Latest news with #Al-Sharaa
Al-Ahram Weekly
41 minutes ago
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Minimum engagement with Syria
Egypt had already translated its justified concerns about Syria's new rulers into a coherent policy of minimum engagement before the present round of regional and international pressures, writes Amr Hamzawy While several Arab governments have opted to open channels with the government of Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohamed Al-Jolani) and Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, Egypt has upheld a distinct and more cautious position and one that, in retrospect, has proven prudent. Cairo voiced early reservations regarding the ideological backgrounds and political orientations of Syria's new rulers, who have emerged from extremist takfiri movements with violent histories and past affiliations with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group. Prior to their ascent to power, these actors were implicated in criminal activities and systematic human rights violations in the areas under their control, a fact well documented by both domestic and international human rights organisations. Egypt has remained unconvinced by Al-Sharaa's new media discourse, which emphasises the values of citizenship, coexistence, and tolerance among Syria's diverse communities. Instead, the evidence indicates a clear tendency by Al-Sharaa and HTS to monopolise power, resist power-sharing arrangements, and reduce nation-building and the construction of a new social contract to superficial and performative gestures. The so-called 'National Dialogue Conference' held in Damascus in February this year was widely criticised by Syrian democratic forces for its procedures and content. Likewise, the Constitutional Document issued in March postponed presidential and parliamentary elections in Syria for several years, effectively consolidating the current government as a de facto authority. Further indications of HTS's monopolistic approach have included efforts to assert unilateral control over the machinery of the state by appointing its members to leadership roles across ministries and key institutions, as well as integrating foreign fighters into Syria's military and security apparatus. The phenomenon of foreign fighters, common to groups like Al-Qaeda, IS, and HTS, has further compounded the risks of institutionalised extremism. Egypt's reservations were therefore well-founded, and its refusal to rush into an engagement with Syria's new leadership was a calculated and rational stance. Adding to Cairo's initial concerns was the documented relationship between HTS and certain regional actors whose broader Middle East policies have involved supporting extremist religious factions and militias. These policies often run counter to Egypt's conception of national and regional security, one grounded in the imperative to combat religious extremism, eliminate its sources, and confront the violence and terrorism it generates. Egypt's scepticism was further reinforced by the new Syrian leadership's silence in the face of repeated Israeli attacks on Syria's military infrastructure and capabilities, as well as the incursions of Israeli forces into southern Syrian territories beyond the Occupied Golan Heights and the demilitarised zone. More troubling still was the framing by Israel's far-right government of its role as the 'protector' of Syria's southern Druze population. The situation escalated in March with the outbreak of clashes in coastal regions of Syria that saw widespread violations and atrocities committed by remnants of the former Al-Assad regime and, more extensively and systematically, by extremist elements affiliated with or allied to HTS. These attacks targeted Alawite civilians in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Hama. They revealed, on the one hand, what can be described as the 'IS-like character' of HTS, unleashing sectarian violence and indiscriminate killings while ignoring the fundamental shift in its identity from a militant group to a governing authority in a diverse nation-state. On the other hand, they also exposed the catastrophic consequences of HTS's rapid consolidation of control over the military and security institutions in Syria, which were then used as instruments of repression against Alawite communities. While these coastal clashes and the sectarian violence shocked some regional and international actors who had rushed to embrace Al-Sharaa and had been eager for photo opportunities with him at the People's Palace in Damascus, Cairo's deepening concerns led it to publicly articulate principled positions. These included a commitment to equal citizenship for all Syrians, a firm rejection of sectarian crimes and violations that threaten coexistence and drag a fellow Arab nation into civil strife, and a call for a consensual process to build Syria's new state and a fair social contract between it and its citizens. As international and regional pressure mounted on Al-Sharaa in the aftermath of the coastal clashes demanding investigations and accountability for the crimes that had been committed, Egypt had already translated its justified concerns into a coherent policy of minimum engagement with Syria's new rulers. Importantly, this policy of minimum engagement has not prevented Egypt from continuing to condemn Israeli assaults on Syria or from responding positively to developments that genuinely serve the interests of the Syrian people, such as the decision by US President Donald Trump to lift the sanctions on the country. Statements from Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent weeks have expressed this dual approach amid unprecedented Israeli attacks on Damascus and southern Syria, near-civil conflict between Druze and Bedouin populations in and around Suwayda (echoing the coastal clashes), and a dangerous security deterioration across Syria. These