OpenAI wants to have a finger in the European AI Gigafactory pie
The Commission has been keenly pushing the concept of high capacity AI hubs to provide infrastructure for European companies for training their own large AI models.
The initiative had originally been announced in January and has since been folded into the AI Continent Action Plan.
Late on Friday OpenAI confirmed that it has formally expressed interest in getting involved.
'These projects are early-stage but they have the potential to power Europe's future,' OpenAI wrote in a blog post in which the ChatGPT developer also announced its intention to sign up to the bloc's newly published Code of Practice for General Purpose AIs (GPAI).
The EU's approach to AI blends rules for AI developers, under the AI Act, with ecosystem support measures – including gigafactories – that aim to accelerate homegrown AIs.
Last month Tech Commissioner Henna Virkkunen announced that the Commission had received more interest in the gigafactory initiative than it had expected – with 76 expressions of interest in building AI hubs. She also said some of these had come from non-European companies but did not disclose the names of any private players at that point.
In its blog post, OpenAI also announced what it framed as a wider 'European AI infrastructure campaign' – saying it's working with European governments to roll out public-private partnerships.
The company also said it's interested in raising country-level funds with willing governments to fund AI startups at a national level.
The developments follow the EU Commission publishing the long-awaited Code of Practice for GPAIs last week. The Code provides detail on the steps that developers of multi-purpose models – such as OpenAI's GPT – can voluntarily take in order to help them comply with the legally binding AI Act.
The drafting process for the Code was long and heavy lobbied by industry, as well as raising civil society concerns. And there is still a lot of uncertainty over who will sign up.
Both OpenAI and France's Mistral have since said they will commit to abiding by the newly completed guidebook. But other large AI companies – among them Google, Amazon and Meta – have so far declined to confirm their plans for the Code.
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