Minimum engagement with Syria

Al-Ahram Weekly

7 days ago

Egypt had already translated its justified concerns about Syria's new rulers into a coherent policy of minimum engagement before the present round of regional and international pressures, writes Amr Hamzawy
While several Arab governments have opted to open channels with the government of Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohamed Al-Jolani) and Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, Egypt has upheld a distinct and more cautious position and one that, in retrospect, has proven prudent.
Cairo voiced early reservations regarding the ideological backgrounds and political orientations of Syria's new rulers, who have emerged from extremist takfiri movements with violent histories and past affiliations with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group. Prior to their ascent to power, these actors were implicated in criminal activities and systematic human rights violations in the areas under their control, a fact well documented by both domestic and international human rights organisations.
Egypt has remained unconvinced by Al-Sharaa's new media discourse, which emphasises the values of citizenship, coexistence, and tolerance among Syria's diverse communities. Instead, the evidence indicates a clear tendency by Al-Sharaa and HTS to monopolise power, resist power-sharing arrangements, and reduce nation-building and the construction of a new social contract to superficial and performative gestures.
The so-called 'National Dialogue Conference' held in Damascus in February this year was widely criticised by Syrian democratic forces for its procedures and content. Likewise, the Constitutional Document issued in March postponed presidential and parliamentary elections in Syria for several years, effectively consolidating the current government as a de facto authority.
Further indications of HTS's monopolistic approach have included efforts to assert unilateral control over the machinery of the state by appointing its members to leadership roles across ministries and key institutions, as well as integrating foreign fighters into Syria's military and security apparatus. The phenomenon of foreign fighters, common to groups like Al-Qaeda, IS, and HTS, has further compounded the risks of institutionalised extremism.
Egypt's reservations were therefore well-founded, and its refusal to rush into an engagement with Syria's new leadership was a calculated and rational stance. Adding to Cairo's initial concerns was the documented relationship between HTS and certain regional actors whose broader Middle East policies have involved supporting extremist religious factions and militias. These policies often run counter to Egypt's conception of national and regional security, one grounded in the imperative to combat religious extremism, eliminate its sources, and confront the violence and terrorism it generates.
Egypt's scepticism was further reinforced by the new Syrian leadership's silence in the face of repeated Israeli attacks on Syria's military infrastructure and capabilities, as well as the incursions of Israeli forces into southern Syrian territories beyond the Occupied Golan Heights and the demilitarised zone. More troubling still was the framing by Israel's far-right government of its role as the 'protector' of Syria's southern Druze population.
The situation escalated in March with the outbreak of clashes in coastal regions of Syria that saw widespread violations and atrocities committed by remnants of the former Al-Assad regime and, more extensively and systematically, by extremist elements affiliated with or allied to HTS.
These attacks targeted Alawite civilians in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Hama. They revealed, on the one hand, what can be described as the 'IS-like character' of HTS, unleashing sectarian violence and indiscriminate killings while ignoring the fundamental shift in its identity from a militant group to a governing authority in a diverse nation-state. On the other hand, they also exposed the catastrophic consequences of HTS's rapid consolidation of control over the military and security institutions in Syria, which were then used as instruments of repression against Alawite communities.
While these coastal clashes and the sectarian violence shocked some regional and international actors who had rushed to embrace Al-Sharaa and had been eager for photo opportunities with him at the People's Palace in Damascus, Cairo's deepening concerns led it to publicly articulate principled positions. These included a commitment to equal citizenship for all Syrians, a firm rejection of sectarian crimes and violations that threaten coexistence and drag a fellow Arab nation into civil strife, and a call for a consensual process to build Syria's new state and a fair social contract between it and its citizens.
As international and regional pressure mounted on Al-Sharaa in the aftermath of the coastal clashes demanding investigations and accountability for the crimes that had been committed, Egypt had already translated its justified concerns into a coherent policy of minimum engagement with Syria's new rulers.
Importantly, this policy of minimum engagement has not prevented Egypt from continuing to condemn Israeli assaults on Syria or from responding positively to developments that genuinely serve the interests of the Syrian people, such as the decision by US President Donald Trump to lift the sanctions on the country.
Statements from Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent weeks have expressed this dual approach amid unprecedented Israeli attacks on Damascus and southern Syria, near-civil conflict between Druze and Bedouin populations in and around Suwayda (echoing the coastal clashes), and a dangerous security deterioration across Syria.
These events have been accompanied by growing separatist sentiments in the east (among the Kurds), the south (among the Druze), and the west (among the Alawites) of the country, as well as mounting public scepticism about HTS's ability, or even willingness, to transcend its militant, jihadist origins and transform itself into a legitimate governing body for a country with such a complex national and societal fabric.
Egypt's policy of minimum engagement, then, is not merely a diplomatic posture but instead is a direct response to a set of grave concerns: the extremist ideological foundations and exclusionary political ambitions of HTS; the trajectory of events in Syria that has exposed the group's limited commitment to citizenship, coexistence, and national reconciliation; and the broader implications of this instability for Syria's future and Egypt's national security in a comprehensive sense.
The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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