events have been accompanied by growing separatist sentiments in the east (among the Kurds), the south (among the Druze), and the west (among the Alawites) of the country, as well as mounting public scepticism about HTS's ability, or even willingness, to transcend its militant, jihadist origins and transform itself into a legitimate governing body for a country with such a complex national and societal fabric. Egypt's policy of minimum engagement, then, is not merely a diplomatic posture but instead is a direct response to a set of grave concerns: the extremist ideological foundations and exclusionary political ambitions of HTS; the trajectory of events in Syria that has exposed the group's limited commitment to citizenship, coexistence, and national reconciliation; and the broader implications of this instability for Syria's future and Egypt's national security in a comprehensive sense. The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Memri
6 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
The Qatar Weekly Update (QWU) – Part Of The Qatar Monitor Project (QMP) – No. 29, July 25, 2025
Left to right: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Syrian leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa, Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Aal Thani, victims of massacre of Druze in Suwayda, Syria. 1. MEMRI Daily Brief No. 817, Rising Again To The Historical Moment: "It is far more difficult to do this when your Islamist enemies – Erdoğan, Qatar, and now Al-Sharaa, aka Al-Jolani – pretend to be your allies. There is no propaganda trick that they would not play to pretend to be America's friends. By now, Qatar's trick is well known: Create a problem, like supporting the Taliban for years up to their takeover of Afghanistan with American casualties, then help move American troops to safety, in what Trump called the 'the greatest foreign policy humiliation' in U.S. history. Qatar does this everywhere on the planet. It supports Hamas, which committed the atrocities of October 7, and then presents itself as a mediator. Qatar supports every Islamist terrorist organization against its Westernized opponents." By Yigal Carmon, July 22, 2025. 2. MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 12085, The Qatar Air Force Monitor (QAFM) Project – Part II, July 18, 2025. 3. Reagan's Secretary of Education Joins Qatar's Payroll, The Free Press, July 22, 2025. 4. Why Al-Jazeera Should Be Designated As A Foreign Terrorist Organization, Gatestone Institute, July 21, 2025. 5. The Dangerous Illusion Of Friendship With Qatar And Other Hostile 'Allies," JNS, July 18, 2025. 6. Qatargate: Israeli Police Will Travel To Serbia For Legal Deposition For 'Qatargate' Suspect Einhorn – Report, The Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2025. 7. Turkey-Qatar Alliance Seen As Growing Threat To Israel, Israel Hayom, July 17, 2025. * Yigal Carmon is Founder and President of MEMRI.
Memri
7 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
Rising Again To The Historical Moment
Although he deservedly prides himself on being a dealmaker, President Trump is an ideological leader defending Western civilization and its values. Realizing that he was facing an historical moment, he understood that he needed to make an ideological decision against Iran, and bombed the Iranian nuclear project – despite the opinion of Europeans who are collaborating with evil, and despite some opposition from his isolationist supporters. Thus, he set the ideological principle that a country ruled by jihadi ayatollahs cannot have nuclear weapons. This was a leadership decision. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in World War II who decided to fight the ideological ambitions of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy, President Trump decided to fight the jihadi ayatollahs in Iran who openly strive to become a world power confronting the West. Now, President Trump needs to rise again to the historical moment, and make an ideological decision against Islamist powers – despite the Westerners who are collaborating with Islamism and despite the supporters of isolationism at home. It was relatively easy to rise up against Iran, which has incessantly proclaimed its hatred of America (even planning to assassinate him) and which built itself up with nuclear capabilities, missiles that reach America, and proxies that will attack American bases. It is far more difficult to do this when your Islamist enemies – Erdoğan, Qatar, and now Al-Sharaa, aka Al-Jolani – pretend to be your allies. There is no propaganda trick that they would not play to pretend to be America's friends. By now, Qatar's trick is well known: Create a problem, like supporting the Taliban for years up to their takeover of Afghanistan with American casualties, then help move American troops to safety, in what Trump called the "the greatest foreign policy humiliation" in U.S. history. Qatar does this everywhere on the planet. It supports Hamas, which committed the atrocities of October 7, and then presents itself as a mediator. Qatar supports every Islamist terrorist organization against its Westernized opponents. Erdoğan is an Islamist who seeks to revive the Ottoman Empire – note his occasional clashes with Greece and Cyprus, his enabling of foreign fighters to cross Turkish territory to reach the Islamic State, his hosting of the Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Turkey, his dispatch of troops to Libya to support the Islamist ruler in Tripoli, and more. Erdoğan acted like an ally of Trump by helping him eliminate the ISIS commander Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and thereby won Trump's trust. However, Erdoğan did it for his own sake, because Al-Baghdadi had claimed the role of leader of the believers (amir al-mu'minim ) – which Erdoğan saw as unnecessary rivalry. He was not doing Trump any favors. In the same way, Qatar's