Helicopter Struck Overhead Cable Before Crash In Uttarakhand: Probe Body
In the helicopter crash that killed six people in Uttarakhand in May, the main rotor blade of the chopper struck an overhead fibre cable, before tumbling down the hillside and coming to rest against a tree, according to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
Releasing the preliminary probe report of the crash on Saturday, the AAIB said that the investigation team is working on the further course of action to find the root cause of the accident.
The 17-year-old Bell 407 helicopter operated by Aerotrans Services Pvt Ltd, with six passengers onboard, crashed 24 minutes after being airborne on May 8.
The pilot and five passengers died in the accident, while one passenger sustained serious injuries.
AAIB said that the helicopter, which was airborne from Kharsali helipad at 8.11 am on May 8, was destroyed in the crash but there was no fire. The accident happened at Gangnani in Uttarkashi at 8.35 am.
In its five-page report, AAIB said the helicopter flew for 20 minutes before descending from its assigned altitude.
"Initially, the pilot attempted to land on the Uttarkashi-"Gangotri Road (NH 34) near Gangnani in Uttarkashi. During the landing attempt, the helicopter's main rotor blade struck an overhead fibre cable running parallel to the road.
"It also damaged some roadside metallic barricades. However, the helicopter was unable to land and tumbled down the hillside. Eventually, it came to rest against a tree, approximately 250 feet deep in a gorge," it said.
The helicopter, powered by Rolls Royce engine, was manufactured in 2008.
The US National Transportation Safety Board and Canada's Transportation Safety Board have appointed accredited representatives and technical advisors for the investigation.
"The investigation team is coordinating with them for further course of action required to find out the root cause(s)," the report said.
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India Today
5 hours ago
- India Today
Story of the crash of Flight AI 171 and a very flighty investigative report
The Air India Flight 171 crash investigation has left aviation professionals and the public deeply unsettled: not because it clarified, but because it seemed tailored to deflect. One glaring inconsistency lies in the heavy emphasis on Fuel Control Switches (FCS), framed as either a manual error by the pilots or a mechanical spotlight appears calculated: if not to direct blame, then certainly to sow suspicion. The cockpit voice recordings selectively quoted in the report hint at confusion and miscommunication, yet are strategically vague enough to insinuate pilot fault without explicitly stating the most critical aspect, which is FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control), remains conspicuously under-reported. This digital system is the nerve centre of modern engines, and any glitch or misinterpretation could trigger a dual engine shutdown. The fact that both engines failed within three seconds of lift-off, and that the switches allegedly transitioned to cutoff near simultaneously, should demand a forensic analysis of FADEC's role. Yet, the report barely acknowledges its presence. This article is based solely on the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) report and my experience as a commercial pilot. The report appears not only factually inconsistent but also contradictory. It states that although the aft Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) was completely burned out and the forward EAFR was damaged, data was still retrieved via the Golden the report is based on EAFR data obtained through the Golden Chassis, then the numerous factual inaccuracies raise concerns about the reliability of that data. Could the EAFR itself have been compromised? In today's world of artificial intelligence, even a pilot's voice can be convincingly as an experienced pilot, my interpretation might shock everyone today, since the vested interest of the corporates has already spread a false narrative all over the world, insinuating the pilots' involvement in AI 171 my flying experience and the AAIB narrative, I am of the opinion that the Fuel Control Switches (FCS) were not moved to cutoff, nor did they transition to cutoff as stated in the report. I will prove this in the later part of this article. The engines never flamed out on their own, nor were they shut down using the Fuel Control distress that this report has caused among flight crews is profound. It's not just the implications but the insinuations. The omission of altitude data, engine telemetry, and a full transcript of pilot communications only intensifies suspicion that the report's true aim may be damage control, not absence of altitude data in the AI 171 crash report, especially during the climb phase, is deeply troubling. In any post-accident investigation involving a commercial aircraft, altitude traces are fundamental. Their omission raises serious