Slovenia bans arms trade with Israel over its actions in Gaza
Slovenia, which often criticized Israel over reported atrocities in Gaza, called the ban, announced late Thursday, 'the first such move by a European Union member state.'
Early in July, Slovenia banned two far-right Israeli ministers from entering the country, accusing them of inciting 'extreme violence and serious violations of the human rights of Palestinians' with 'their genocidal statements.'
In June 2024, Slovenia's parliament passed a decree recognizing Palestinian statehood, following in the steps of Ireland, Norway and Spain.
Tiny Slovenia has almost no arms trade with Israel and the decision to ban weapons trade with Israel is mainly a diplomatic message meant to step up pressure as international outrage over Israel's conduct and images of starvation in Gaza grows.
Last year, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer's government suspended exports of some weapons to Israel because they could be used to break international law. Spain says it halted arms sales to Israel in October 2023. The Netherlands has also cracked down on weapons trade with Israel, and there are court cases in France and Belgium around weapons trade with Israel, but none of the three has announced a blanket ban on all trade and transit similar to what Slovenia announced Friday.
Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob has said on multiple occasions that Slovenia would act unilaterally in the absence of concerted EU action, the state STA news agency reported.
'The EU is currently incapable of completing this task due to internal discord and disunity,' the government press release said.
'The result thereof is shameful: People in Gaza are dying because they are systematically denied humanitarian aid. They are dying under rubble, without access to drinking water, food and basic health care.'
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The Middle East Israel-Hamas warFacebookTweetLink Follow Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden. Even as someone who helped negotiate the only two ceasefires of the terrible war in Gaza, including the release of nearly 150 hostages, the situation today seems hopeless and destined to simply continue with no clear end in sight. That is not acceptable. This war must end. The hostages must come home. Humanitarian aid must surge. Gaza needs a multiyear recovery without Hamas in charge. This all needs to start now. So, how? To answer, let's review what happened over the last two weeks, some of the options that are now being proposed, and what might work to finally bring this to an end. Only two weeks ago, there was hope that Israel and Hamas — through US, Qatari, and Egyptian mediation — were on the brink of a 60-day ceasefire. That deal entailed the release of half the living hostages Hamas still holds, thought to be ten people, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including more than one hundred now serving life sentences, together with a 60-day ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas, daily surges of humanitarian aid, and a commitment by Israel, backed by Trump, to negotiate over those 60 days the conditions to end the war. These promising talks reportedly broke down after Hamas leaders living comfortably in Qatar accepted its terms, but Hamas terrorists holding the keys to the hostages inside Gaza said no or demanded new terms. Israel and the US walked out of the talks, leading to their collapse. In the days that followed, reports emerged of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza — due largely, it appears, to Israel's decision in March to blockade Gaza and allow no assistance to enter at all over nearly 80 days. Israel now faces a crisis of its own making with the world's attention focused on its misguided humanitarian decisions, as opposed to focusing on Hamas as the obstacle to a ceasefire. Meanwhile, France responded with an initiative to recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state next month without demanding anything up front from Hamas or explaining how such an initiative might help end the Gaza crisis anytime soon. The UK went a step further and said it will also recognize a Palestinian state next month unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza, thereby guaranteeing that Hamas will not accept one. Hamas in turn welcomed these initiatives and released images of an emaciated hostage digging his own grave, thereby making clear that it now has no intent to cut a deal. Before discussing ways out of this impasse, let's stipulate that the delivery of assistance to the people of Gaza is non-negotiable and must continue no matter what. This is not only moral, but strategic, because Hamas views civilian suffering as a component of its strategy. Israel's blockade, a tactic the Biden administration never allowed, was a trap for itself, allowing Hamas to turn the tables even as the group obstructs the ceasefire needed to bring immediate and sustained relief to the population it purports to represent. Israel has since declared humanitarian pauses in fighting and restored delivery of UN aid, even with risk of some diversion to Hamas. This is the right move, and it must continue no matter what option is chosen going forward to secure the release of hostages. The options now being discussed can broadly be categorized into five outlines: 1. Military Victory: Proponents of this option, including inside the Israeli government, claim that Hamas's leaders inside Gaza will never accept a deal. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to further intensify its military campaign, including to find and eliminate those few remaining leaders of Hamas inside Gaza. The hope is that Hamas' control in Gaza will crack, and Israel can then establish a new Palestinian entity to secure and govern the strip, one that is not Hamas or the existing Palestinian Authority. But Israel has been doing precisely this since May, intensifying its military campaign with five divisions deployed into Gaza. This operation, called Gideon's Chariots, did help eliminate Mohammed Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at the time, and seize 70% of the strip. but Israel also lost over forty soldiers, tragically killed civilians, and did not fundamentally change the equation or lead to a deal. There is no reason to believe that more of the same will deliver a different result, and to further intensify the war now as international support reaches its nadir carries strategic risks to Israel far greater than any potential tactical military gain. 2. Comprehensive Deal: Proponents of this option claim the obstacle to the 60-day ceasefire deal is its phasing since Hamas demands a permanent end to the war upfront. Thus, Israel should now propose the return of all hostages living and dead in exchange for a full withdrawal from Gaza, the establishment of a new governance structure that is not Hamas, and a large-scale release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. I call this the 'have it all' option because it suggests there is a magic key to free all hostages, end the war, and remove Hamas from any significant role in Gaza. In my experience negotiating with Hamas, however, this proposal likely leads to an even more intractable negotiation upfront. Hamas will haggle over every name on a proposed governing council, demand guarantees such as a UN Security Council resolution against future Israeli operations, refuse under any circumstances to disarm or relinquish security control, and demand the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. So, this is unlikely a faster path to a deal that brings a ceasefire or returns hostages than the phased deal that was nearly agreed to only two weeks ago. No doubt, Israel and the US missed an opportunity earlier this year to maintain the deal it inherited from the Biden administration, a deal backed by the UN Security Council and one that could have been extended through talks on these issues with a ceasefire in place. The point of this essay is not to argue what might have been, but rather what to do now — and the fastest path to stopping the war and freeing hostages. Opening an entirely new negotiation on a new deal would not achieve either, anytime soon. 3. Stick to a 60-day Proposal: Proponents of this option, and I have been one, believe the fastest path to stop the war and ultimately end it altogether remains the existing phased proposal. Hamas is divided within its ranks and the US could press the three countries with influence — Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey — to demand that Hamas take the deal, release ten hostages, and begin the 60-day pause. The 'or else' for Hamas and its leaders might include exile from Doha, together with requests for extradition to the United States for their role in killing Americans, and new sanctions to ensure they do not set up shop elsewhere, other than perhaps Iran, where they would be less effective and vulnerable to Israeli targeting. This pressure together with international support for the deal would help influence the holdouts inside Hamas. In my experience negotiating these deals, international pressure matters to Hamas as much as military pressure. The problem with this option now is that the French and UK initiatives have removed any such pressure or incentive from Hamas to close any deal, as a Palestinian state has been promised in September no matter what happens with the hostages. Hamas views creation of a Palestinian state not as an end goal but as a stepping stone to ending Israel's existence. Its leaders have deemed the French initiative 'one of the fruits of October 7,' and Hamas has since shown no readiness to renew talks on the 60-day deal, a point brought home with its grotesque displays of hostages starving in tunnels. 