hosting of the CENTCOM base is no favor to Trump – on the contrary, it guarantees the very survival of the Qatari ruling family. Without the CENTCOM base, they would be wiped out by their neighbors in no time. As soon as they took over Syria, Al-Jolani's extremist jihadis in the guise of a legitimate army showed their fundamental ideology, putting into motion a process of massacring the country's minorities. First, the Alawites, then the Christians, and now the Druze. Next, it will be the Kurds – and, finally, the Jews in Israel. This is deeply entrenched in the Islamist DNA of jihadi terrorists like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and, most recently, Pakistani jihadis in Kashmir. To the Islamists' bad luck, it blew up in their faces. The news of the horrible massacre of the Druze in Syria went viral all over the West, showing President Trump that he had perhaps been duped by Erdoğan, Qatar, and Al-Jolani. The massacre in Syria was no tribal accident, as the Islamists will probably tell Trump. Al-Jolani praised the jihadi perpetrators in his speech. They had carried out a deliberate Islamist attack on minorities. Earlier, in March, Al-Jolani had already penned a "constitutional" declaration setting out the ideological-religious grounds for such massacres. The isolationists in Trump's camp hastened to criticize Israel for its stopping of the massacre, calling Netanyahu a madman. How can Netanyahu be criticized for stopping a massacre? It is only isolationists who would criticize such a thing. But Trump is not fooled; he understands that something here stinks – that he has been duped by Erdoğan, Qatar, and Al-Jolani who posed as his allies and as guardians of human rights. President Trump will probably give Al-Jolani another chance. But the next massacre is already on its way. The Christians in Syria are seeking Trump's support, after they were bombed in their church in Damascus. They have already paid with their blood – and they know more is coming. Sometimes historical events are symbolized by individual cases. The real Al-Jolani, Erdoğan, and Qatar are represented by the execution of Hosam Saraya, a Syria-born Druze from Oklahoma, by Syrian government forces. American Druze Hosam Saraya executed by Syria government forces. President Trump now realizes that he must make a tough historical decision against Islamists who, unlike Iran, masquerade as allies of America. He already knows the bitter price he has to pay with his own supporters for rising up yet again to make an ideological historical decision for Western civilization. * Yigal Carmon is President and Founder of MEMRI.
Memri
7 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
Following The Attacks On The Druze In Syria, Kurdish Columnist Writes On Saudi News Website: The Kurds Are Also In The Crosshairs Of The Terrorist Al-Sharaa Regime, Which Is Supported By Turkey; Askin
Following the violent clashes in the Druze stronghold of Al-Suwayda in southern Syria between Druze factions and Beduine tribes backed by the forces of the Al-Sharaa regime – clashes that included acts of massacre against the Druze – the Saudi news website Elaph posted two articles by Kurdish journalist Mahmoud Abbas that slammed the Al-Sharaa regime for its treatment of the minorities in Syria. In the first article, posted on July 18, 2025, Abbas wrote that Al-Sharaa's regime, backed by Turkey, is even worse than the Assad regime since it not only persecutes political opponents but also directs accusations of heresy and treason, as well as racist hatred, against various sectors of Syrian society, such as the Alawites, Druze, Kurds, Christians and Yazidis, and subjects them to a policy of political exclusion. Abbas warned that "yesterday's murderers," namely the militias backed by the Al-Sharaa regime that massacred the Alawites and Druze, are already preparing to confront their next target – the Kurds – and that Syria is rapidly sliding into a new civil war, more brutal than the previous one. The only solution, he argued, is to reshape Syria as a decentralized federation that will ensure the rights of all its citizens and stop the bloodshed. In another article posted the following day, Abbas expressed explicit support for Druze leader Hikmat Al-Hijri's appeal to Israel for help, and rejected the criticism he had incurred for this.[1] Asking Israel for assistance, Abbas said, is not treason but rather an expression of patriotism in its true sense, of defending human dignity. He noted that Assad's former opponents, who are today part of the Al-Sharaa regime, received aid from Turkey and Qatar and were not considered traitors, yet today they hypocritically direct this accusation at those who are hoping for Israeli help. Stating that Israel, despite its reputation, is better than all Middle East regimes in its treatment of minorities, he added that the most virulent hostility in the region is not directed at Israel but rather at 'anything that is not Arab or Muslim' and sometimes even at fellow Muslims. It should be noted that both these articles by Abbas were later removed from the Elaph website. This is despite the fact that the site was established in London in order to avoid the censorship imposed in Saudi Arabia and give voice to liberal views, especially those opposing religious extremism. The following are translated excerpts from Kurdish journalist Mahmoud Abbas's articles: Turkey, The Patron Of The Al-Sharaa Regime, Regards All Of Syria's Minorities As Terrorists; The Syrian Kurds Are Next In Line For Violent Attacks In his July 18, 2025 article, Abbas wrote: "…[Syria's] former regime scorned the concepts of society and homeland, and sold [its] values in exchange for mass graves. Now Al-Joulani's government has emerged from the womb of the same turgid swamp to peddle [the slogan of] 'the single homeland' while scorning [various] values and sectors and [wearing] an extremist Sunni-Umayyad