concerns about the potential suppression of facts, or it is sheer critical anomaly is the landing gear status. Under normal circumstances, gear retraction occurs between 50–100 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), and by three seconds after lift-off, the aircraft should have reached approximately 100-150 feet. Yet, the gear was reportedly not opens two possibilities:1. Gear was selected 'UP' but remained extended. The report mentions the gear lever was in the 'DOWN' Figure 12 of the report page shows the lever in a position between 'UP' and 'DOWN', suggesting it may have been selected 'UP' but failed to true, this points to a failure in the ground-air logic system, which determines whether the aircraft is airborne. The system will not allow the gear to be retracted if it believes that the aircraft is still on the ground.A faulty signal could have led FADEC to misinterpret the aircraft as still on the ground, triggering an engine the aircraft gets airborne with FADEC at ground logic and at 10 feet radio altimeters, the FADEC gets an airborne signal conflicting with weight-on-wheels micro switch: FADEC may cut the engine power to Ground Idle or shut it down completely.2. The more likely possibility is that 'Gear' was never selected 'UP' due to pilots' distraction at takeoff. If the lever was genuinely in the 'DOWN' position, it implies that the pilots were distracted by a failure around 50 feet AGL or distraction could have prevented gear retraction and coincided with the dual engine rollback nature of this failure, possibly electrical or software-related, may have caused an FADEC reset, leading to fuel or engine thrust in the Thrust Lever QuadrantBoth thrust levers were found in the aft (idle) position as per the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained in the forward (takeoff) position until impact. This presents a critical mismatch between the physical lever positions in the flight deck and the digital command interpreted by FADEC: unless, of course, the levers were displaced post-impact due to mechanical or thermal this raises a deeper question: can we trust post-crash lever positions as reliable indicators of pilot intent? Or are we witnessing the limitations of forensic reconstruction in the face of high-energy impact and fire damage?advertisementIf the pilots attempted to relight the engines, it's plausible they moved the thrust levers to idle to manage the temperature surge that typically accompanies ignition. This is standard practice to prevent Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) overshoot, which can damage engine it is difficult to imagine FADEC initiating a relight sequence with the thrust levers digitally locked in the takeoff position, unless the system is designed to override lever input, restart the engine at idle, and then ramp up thrust in a controlled manner. If so, this behaviour should be explicitly recorded in EAFR and yet, the report suggests it wasn' FADEC can override thrust lever input during relight, but fails to log this override in EAFR, then we're dealing with a black box within a black box: a subsystem whose decisions are invisible to investigators. That's not just a data gap; it's a design philosophy problem and a clever technique to hide an era where automation is increasingly entrusted with life-critical decisions, shouldn't every autonomous action be traceable and auditable? If FADEC's logic is opaque, then post-crash analysis becomes speculative and safety improvements become reactive rather than discrepancy isn't just about lever positions. It's about how much control pilots truly have, and how much trust we place in systems that may act independently and silently. If FADEC made decisions that weren't recorded, then the investigation is chasing shadows. And if the levers were moved by human hands during a desperate relight attempt, then we owe it to those pilots to understand their final actions with clarity, not ambiguity and that desperate action took place at 08:08: READ: Engines dead, pilots glided plane for 120km over ocean, saved 306 livesThe gear and thrust lever's ambiguous position, combined with the missing altitude data, suggests a deeper systemic issue. Whether it was a mechanical fault, a logic misfire, or an electrical fluctuation, the implications point squarely at FADEC's role in engine power degradation. It is humanly not possible to shut down both engines within a span of one second since the fuel cutoff switches are mechanically spring-loaded, and it takes some effort to lift it from the detent, take it back and then put it in the the question is what is the time duration if FADEC cuts off both engines. A deeper analysis into the FADEC system reveals that if FADEC sends sequential commands due to processing order, it can take up to one second for cutting down both engines. While manually it is not possible to cut down both engines within one second, FADEC can do it anywhere from .1 to 1 second. As per