4. Unilateral Humanitarian Pause: An outlier option could see Israel declare a 30-day pause on major combat operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israel would not withdraw its forces from present positions, and retain the right to respond in self-defense, but it would immediately shift international focus back on Hamas while also allowing the Israeli military forces to rest and refit. True, this would also allow Hamas to rest and refit with no hope of a near-term hostage release, but by alleviating the aid situation, Israel might benefit strategically by taking this card away from Hamas and demonstrating that Israel is now correcting for its own mistakes. It might also demand International Red Cross access to the hostages as a condition for the pause, an issue of urgency given the horrific images Hamas released of hostages in recent days. The problem with this option is that it says nothing about what happens after the pause, further removes pressure from Hamas, and would be extremely unpopular in Israel, both within the rightwing Israeli government but also the broader population, to include most hostage families that rightly demand a process leading to a deal – not a unilateral move by Israel that might benefit Hamas with nothing in return. 5. US Breaks with Israel: Proponents of this option believe the United States should announce a halt on all further arms sales to Israel and demand that Israel end the war unilaterally even with Hamas remaining in control of Gaza. Some go further and claim this should happen even without hostages being freed. Their argument is that the overwhelming priority is to stop the war and only the United States has leverage against Israel to force it into doing so. As for the hostages, proponents of this argument claim that Netanyahu, not Hamas, is the primary obstacle to a deal and that by halting US military support, the Israelis might make concessions needed to conclude a deal. These arguments are appealing to those appalled by the images from Gaza and wishing for a quick fix. But they would do nothing to stop, let alone end, the war. Hamas has shown no serious indication that it will release all the hostages if Israel simply gives up, and if Hamas remains in charge of Gaza there is no chance whatsoever for longer-term peace or an internationally backed relief plan that the strip so badly requires. In any case, this is a politically motivated and not realistic option for those who truly aim to stop the war. It's also highly unlikely to ever happen. Trump is unlikely to break with Israel, and Israel is unlikely to simply withdraw from Gaza without all the Israeli hostages and a deal that helps to ensure Hamas cannot retain its control there. In total, that is a depressing summary — it suggests that every broad option now being discussed is either unlikely to succeed or might make the situation even worse. So, what would I recommend? Senior officials do not have the luxury of admiring a problem or analyzing impractical or politically motivated options. They must think seriously about the best of the bad, or meld options together to chart a new path. That is what I might propose: Because, combining options two, three, and four offers an immediate path to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, returning the focus squarely on Hamas, and parlaying the unconstructive proposals coming from Paris, London, and other capitals. This new path — call it Option 6 — would combine a unilateral 30-day pause in Israeli military operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation with an ultimatum that by the end of the 30 days, Hamas must free half the living hostages to extend the ceasefire by 60 days under the existing proposal. From there, you could proceed with a firm, US-backed commitment to negotiate over those 60-days a comprehensive deal to end the war with a new governance structure in Gaza and the release of all remaining hostages. If Hamas refuses to release half the remaining hostages after 30 days, then Israel's unilateral pause would end. Israel could return to military operations but after its military has refit and with the legitimacy for its objectives somewhat restored internationally. This might also parry the French initiative to recognize Palestinian statehood at the UN general assembly next month: If, following Israel's unilateral pause, Hamas has not released ten hostages, then the obstacle to peace would clearly be Hamas. On the other hand, if Hamas does release the ten hostages and we are entering a 60-day window for negotiations to end the war, then it would not make sense to declare Palestinian statehood at the start of that process, as opposed to an incentive towards its conclusion. At bottom, this is an opportunity for Israel and the United States to flip the script entirely, urgently address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and place the onus for ending the crisis more squarely on Hamas where it belongs. Trump and Netanyahu may not favor such an option as it takes pressure off Hamas on the front end, but it would dramatically increase such pressure — strategic pressure, not just tactical pressure — on the back end. It's also the only viable option at this moment that is likely to achieve what we all want to see: assistance distributed throughout Gaza, hostages coming out of Gaza, and an end to the war with Hamas no longer governing or in control of Gaza. The alternatives might score rhetorical points, but they won't help anyone in Gaza, not the civilians trapped in this awful war, nor the hostages now in tunnels for over 600 days. It's time indeed to flip the script. That means Option 6.