guise. They have expanded the circle of takfir [accusing others of heresy], so that it is no longer limited to any [particular] political or national [sector] but now also includes [entire] streams and religions, and anyone who is different from them faces various accusations, [such as] 'traitor,' 'infidel' and 'agent'. "Now they are working to sew together the torn body of the homeland, after they severed the Alawite, Druze and Kurdish regions from the national fold, eliminated the Christian, Alawite and Druze elements from [Syria's] religious reality, and [removed] the Yazidis from the spiritual map and others from the mosaic of Syrian society. [These] elements are eliminated through explicit accusation of heresy, reprehensible racism or political exclusion. "Al-Joulani – a man of many faces – wears ties in the halls of diplomacy… and a turban in the extremist councils. He deals with organizations that harm Syria's territorial [integrity], knowing that it cannot withstand being torn apart in this manner. Al-Joulani is absent from the streets of the Syrian coast and is forgotten in the alleys of Al-Suwayda, but he is forced to be present, if only formally, in the halls of dialogue with the Kurdish movement and the [Democratic] Autonomous Administration [of North and East Syria].[2] "Syria cannot survive without the Druze and the Alawites, and it will collapse if the Kurdish people and national movement are denied representation. It will not be a state that serves its people by means of a central government that imposes itself by force and though accusations of heresy. The provinces have become [nothing but] meaningless names, and those who purport to represent the 'Syrian interim government' in them have [actually] been sent to destroy what remains of the homeland, including all of its areas and components. "They executed the Alawites and now they are starting to execute the Druze… and accuse them of treason and heresy, just as was previously done to the Yazidis and the Christians, whose women were abducted and men were arrested [on false charges]... Anyone who rejects the black [jihadi] flag and the banner of the false caliphate, has become a target for terror groups that continue to harm Syria under distorted slogans. "…Yesterday's murderers, who massacred Yazidis and abducted Christians, are now reinventing themselves and laying the groundwork for a struggle against the Kurds, using the same ugly pretexts they used to frame the Alawites and the Druze. And every time the truth is exposed, they deny involvement [in the violence] and blame 'criminal' groups that disobey the government. "What is now happening in Al-Suwayda is a blood-soaked message to the [Kurdish-led] Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], the Autonomous Administration and the Kurdish people in general, that the trust [they placed in the new Syrian government] was delusional… We charge the SDF to defend the communities east of the Euphrates [i.e., in northeastern Syria] and in the Kurdish region, from Afrin… to the sources of the Euphrates in Iraq – for they are all in danger: the Kurds, the Arab tribes, the Assyrians and the Yazidis. They are all accused of collaborating with America and with the forces of the [international] coalition. They are all terrorists in the eyes of Turkey, the patron of the [Syrian] interim government and its apparatuses, which feeds them ideas and inspires their projects of exclusion. The conflict is therefore not only with the Kurds, but with all that remains of a homeland that has not yet succumbed to the [forces of] evil. "From now on there is no more room for dialogue, because Syria, exhausted to begin with, is rapidly sliding into a new civil war, crueler and more horrific than everything that preceded it, [and will continue to slide] as long as this takfiri and terrorist regime remains in control of the country… What we see in the footage coming out of Al-Suwayda, and what happened before this in Latakia and Tartous, are but early signs of a black storm that has appeared on the horizon and threatens the slivers that still remain of the homeland. "The only way out of this hell is to fully recognize that Syria can only be rebuilt on a decentralized federative basis that will ensure [human] rights and stop the ever-recurring bloodshed. "It is almost impossible to imagine a homeland existing under the control of takfiri groups mired in terrorism, ignorance and crime. Such [forces] cannot build a homeland, but only cemeteries, a history written in blood and an ideology that negates the human in the name of Allah. "Syria, which gave birth to the greatest philosophers, poets and thinkers, is too pure and lofty to let these benighted and ignorant [forces], bereft of intelligence and values, contaminate its soil." Everyone Relies On Outside Help, Such As Turkey's And Qatar's; The Druze Leader's Appeal To Israel Is Not Treason In another article published one day later, on July 19, Abbas expressed support for Hikmat Al-Hijri's move of appealing to Israel for help and rejected the criticism that had been directed at him for this. He wrote: "When an honorable sheikh from the Druze Mountains – [the region] whose name has been changed to the Arab Mountains out of respect for Arabhood and the homeland – cries out and asks his fellow Druze in Israel to help him repel tribal attacks… he is not overstepping the boundaries of patriotism. [On the contrary], he is only restoring [patriotism] to its primary meaning: of defending honor before defending slogans, and of defending people before defending land. For the homeland is not a rag that is waved over the ruins of [our] values. It is a moral contract that has no meaning if honor is buried beneath it. "After all, what is the difference, or the moral discrepancy, between what the opposition government [in the time of the Assad regime] did when it solicited the help of Turkey, which is one of the most