Akazawa in Washington for trade talks after weekend's election
Tokyo wants to strike a deal before US President Donald Trump's August 1 deadline for 25 percent tariffs.
Shortly after landing, Japanese Economic Revitalization Minister Akazawa Ryosei told reporters, "These are negotiations involving our national interests, so whether we won or lost an election is fundamentally irrelevant."
He added, "We will continue vigorous discussions to find a mutually agreeable solution between Japan and the United States, while firmly protecting our interests."
It is Akazawa's eighth trip to the US capital to negotiate tariffs. He would like to hold talks with US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
But Bessent said in a CNBC interview on Monday that he does not intend to rush the negotiations.
He noted that the US is more concerned with getting "high quality deals" than meeting the deadline.
He also said that regardless of the election's outcome, Washington is prioritizing "getting the best deal for the American people."
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The order to attack Japanese cities with atomic bombs was issued on July 25, 1945, by acting U.S. Army Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, to "deliver (the) first special bomb as soon as weather will permit after about Aug. 3, 1945. ... The target list: 'Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.' " Further attacks on the above targets were authorized to proceed as soon as additional atomic bombs were delivered. The order explicitly confirmed that Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson had approved it. U.S. President Harry Truman, of course, provided the ultimate authorization for dropping the bombs. Before the above order to attack was given, the U.S. Air Force had started practicing to use the atomic bombs from around mid-July through early August in Japan, dropping 49 mock bombs with conventional explosives, each weighing 6.5 tons, the same as the one used on Nagasaki, on 18 prefectures. The training was to learn the necessary trajectory for the real thing. The first uranium bomb (Little Boy) had been shipped earlier and arrived in Tinian on July 26. The plutonium implosion device (Fat Man) arrived in Tinian shortly thereafter. A third bomb of the Fat Man type would arrive in Tinian later in August. With two bombs in Tinian, both would be used. The Potsdam Declaration demanding Japan's surrender or face destruction was issued on July 26, 1945, around the same time as the order to deploy the atomic bombs. The declaration promised the Japanese that they could design their new government as long as it was peaceful and more democratic. There was debate on the U.S. side to suggest the imperial system could continue, as some knew this would be critical to a successful occupation, but the declaration was silent on this point. Diplomatic discussions were launched through Switzerland, a neutral and nonbelligerent power acting as an intermediary, to seek clarification on whether the imperial system could continue in the Asian nation's postwar government. In Japan's request for clarification on the issue, its communications did not specifically mention Emperor Hirohito, who, according to Imperial Household historical records, had resigned himself to abdicating to assume accountability. Soviet leader Josef Stalin chose to delay those discussions because he wanted the USSR to enter the war so it could grab territory. Yet, the U.S. did know from intercepted messages between Tokyo and Moscow that the Japanese were seeking a way to end the war starting in June 1945. And after the Potsdam Declaration was issued, the intercepted messages confirmed that Japan sought a clarification of the continuation of the imperial system in the new democratic system. The U.S. chose to interpret that request for clarification as a rejection of the Potsdam Declaration. At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets had committed to attack Japan by Aug. 15. However, with confirmation that the July 16 bomb test in New Mexico had been a complete success, the Allies no longer needed the USSR's help to end the war without an invasion, nor did they want Stalin involved in the postwar aftermath. The U.S. and U.K. chose not to inform him about the bomb, but through his spy networks, he already knew all about the Manhattan Project. After the Hiroshima bombing at 8:15 a.m. on Aug. 6, the Soviet attack was brought forward. It commenced just after midnight on Aug. 9 Moscow time. Fat Man was dropped on the unlucky city of Nagasaki at 11:02 a.m. on Aug. 9 (Japan time). The bombing took place later than planned because the city of Kokura was the primary target that day, but cloud cover and smoke obscured the city, so after a delay, the Americans chose the secondary target. Was it necessary to drop the bombs on civilian population centers to demonstrate the power of the weapons? Months before the attacks, a special committee debated how to deploy the new weapons. An early proposal to stage a demonstration, possibly on an offshore island near Tokyo Bay, was rejected as officials believed only the shock of an actual strike would compel Japan to surrender. The committee ultimately settled on a "dual target" plan to strike a military facility located near a manufacturing hub with its workers. However, shortly after, a different committee set aside the "dual target" plan and proposed the cities of Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Kyoto as targets. Secretary of War Harry Stimson vetoed Kyoto so Nagasaki took its place. These cities were chosen mainly because, unlike other major Japanese cities, they had not yet been heavily bombed, which would help in assessing the damage and effectiveness of the attack. The question then is why the first atomic bomb was dropped just a week or so after the Potsdam Declaration. The evidence strongly suggests the attacks were timed to occur before the USSR could enter the war against Japan. With the "iron curtain" already descended on Eastern Europe, the U.S. and Great Britain wanted to check Stalin's influence in postwar Asia. Was it necessary to drop it in the morning hours when civilian populations would be most concentrated in the city center? With the change in U.S. bombing strategy in January 1945 from high-altitude precision targeting to low-altitude attacks on civilian centers with incendiary bombs, the distinction between military, industrial and civilian targets was cast aside. The objective became to destroy large sections of a city at once. Starting with the firebombing of Tokyo on March 9-10, 1945, which took the lives of over 100,000 civilians, the use of napalm and white phosphorus incendiary bombs dropped by hundreds of bombers on major civilian centers continued over the following months, causing several hundred thousand more civilian deaths and leaving millions homeless. The issue of civilian casualties during this period was not a priority. Daytime raids allowed bombing crews to see their targets clearly and document the damage caused. Given the nature of the orders issued on July 25 and the fact that two bombs were expected to arrive in Tinian before Aug. 3, it's clear the plan was to drop both bombs to compare their effectiveness before Japan could mount a realistic response. The debate over the necessity of using such destructive weapons continues to this day. U.S. history books have long stated the bombings were needed to avoid an invasion of Japan that could cost up to 1 million American casualties. The fierce defense of Okinawa is cited as an example of what would take place in an invasion of Kyushu, which was expected to be the first U.S. target. The problem with that reasoning is that the invasion of Japan under Operation Olympic was planned to start in November, some three months after the atomic bombings. The U.S. knew with certainty that Japan was trying to end the war and believed surrender could likely be secured by accepting the recommendation of some American experts to signal support for a constitutional monarchy. The obvious alternative to using nuclear weapons was to wait for the USSR's planned attack on Japan, expected around mid-August. But Washington and its allies wanted to avoid Soviet involvement, so the U.S. saw using atomic bombs as the better option. There is some historical evidence that suggests the bombs were also intended to pressure Stalin to halt further advances into Europe and elsewhere. But that plan failed miserably — both bombs were dropped, the USSR entered the war and demanded full involvement in postwar plans for the Asian nation as a reward for its brief six-day fight before Japan announced its surrender. Every Aug. 6 and 9, Hiroshima and Nagasaki update and announce the number of deaths caused by the atomic bombings. Radioactive fallout continued to cause cancers for decades after the attacks. As of Aug. 6, 2025, Hiroshima has recorded 349,246 names; Nagasaki will also add more names to last year's total of 198,785. Edo Naito is a commentator on Japanese politics, law and history. He is a retired international business attorney and has held board of director and executive positions at several U.S. and Japanese multinational companies.