the investigation report, both engines were shut down within a span of one vague AAIB ReportThe time versus distance information given in the report does not tally with technical data of the Boeing 787 aircraft. Since the AAIB did not have any type-rated pilots and qualified engineers in the team at the time of the preliminary investigation, the manufacturer and other officials were able to put their words into the mouths of AAIB officials who had no knowledge about the aircraft systems. It is also pertinent to ask here as to who decoded the EAFR data. Let us now examine the report one by conversationThe explanation for the selective pilot dialogues in the report may have been due to a misunderstanding at the critical time of the flight, which is as first officer was flying the aircraft and the more experienced captain was monitoring the flight. At three seconds after lift-off, both engines spool down to idle due to some FADEC fault (either Ground/Air contradiction or electrical glitch). Remember that I used the word idle and not fail or Fuel Control Switch captain who was monitoring the flight would be the first one to notice it and realises that both engines were losing power near simultaneously. Being an experienced Line Trainer, he quickly reacts to move both Fuel Control Switches to cutoff in order to put them back to run, since it is the only way to relight those engines if they fail and to get the required thrust back. However, the engines did not fail here: the N1 and N2 were reduced to PF who was busy flying the aircraft notices both engines spooling down a bit later, and, seeing the captain's hand on the Fuel Control Switches, mistook this action for cutting off the engines and hence, the question from the confused first officer. The captain may have been taken aback by this questioning and responded that he did not do so. He was ready to do so but the engines never failed at this time, but only N1 and N2 were reduced to idle power and, therefore, this action was never done at 08:08: will take approximately four to five seconds for the engines to spool down from takeoff power to idle. RAT (Ram Air Turbine) will deploy only when both engines' Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) falls below 'air idle'.Therefore, as given in the report, assuming that both engines were at full power and both engine Fuel Control Switches were cutoff at 08:08:42 + 1 (time delay as given by the report for cutting off), we will have to add at least four seconds for the rollback which would give the RAT deployment time as 08:08:47 assuming that RAT deploys instantly after both engines reach below flight practice, RAT takes two seconds to deploy after it gets the signal, and this extends our timing further ahead to 08:08:49. But the report says that the RAT was seen deployed immediately after lift-off, which indicates that the RAT had deployed before the Fuel Control Switches were allegedly three possibilities of automatic RAT deployment immediately after lift-off indicate either both engines failed at or above lift-off (which has not happened), a total electrical failure with power loss to the captain's and first officer's instruments, or full system hydraulic pressure RAT typically takes 5-6 seconds to start supplying power to the systems after the report says that RAT started supplying power at 08:08:47, reducing 6 seconds from this time brings the RAT deployment time as 08:08:41. This is the time when RAT was fully deployed. However, RAT takes 2 seconds to deploy once it gets the deployment signal, which brings the time to 08:08:39 and this is the most critical aspect which everyone needs to understand. 08:08:39 is the lift-off time given in the AAIB report. Therefore, it is clear to assume that the RAT did not deploy due to both engines failing at 08:08:42, as stated in the report, but due to some other reason at lift-off or immediately thereafter. The RAT cannot deploy on the if both Fuel Control Switches had transitioned from run to cutoff at 08:08:42, then two seconds later the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door should have opened, which did not happen. It is very clear from this that at 08:08:42 both engines did not fail, but FADEC may have reduced the takeoff thrust to idle or near it is safe to assume that the pilots did not move both Fuel Control Switches to cutoff at this time. It is also clear from the report that the throttle lever was in the takeoff position till the impact, which means that RPM was reduced to idle by FADEC with the throttle lever at takeoff therefore, the Fuel Control Switches were not activated at 08:08:42 but FADEC probably reduced the takeoff power to idle. Taking four seconds for both engines to spool down from takeoff power to idle and adding one second for the difference in both engines spooling down as given by the report, we are back at 08:08:47 where the previously reported conversation between the pilots took pilots found themselves in an