultimate goal is to gain as much territory as he can, to weaken Ukraine.' Still, as long as they have Trump's attention, and they are able to impress on him the importance of making serious commitments to ensure Ukraine's security beyond this war, that will count as a victory for Zelensky and his allies for now. At least until Trump's next big encounter with Putin. Then, of course, the policy could just as easily change again. [See also: The great big anti-climax in Alaska] Related
Daily Mail
5 minutes ago
- Daily Mail
LIVE Russia-Ukraine LIVE: Trump sets up Putin-Zelensky peace talks after 'breakthrough' at White House summit - but Moscow issues more rocket attacks overnight
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky will meet, Donald Trump has said following a White House summit with European leaders aimed at bringing an end to the war in Ukraine. The US President spoke directly with the Russian president to begin planning a meeting between the two warring leaders, which will then be followed by a three-way meeting involving himself. Follow the Daily Mail's liveblog throughout today for all the latest updates. 06:37 Moscow REFUSES to commit to peace talks Let's start with a look at the Daily Mail's top story, which is that Vladimir Putin has failed to commit to peace talks with President Zelensky after yesterday's summit. This is fuelling fears the Russian leader will pull out of efforts to end the Ukraine war at the last minute. Read the full article here: Moscow REFUSES to commit to Putin-Zelensky peace talks The Kremlin branded a 40-minute phone call between President Trump and Putin on Monday as 'frank' and only 'fairly constructive'.
Reuters
5 minutes ago
- Reuters
War or peace? For oil markets, the Ukraine outcome is insignificant
LONDON, Aug 19 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump's high-stakes diplomacy to resolve the war in Ukraine is unlikely to jolt oil and gas markets, no matter the outcome. Russia has faced multiple rounds of western sanctions and restrictions since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which have dealt severe blows to the country's giant oil and gas industry, sapping Moscow of vital revenue and reshaping global energy markets. Russian gas now accounts for just 18% of European imports, down from 45% in 2021, while the bloc's oil imports from Russia have fallen to 3% from around 30% over that time. The European Union plans to fully phase out Russian energy by 2027. Meanwhile, India has increased its share of Russian crude to 38% of total imports from 16% in 2021, according to Kpler. China and Turkey have also notably ramped up their Russian oil purchases. The war in Ukraine has left over a million dead or wounded, so its conclusion would be welcomed by many. Energy markets, however, are not apt to register much of a reaction unless there is a full ceasefire along with the lifting of all U.S. and European sanctions. And that is long shot. Given the more probable set of scenarios, oil and gas markets are unlikely to be rattled by the fallout from either last Friday's disappointing summit between Trump and Russian President Valdimir Putin or the U.S. president's meetingwith his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskiy and European leaders on Monday. Full peace in Ukraine remains highly improbable. Trump's apparent support for a comprehensive settlement, rather than a ceasefire, has widened the gap between America, Ukraine and Europe. At the same time, his suggestion of U.S. post-settlement security guarantees for Ukraine is likely to face resistance from Moscow. In other words, don't bet on a full normalization of relations between Russia and the West any time soon. Trump might pressure Zelenskiy into accepting a temporary or partial halt in fighting. But even then, Europe is unlikely to resume Russian energy imports while Putin remains in power. Before 2022, Europe accounted for nearly half of Russia's 4.7 million barrels per day of oil exports and 75% of its gas exports, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The Trump administration could attempt to ease some sanctions unilaterally, but this could face opposition in Congress, including from Republicans, unless a broad peace deal is reached. Perhaps the more likely scenario – Trump failing to broker a deal – also shouldn't have a major impact on energy markets. The U.S. could tighten sanctions, particularly by targeting buyers of Russian energy, as Trump has already threatened. But the U.S. president said on Friday that he would delay so-called "secondary sanctions" on China due to what he described as 'successful' talks with Putin. Of course, India already faces secondary tariffs over its Russian oil purchases. Earlier this month, Trump announced a 25% tariff on Indian goods, citing the country's continued oil imports from Russia. The new tariff, effective August 27, will bring total tariffs on Indian imports to 50%. But even though Indian buyers already appear to be reducing their Russian oil purchases, the impact on global supplies has been minimal as China has increased its intake of Russian crude. Ultimately, China matters far more in this story, and it's unlikely to significantly curb its Russian oil imports, not least because it considers its relationship with Moscow to be strategic. Chinese and Russian oil producers, refiners and traders have already built a sprawling network of tankers and insurers to circumvent Western sanctions on Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. Additionally, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods already average 55%, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Additional tariffs could raise costs for U.S. consumers, and Beijing could retaliate, potentially by withholding rare earths or other critical minerals, all outcomes Trump would want to avoid – and Beijing knows this. In short, Trump appears to have little stomach for the potential consequences, and even if he were to tighten sanctions, this likely wouldn't materially affect China's ability to import oil. Crucially, oil and gas markets appear to be entering a period of oversupply, meaning any possible disruption in Russian volumes can easily be offset. The IEA expects oil supply to exceed demand by 1.76 million barrels per day in 2025 and by 3 million bpd in 2026, driven by rising output from OPEC+ and the Americas. Global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets are also expanding rapidly, with new supply coming online in the coming years across the U.S., Qatar, Canada, and elsewhere. LNG capacity is projected to grow from 500 million tons per year in 2024 to 800 mtpa by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency. While Trump's foreign policy remains unpredictable, a few things seem clear. He can't, as he once claimed, end the Ukraine war in one day, and what he can do is unlikely to have much of an impact on oil and gas markets. Enjoying this column? Check out Reuters Open Interest (ROI),, opens new tab your essential new source for global financial commentary. ROI delivers thought-provoking, data-driven analysis. Markets are moving faster than ever. ROI, opens new tab can help you keep up. Follow ROI on LinkedIn, opens new tab and X., opens new tab