bitter enemies of the components of Syrian [society], or the help of Qatar or of [other] Arab countries…? The factions that made up the Syrian National Army, [comprising pro-Turkish groups] – were they not the product of Turkish and Qatari political capital? Is it not true that some of them were nurtured in the bosom of intelligence agencies and coalesced over the ruins [caused by] regional chaos, just as the militias of the criminal [Assad] regime emerged under Iranian sponsorship and with direct Russian support? "This is the skewered Syrian logic: everyone uses the help of external forces, and everyone accuses everyone of treason. The land is the one that bleeds and the people are the ones who pay the price as they die or are scattered [around the globe], in the complete absence of trust between the components [of society] and amid a rapid decline into division and the reemergence of tyranny with a new face. "How terrible it is that 'Israel' has become such a hangup in the crisis-ridden Arab-Islamic consciousness, which has lost its powers of discernment to the extent that it sees anything coming out of [Israel] as aggression – even [when Israel hands] a glass of water to a wounded child or comes to the defense of a sect that is being exterminated. The Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham movement has forgotten that wounded [fighters] of the Syrian opposition, including [members of the HTS] organization, which formed Syria's [current] interim government, received treatment in Israeli hospitals. "Who instilled this culture of blind hostility and violated the scriptures of the three monotheistic faiths, which [all] preach acceptance of the other? How did appeals for Israeli help become treason, while appeals for the help of the Turkish occupier or the Iranian militias, or [requests for] Gulf capital, are considered a blessed national partnership?... "And to remove any doubt, [let me say that], in terms of democratic structure and minority rights, Israel, despite everything that is said [about it], is better than all the Middle Eastern regimes when it comes to the treatment of the Druze, of its Palestinian citizens and of the Syrians living on its soil. Do the Kurds in Syria or Turkey enjoy [the rights] that the Druze and Arabs living in Israel enjoy? Does reality not merit some objectiveness, instead of canned curses? "The hostility that is really destroying the peoples of the region is not the hostility directed at Israel, as is commonly believed. It stems from a distorted culture that deeply permeates [our] collective consciousness and perpetuates hatred for anything that is not Arab or Muslim. Moreover, we find this burgeoning [hatred] even within Islam, between Sunnis and Shiites, and, worst of all, between different Sunni streams, whose hatred for each other is no less than [their hatred] towards Jews or Israel… "Those who accused Sheikh Al-Hijri of treason should look at their own treason. Perhaps they will see their true faces in the mirror. For treason is not asking your community members in Israel to help you repel the danger of tribal invasions led by [organizations] like ISIS with new names, [organizations] that are supported by the remnants of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which forms the foundation of Syria's interim government. Treason is asking ten Arab countries, led by Turkey, to launch an offensive against a component of the Syrian nation whose battles and sacrifices prove its loyalty to the [Syrian] soil and people. Treason is not a desperate cry for help aimed at keeping your women from being abducted and your children from being massacred. It is when you sell out your national decision-making to advance an extremist takfiri component [of society] at the expense of Syria's national components, and when you raise the banners of sectarianism over the ruins of the state and reach out to those who have betrayed every revolution and committed every crime."
Memri
7 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
The Al-Joulani Files: The Biography And Evolving Stances Of Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa
The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here. Since Ahmed Al-Sharaa – who formerly led Syrian jihadi group Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) under the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani [i.e. Abu Muhammad from the Golan] – became Syria's interim leader when a coalition of militant and jihadi factions under his command toppled the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, his name has remained in headlines across global news outlets. There has been much discussion of the beliefs and stances of Al-Sharaa, who headed Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) for years. While it is impossible to say definitively what Al-Sharaa really thinks or predict his future moves, this report aims to shed light on the former jihadi leader by providing a brief biography and review of his statements prior and subsequent to the fall of the Assad regime, based on material gathered in real time by MEMRI JTTM staff. This report will refer to Al-Sharaa as Al-Joulani when discussing the period before he returned to using his given name. Serving as Syria's de facto leader since December 8, Al-Sharaa was formally appointed interim president on January 29, 2025 at the Conference Announcing the Victory of the Syrian Revolution. There, the formal dissolution of all rebel factions, including HTS, and their incorporation into the Syrian armed forces, was also announced.