unimaginable scenario: their aircraft was descending during takeoff with thrust levers at takeoff power, both engines at idle power, and a catastrophic outcome looming just seconds no prescribed action for such a situation and virtually unheard of in the annals of aviation, they made a split-second decision. At 08:08:50, as a last-ditch manoeuvre, they moved the Fuel Control Switches to cutoff and then the actions are: Fuel Control Switches (both), cutoff and then run, one by one. The first FCS was put to run at 08:08:52, which means the actions were initiated at least two seconds earlier, at 08:08:50. Engine No. 2's FCS was returned to the run position at 08:08:56, as per the report. Now imagine: to move both Fuel Control Switches from run to cutoff and then back to run, it took them at least six seconds or more. This action reset the FADEC, and both engines began to relight. Had they been just a bit higher in altitude, these two men might well have been hailed as again, since it was the first time that both engine RPMs wound down below idle, the APU door opened within two seconds at 08:08:54, as stated in the report. However, going back to our timing of 08:08:47 plus 2, the APU door should have opened at 08:08:49. But the report indicates it opened at 08:08:54. Therefore, this is not consistent with the APU auto-start logic as given in the report, but it does align if the Fuel Control Switches were moved to cutoff and then to run at 08:08: Versus RealityNow, analysing both situations, what could have possibly happened on AI 171 is as follows from the preliminary report. A detailed diagram is presented for easier understanding.1. An electrical glitch (possibly at lift-off or before) initiates the RAT deployment at lift-off or shortly thereafter (probably loss of all electrical power, including to the captain's and first officer's instruments). Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 2. The melting of the aft EAFR covering, composed of steel and titanium, indicates an exceptionally high-intensity fire far exceeding typical fuel combustion temperatures. One plausible source of such extreme heat could be a thermal event involving the APU's lithium-ion battery. If this battery were to catch fire, the temperatures could surge to levels capable of compromising and burning through the EAFR shielding. I have personally experienced a thermal runaway of the Li-Ion APU battery in B777 and the intermittent fire that erupted every 15 minutes was so intense that the battery had to be isolated from all other equipment on the tarmac.3. A high-voltage fire of such calibre may have created a total power failure or interruption/ fluctuation in the aircraft that compelled the RAT to deploy as soon as the aircraft was airborne. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 4. The FADEC got multiple resets as a result of power supply interruption/fluctuation.5. At 08:08:42, FADEC gradually reduced takeoff thrust to idle, or a thrust fluctuation may have occurred. This likely explains how the aircraft could climb from about 150 feet AGL and 180 knots to 425 feet AGL. If both Fuel Control Switches had been suddenly cutoff, the aircraft would have climbed a maximum of another 150 feet to a total of 300 feet AGL, considering the extra 30 knots above gliding speed, the sudden loss of thrust to near zero, and with gear and flaps down. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 6. The APU doors did not open within two seconds after both engines were cut off at 08:08:42. This clearly indicates that the Fuel Control Switches were never cut off, nor did they transition from run to cutoff. At this time, only Engine No. 1's thrust started to decrease.7. 08:08:43: Engine No. 2 Thrust starts to decrease. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 8.08:08:46: Engine No. 1 RPM reduces to idle. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 9.08:08:47: Engine No. 2 RPM reduces to idle. Communication between the pilots takes place. The RAT starts powering electrical and hydraulics. The aircraft reached its maximum altitude of 425 feet AGL. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 10. 08:08:50: The pilots begin to recycle both FCS to cutoff and run, in order to reset the FADEC and get the takeoff thrust back. A desperate attempt since both the engines were at idle with thrust lever at takeoff position. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 11. 08:08:52: Both engines' FCS are cutoff and No.1 FCS is moved to run. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 12. 08:08:54: APU inlet door opens as a result of both engines shutting down two seconds earlier. This indicates both engines were shut down for the first time during the flight at 08:08:52. No 2 Engine FCS moved to run. 13. After both engines started relighting at 08:08:56, the report says, 'The Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) was observed to be rising for both engines, indicating relight. Engine No. 1's core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery.' Very intriguing. Deceleration stopped from where? As per the report, at 08:08:42, both FCS transitioned from run to cutoff which means that both engines N1 and N2 will reduce to wind milling from that point onwards, and by 08:08:47, both engines should have been at wind milling RPM. Both N1 and N2 cannot go below wind milling RPM. