DeepSeek unveils upgraded giant-challenging R1 model
The updated model, R1-0528, significantly enhances performance in complex inference tasks, narrowing the gap with OpenAI's o3 series and Google's Gemini 2.5 Pro, according to a post on the developer platform Hugging Face.
While described as a 'minor' version upgrade, R1-0528 introduces substantial improvements in mathematical reasoning, programming, and logical deduction. DeepSeek also reported a 50% reduction in hallucinations—AI-generated false or misleading output—in tasks such as rewriting and summarization.
In a WeChat post, the Hangzhou-based firm said the model now excels at generating front-end code, roleplaying, and producing creative writing including essays and novels. 'The model has demonstrated outstanding performance across various benchmark evaluations.'
Originally launched in January, R1 quickly went viral, challenging assumptions that advanced AI development requires vast computing infrastructure. Its success triggered responses from Chinese tech giants such as Alibaba and Tencent, both of which released competing models claiming superior performance.
DeepSeek also disclosed that it applied a distillation technique—transferring the reasoning methodology from R1-0528—to enhance Alibaba's Qwen 3 8B Base model, boosting its performance by more than 10%.
'We believe the chain-of-thought from DeepSeek-R1-0528 will hold significant importance for both academic research and industrial development focused on small-scale models,' the company added.
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