[1] Al-Sharaa delivering his speech at the Conference Announcing the Victory of the Syrian Revolution Al-Joulani's Early Life Al-Joulani began officially using his given name on December 5, 2024, during the offensive that toppled the Assad regime, although the name Ahmed Husayn Al-Sharaa had already been publicized by HTS supporters in June 2021. Before that, Al-Joulani's true identity was unknown, and multiple rumors circulated about it and his life story. The name Ahmed Al-Sharaa was mentioned as one possibility as early as 2016,[2] along with other narratives later proven false, such as an Al-Jazeera claim that his real name was Usamah Al-'Absi Al-Wahedi and he was a native of Al-Shuhayl in eastern Syria's Deir Al-Zour Governorate.[3] The following biographical information is based on an interview Al-Joulani gave to Martin Smith, a correspondent for the U.S.-based Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) television network, in January 2021, which was released in June of that year.[4] An infographic poster released by pro-HTS Telegram channels shortly afterward featured nearly identical details.[5] Giving his real name as Ahmed Husayn Al-Sharaa, Al-Joulani told Smith that his family stems from "the now-occupied Golan Heights," from the village of Jibbeen, from which his paternal grandfather was displaced after Israel captured the area in 1967. His father Husayn was an economist influenced by the Arab nationalist ideas of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who worked as a government employee for the Syrian Ministry of Oil but later left the public sector due to political disagreements. His mother was a conservative woman who taught geography at a girls' elementary school.[6] Farouk Al-Sharaa, Syria's former foreign minister and one of the country's two vice presidents, is reportedly a close relative.[7] Al-Joulani was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where his father was working in the oil sector, and at the age of seven returned to Syria with his family, growing up in Damascus' Mezzeh neighborhood, where he worked in a shop belonging to his father. He majored in "open education" at Damascus University's Faculty of Media, but his departure for Iraq in 2003 prevented him from completing his studies. According to an anti-HTS Telegram channel, Al-Joulani was not raised as a devout Muslim and in 2000 had an Alawite girlfriend, but was rejected by her family when he asked for her hand in marriage.[8] Al-Joulani's Radicalization And Travel To Iraq For Jihad According to HTS supporters, Al-Joulani's "life was changed" when an acquaintance convinced him to regularly attend Friday prayers at the mosque, ultimately leading him to study Islamic subjects under a sheikh. Al-Joulani told Smith that the Second Palestinian Intifada, which began in September 2000, influenced him to start "thinking about how to fulfill my duties defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders." After Al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attacks on America, he grew more religious and began wearing a beard and jellabiya and attending secret religious discussions in Damascus. Al-Joulani arrived in Iraq several weeks before the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and joined a "small group" based in Mosul, Saraya Al-Mujahideen, which later came under the command of Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi – the infamous Jordanian-born jihadi leader who eventually affiliated with Al-Qaeda and formed the precursor to the Islamic State (ISIS) – although Al-Joulani insisted that he never met Al-Zarqawi personally. Al-Joulani acknowledged that he was captured and spent time in the custody of American and Iraqi forces, while additional details of his incarceration were revealed by Telegram channels linked to Iraqi militias in April 2025.[9] Al-Joulani was captured by the Americans on May 14, 2005, masquerading as an Iraqi from Mosul named Amjad Muzaffar Husayn 'Ali Al-Nu'aymi, and spent almost five years in Camp Bucca in southern Iraq, where over 14,000 detainees were held at its peak, including several who later became senior Al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders. In April 2010, he was transferred to Iraqi government custody and imprisoned in Al-Taji. HTS supporters claimed that while in prison, Al-Joulani gave classes on tafsir (Quranic exegesis) and the Arabic language, worked to "correct many incorrect concepts" held by some of the prisoners, and discussed his "analyses and predictions of changes that might occur in the region in the future." He was released on March 3, 2011 due to insufficient evidence and no outstanding warrants; subsequently, he assumed command of Al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) forces in Mosul. A photo of Al-Joulani taken while he was in custody in Iraq Al-Joulani further claimed that while in Camp Bucca, he wrote a 50-page document describing how to transfer jihad to Syria. After the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, he sent this document to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who founded ISIS in 2014 and at the time was the emir of ISI, and proposed establishing a jihadi group in Syria. Al-Joulani met with Al-Baghdadi and asked for a hundred men to accompany him to Syria, but due to opposition from some ISI leaders, Al-Baghdadi agreed to send Al-Joulani with only six companions, who crossed the border wearing suicide belts in case they were caught. Al-Baghdadi also reportedly paid the men $50,000 to $60,000 a month for six to seven months. Founding Of Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) Upon his return to Syria, Al-Joulani founded Jabhat Al-Nusra li-Ahl Al-Sham (The Front for the Defense of the Syrian People) – generally known as Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) – in early 2012.[10] In December 2012, the U.S. State Department designated JN a foreign terrorist organization, describing the group as an alias for Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[11] The black jihadi flag used by JN. Al-Joulani publicly pledged allegiance in April 2013 to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, making JN Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria.[12] The circumstances of Al-Joulani's ties to Al-Baghdadi are still disputed among supporters of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and HTS. ISIS supporters claim that Al-Baghdadi sent Al-Joulani to establish a branch of ISI in Syria, and accuse Al-Sharaa of violating his oath to Al-Baghdadi by establishing a separate organization, while HTS supporters deny that Al-Joulani ever swore allegiance to the founder of ISIS.[13] In July 2016, Al-Joulani severed his group's ties with Al-Qaeda and renamed JN as Jabhat Fath Al-Sham (The Front to Conquer Syria – JFS). In the video announcing the rebranding, Al-Joulani stated that JFS had "no affiliation with any foreign entity" and expressed willingness to cooperate with other Syrian groups. This marked a shift in the group's orientation, away from Al-Qaeda's ideal of global jihad to a more local effort to liberate Syria from the Assad regime.[14] The JFS logo Al-Joulani announces the establishment of JFS in 2016. JN Splits With Al-Qaeda And Becomes HTS In January 2017, JFS joined with several other Islamist rebel groups to form HTS.[15] Al-Joulani was initially the deputy leader of JFS, with former Ahrar Al-Sham leader Abu Jaber Al-Sheikh appointed the group's leader, but in October, Al-Joulani became JFS leader upon Al-Sheikh's resignation.[16] The HTS flag (left) and logo (right) Abu Jaber Al-Sheikh It became clear, in the years following JN's rebranding, that – counter to the initial beliefs of some analysts – this move reflected a real change, in which the group abandoned the Al-Qaeda ideal of global jihad and restricted its focus to waging jihad only in Syria, with the ultimate goal of "liberating" the country from the Assad regime. As suggested by a series of 2022-2023 Telegram posts by Iraqi-born Maysarah Al-Jubouri aka Abu Mariyah Al-Qahtani, a slain senior Iraqi-born HTS religious official, this shift was a tactical one based on the belief that a state of warfare with all countries is unsustainable and that Muslims' interests require the formation of alliances with states.[17] In May 2018, the U.S. State Department designated HTS a foreign terrorist organization, describing the group as an Al-Qaeda affiliate, despite Al-Joulani's assertion that he had severed ties with Al-Qaeda. HTS issued a statement protesting the designation, declaring that HTS posed no threat to other countries, and urging international bodies to pressure the U.S. to reverse its decision.[18] HTS Clashes With Rival Jihad Groups HTS' hostility to rival jihadi groups preceded its capture of Damascus by years, dating back to the period of its affiliation with Al-Qaeda as JN. It should be noted that HTS clashed with a wide array of rebel factions, both those more extreme and more moderate than itself, based more on a desire to consolidate power than on ideological grounds, ultimately establishing itself as the most powerful faction in the rebel stronghold of Idlib in northwestern Syria.[19] After JN differentiated itself from ISIS, the tension between the two groups gradually escalated until full-blown warfare erupted between them.[20] In the HTS-controlled Idlib area, ISIS attacks and assassinations targeting HTS, as well as HTS arrests and executions of ISIS members, were at their peak in 2018, but the ISIS presence in Idlib subsequently dwindled.[21] Following HTS' dissociation from Al-Qaeda, the global jihadi organization established another affiliate in Syria, Tanzim Hurras Al-Din (Guardians of the Religion Organization), created by the merger of several factions in February 2018.[22] HTS clashed intermittently with Hurras Al-Din from as early as November 2017, when it arrested senior Al-Qaeda commanders.[23] The two jihadi groups later reconciled and launched a joint offensive against the Assad regime in November 2019.[24] However, armed clashes again erupted between HTS and the Al-Qaeda affiliate in June 2020, ultimately leading to the effective elimination of Hurras Al-Din.[25] Hurras Al-Din claimed its last operation in August 2021,[26] and formally announced its dissolution on January 28, 2025, alleging that the Assad regime's fall had made its jihad unnecessary.[27] The Hurras Al-Din logo HTS' military campaign against its jihadi rivals was accompanied by a media campaign rooted in Salafi-jihadi ideology legitimizing the crackdown. As early as 2014, JN justified its fight against ISIS by branding the latter an extremist Kharijite[28] group.[29] Later, when HTS fought against Hurras Al-Din in 2020, it justified this campaign by accusing Hurras Al-Din members of being extremists who are excessive in declaring takfir[30] on other Muslims; alleging that they are responsible for assassinations, kidnappings, and robberies, and claiming they cooperate with ISIS cells.[31] HTS also outlawed the activity of rival factions which did not belong to an operations room under its aegis, Al-Fath Al-Mubin (Clear Conquest), arguing that such groups' presence threatened rebel unity and hindered efforts to defend the Idlib area.[32] HTS' Gradual Ideological Evolution While Al-Sharaa's moderate statements and actions since the fall of the Assad regime have surprised some observers expecting the former Al-Qaeda commander to pursue a more hardline approach, most of these actions are modeled on the approach HTS adopted since 2017, long before the regime's collapse. Gradually modifying its ideology and methodology towards moderate pragmatism, HTS legitimized its actions based on Islamic teachings while continuing to identify as a Salafi-jihadi group. Prior to toppling the Assad regime, HTS disavowed global jihad in favor of more limited goals to liberate Syria;[33] abandoned public executions and floggings for violators of shari'a;[34] cancelled its hisbah morality police;[35] and softened its treatment of non-Sunni minorities, by granting Christians freedom of worship and not imposing the jizyah tax on them, while making overtures to Christian and Druze leaders.