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital Wind milling refers to the rotation of the engine's compressor blades caused by airflow rather than engine power. On the ground, when the engines are off, strong headwinds can cause the blades to spin. In flight, if both engines shut down, the forward speed of the aircraft forces air through the engines, causing the blades to rotate: similar to the effect of very admission that core deceleration stopped, reversed, and started to progress to recovery is an acknowledgement that both engines were at idle: moved to wind milling when both Fuel Control Switches were cutoff, and reversed when the Fuel Control Switches were returned to indicates beyond any doubt that both the engines were never shut down at 08:08:42. When both engines' FCS were moved to cutoff by 08:08:52, both engines had at least idle thrust which started deceleration to wind milling and started to relight when they were sequentially moved to run at 08:08:52. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital So where is the question of pilots or a mechanical fault triggering the Fuel Control Switches? The Fuel Control Switches were nothing but scapegoats to save FADEC. Today, the attention has been deviated from FADEC to FCS. Insinuation on the pilots may also be part of diverting scrutiny from the more complex and potentially culpable this light, the switches may be absorbing the blame for a deeper systemic failure, which may demand a closer inspection of the aircraft's digital engine control architecture and the design logic of overruling the pilots by FADEC. Such a design flaw, if proved, will turn catastrophic not only for aircraft manufacturers but also for engine manufacturers and all supporting companies associated with FADEC and other electronics.A pilot suicide theory will also take the heat off the insurers. Tomorrow, if the Fuel Control Switches report is changed to Fuel Control Valve as a typing error, it absolves the pilots and everyone will be happy, including the manufacturer, since the alleged culprit (FADEC) is long this shielding will continue is just a matter of time, but the manufacturer knows the truth through data from ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) and ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System), along with full EAFR transcripts. Did the Board ask for these reports, or were these reports compromised? Does Air India B787's EAFR have a cockpit mapping facility? Not all regulators mandate such requirements. The Board needs to answer all these questions and address the flaws in their report, as stated above, in order to put the facts before the public and come clean. The nation owes this much, at least to all those unfortunate souls who lost their lives due to this AAIB report, through its flawed narrative and contradictory statements, has brought shame upon the nation. However, it is not too late to come forward, acknowledge the errors within the report, and restore its credibility by prioritising truth over corporate interests. Now that the team includes a type-rated pilot, it is imperative that qualified engineers from both mechanical and electrical disciplines are also brought on board to uncover the real cause of this heart goes out to the unfortunate souls who lost their lives in this tragedy, and to the brave pilots who fought valiantly until the very end. I cannot help but empathise with the poor fuel control switches, on which corporate greed seems to depend: in an attempt to shield a faulty FADEC system. Our great nation must hold its head high and commit to uncovering the truth, no matter the consequences.(From fighter jets to classroom desks, Dilip Desmond, former Indian Navy pilot, has lived a life packed with adventure: surviving two aircraft crashes and clocking thousands of miles on Boeing 777s with Air India. Now based near Trivandrum, he runs a school where he shares his experiences through stories and mentorship, turning tales of the skies into lessons for life)- Ends(Views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author)Tune InMust Watch
News18
a day ago
- News18
Air India Crash Probe: AAIB Ropes In ‘Human Factor Specialists'
This is important, as multiple reports in the Western media have laid the blame on the senior pilot for the AI-171 crash The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has roped in 'human factor specialists" besides others in its ongoing probe into the AI-171 Ahmedabad crash, the government told Parliament on Thursday. This is important, as multiple reports in the Western media have laid the blame on the senior pilot for the AI-171 crash. Both the AAIB and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have scotched such reports, appealing to all not to jump to any conclusion. The government has said all the angles are under probe. What government said 'B787 type-rated experienced pilots, type-rated engineers, aviation medicine specialist, human factor specialists and flight recorder specialists have been taken on board as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assist the investigation," minister of state for civil aviation Murlidhar Mohol told Parliament. He added that the preliminary report published on the AAIB website in July does not contain any conclusion. Defects in aircraft The government also told Parliament that a total of 2,094 investigations have been carried out against serious defects or snags reported in various aircraft during the last five years up to June 2025. These were all technical defects—514 reported in 2021, 528 in 2022, 448 in 2023, 421 in 2024, and 183 in 2025. 'All defects which are serious in nature shall be intimated immediately by all operators to DGCA. During the DGCA audit, if it is observed that defects have not been reported by the airline, DGCA initiates investigation and takes appropriate action as per enforcement policy and procedure manual," the government has said. The government also said that there have been a total of eight accidents (involving 1 scheduled aircraft, 3 trainee aircraft and 4 helicopters) reported in the year 2025. These led to the loss of 274 lives, it said. view comments Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
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First Post
24-07-2025
- First Post
Air India crash: How to spin-doctor and peddle narratives, the Western way
Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore used to terrorise villainous Western media by suing them in his courts. They learned to toe the line read more There has been a virtual masterclass lately in the creation and dissemination of biased narratives. Not only in the case of the ill-fated Air India 171 (Boeing 787, June 12, 2025) that crashed, but also in some other, unrelated instances. The age-old practices of 'truth by repeated assertion' and 'dubious circular references' as well as 'strategic silence' have all been deployed in full force. The bottom line with the Air India flight: there is reasonable doubt about whether there was mechanical/software failure and/or sabotage or possible pilot error. Any or all of these caused both engines to turn off in flight. But the way the spin-doctors have spun it, it is now 'official' that the commanding pilot was suicidal and turned off the fuel switch. Boeing, the plane maker, and General Electric, the engine maker, are blameless. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This is, alas, not surprising. It is in the interests of Western MNCs to limit reputational damage and monetary loss related to their products. They do massive marketing by unleashing their PR agencies. We also saw how they protect themselves in other instances. A leaked Pfizer contract for their Covid vaccine insisted that if anything happened, it was the user's problem, not Pfizer's: there was no indemnity. Incidentally, a report on July 19 said that the Pfizer Covid vaccine can lead to severe vision problems. Oh, sorry, no indemnity. What is deplorable in the Air India case is that the AAIB, the Indian entity investigating the disaster, chose to release a half-baked preliminary report with enough ambiguity that a case could be (and definitely was) built up against the poor dead pilots. Any marketing person could have read the report and told them that it would be used to blame the pilots and absolve the manufacturers. Besides, the AAIB report was released late night on a Friday, India time, which meant that the Western media had all of one working day to do the spin-doctoring, which they did with remarkable gusto. Meanwhile, the Indian media slept. Whose decision was this? Clearly, Indian babus need a remedial course in public relations if this was mere incompetence. Of course, if it was intentional, that would be even worse. There is a pattern. In earlier air accidents, such as the Jeju Air crash involving a Boeing 737-800 in South Korea in December, the pilots were blamed. In accidents involving Lion Air (Boeing 737 Max 8, 2018), China Airlines (737-200, 1989), Flydubai (737-800, 2016), ditto. I am beginning to believe that a lot of Asian pilots are poorly trained and/or suicidal. Ditto with the F-35 that fell into the ocean off Japan. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Truth by repeated assertion is a powerful force for gaslighting the gullible. I wonder what excuses we'll hear about the Delta Airlines Boeing 767 whose engine caught fire in the air after take-off from LAX on July 20. The pilots didn't die, so they will speak up. Besides, they were Westerners. I am eagerly awaiting the spin on this. I also noticed with grim amusement how the BBC, WSJ, Bloomberg, and Reuters, and so on were busy quoting each other to validate their assertions. This is a standard tactic that India's 'distorians' (see Utpal Kumar's powerful book Eminent Distorians) have perfected: B will quote third-hand hearsay from A, then C will quote B, D will quote C, and before you know it, the hearsay has become the truth. But if you wind it back from D to C to B to A it becomes, 'I hear someone told someone that xyz happened.' Out of thin air, then. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD There is also the lovely tactic of strategic silence. It has been used to un-person people who ask inconvenient questions. It has also been used to defenestrate inconvenient news. Just days ago, under the Deep State-installed new regime in Syria, hundreds of minority Druze were brutally massacred. There was video on X of armed men in uniform forcing Druze men to jump off tall buildings, and desecrating their shrines. Similarly, there is a brutal reign of terror, rape, murder, and thuggery against Hindus, Buddhists, and others under the Deep State-blessed regime of Mohammed Yunus in Bangladesh: a clear genocide. Neither Syria nor Bangladesh gets any headlines. There are no loud human-rights protests as in the case of Gaza. This is not news. It is un-news. 'Manufacturing Consent' all the way. India is particularly vulnerable to this gaslighting because Indians consume a lot of English-language 'news.' Scholars have long noted how the US public has been maintained in a state of ignorance so they could be easily manipulated. The same is true of the Indian middle class. So, there is yet another reason to do less in English. Fooling, say, the Chinese or Japanese public is a lot more difficult. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The fact is that even though Indians may be literate in English, they do not understand the context and the subtext of what is fed to them by the likes of The Economist, NPR, The Financial Times, The New York Times, etc. The best way I can explain this is the 100+5 analogy in the Mahabharata: they may fight with each other on domestic matters, but Anglosphere and Deep State are in cahoots when it comes to international matters. Things are both getting better and getting worse. On the one hand, social media and its imprint on generative AI mean that it is ever easier to propagate fake news (in addition to deepfake audio and video, of course). On the other hand, despite the problem of charlatans and paid agents provocateurs getting lots of eyeballs, the large number of Indians on social media may push back against the worst kinds of blood libel against India and Indians, of which there's plenty these days, often created by bots from 'friendly' countries. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This is a serious matter indeed. One solution is to do a version of the Great Chinese Firewall and ban wholesale the worst offenders. Indeed, a few of the vilest handles have been ejected from X. However, the pusillanimity with which notorious Pakistani handles were unbanned, then re-banned after outrage, shows there's something rotten in the Information Ministry. Almost exactly the same as the unbanning of Pakistani cricketers, then rebanning after outrage. Is there anybody in charge? Information warfare is insidious. Going back to the Air India case, I think the families of the maligned pilots should sue for gigantic sums for libel and defamation. The sad state of the Indian judiciary may mean that, unfortunately, this will not go far. However, there is precedent: Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore used to terrorise villainous Western media by suing them in his courts. They learned to toe the line. If this tactic does not work, India should eject the hostile media. The Indian market is increasingly important to Western media (not vice versa) because soon there will be more English-reading consumers in India than in the Five Eyes Anglosphere. I should say that in quotes because as I said above, most Indians are blissfully unaware of the hidden agendas, and naively believe them. But 'Judeo-Christian' culture is very different from dharmic. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD I keep getting emails from The New York Times with tempting offers to subscribe to them for something really cheap like Rs. 25 a month. They need Indian readers. I have been shouting from the rooftops for years that one of these charlatan media houses needs to be kicked out, harshly, with 24 hours' notice to wind up and leave. As in the Asian proverb, 'Kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.' The monkeys will notice, and behave. Otherwise, the information warfare is just going to get worse. The writer has been a conservative columnist for over 25 years. His academic interest is innovation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