[36] The group also gradually acquiesced to the presence of Turkish and Russian forces in Idlib – although Salafi-jihadis generally consider these countries' forces infidel invaders who must be fought – and expressed support for the Turkish state and government.[37] These concessions made during the group's phase as a jihadi insurgency in rebel-controlled Idlib echo similar moves on a larger scale that followed the Assad regime's fall. Al-Joulani meeting with Idlib Christians in July 2022 The group initially employed suicide bombers like other jihadi organizations.[38] However, after its last SVBIED attack, perpetrated in February 2020, the group retired its use of "martyrdom-seekers" by September of that year, as part of its efforts to transform itself from a terrorist insurgent movement into an organized army, retraining these operatives to perform other types of military operations.[39] Aerial footage of an HTS suicide bombing, from a May 2022 official HTS video Nevertheless, during its jihadi phase, HTS remained committed to jihad and the implementation of shari'a, and opposed to democracy, using Salafi-jihadi sectarian terminology by pejoratively referring to the Assad regime and to Shi'ites as "Nusayris" and "Rafidites," and declaring the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) "atheists." The group's clerics similarly pronounced takfir on Syrian soldiers, declaring them apostates whose lives are forfeit.[40] It should be noted, however, that as early as 2015, Al-Joulani declared his group would not target Alawite or Druze civilians, despite describing them as heretics.[41] Al-Sharaa has further moderated his statements since receiving increased international legitimacy after capturing Damascus and becoming Syria's de facto leader, although the extent to which he and his inner circle have abandoned their jihadi beliefs remains unclear. Since toppling the Assad regime, Al-Sharaa has made no public mention of jihad, has committed to holding "free and fair" elections for president, ordered the drafting of a constitution that declared Islamic shari'a the "main source of legislation" – rather than "sole source," as jihadi hardliners demanded – and guaranteed women's rights and freedom of expression.[42] Al-Sharaa and his group reached out to Syria's minorities, including Kurds, Alawites, Shi'ites, and Druze, at the start of the offensive that toppled Assad, promising not to target any group based on its "sectarian or ethnic affiliation" and to grant them the same rights of citizenship granted to members of the Sunni majority.[43] While Al-Sharaa's government has not explicitly disavowed the goal of implementing shari'a, it has not imposed it more than other Muslim countries, such as Turkey. Bars continue to sell alcohol in Damascus; music has not been banned; women circulate freely without a hijab; and non-Muslims are not forced to pay the jizyah tribute and are allowed to practice their religious rituals openly.[44] After Al-Sharaa ordered a woman in December 2023 to cover her hair before being photographed with him, his government prominently posted photos of the Syrian leader meeting with uncovered women, both foreigners and Syrians.[45] Al-Sharaa has been photographed at multiple public events attended by mixed gatherings of men and women; his own wife, Latifah Al-Duroubi, has attended some wearing a hijab, with her face uncovered.[46] Statements and actions such as embracing democratic elections and the nation-state concept, tolerating non-Sunni minorities – especially esotericist sects such as Alawites and Druze – and allowing them to worship freely, would be anathema to most Salafi-jihadis and run counter to explicit statements made by Al-Sharaa and HTS clerics only a few years ago. While the new Syrian government has explicitly grounded some of these stances in Islamic sources – and clerics supporting it have likely provided oral justification for the rest – these justifications do not pass muster in Salafi-jihadi circles. Some actions, such as refraining from fully implementing shari'a and instituting hisbah, tolerating "apostate" sects such as Alawites and Druze, and holding gatherings not segregated by sex, have been harshly criticized by Syrian jihadi clerics, including some who otherwise support the new government.[47] It should be noted that many of these developments toward moderation, both during HTS' jihadi period and in its current phase as Syria's interim government, were taken without public fanfare, precluding criticism by hardline rivals while freeing the group of the need to justify these concessions to its jihadi supporters. The failure of Al-Sharaa and the clerics close to him to repudiate many of HTS' erstwhile hardline Salafi-jihadi beliefs or present a more moderate alternative suggests that many followers remain committed to such ideas, as is clear from Telegram posts of supporters who take more extreme positions than those articulated by Al-Sharaa and members of his government.[48] While Al-Sharaa may assume that any actions unacceptable to the international community can be prevented through orders to senior administrative and military officials, the possibility remains that low-level operatives may act on their jihadi beliefs as long as such ideas have not been explicitly repudiated. Al-Sharaa Repudiated Jihad Against The West; Foreign Countries Accused HTS Of Planning Attacks Abroad Ever since it was known as JN, HTS has declared that it does not pose a threat to the West.[49] Both Al-Joulani and chief HTS religious official 'Abd Al-Rahim 'Atoun gave interviews to Western media in which they stressed this point and even requested Western support for the Syrian revolution.[50] Al-Joulani, while describing U.S. foreign policy as "stupid," expressed hope that the U.S. would eventually "reconcile with Muslims" and asserted that such reconciliation would increase U.S. security.[51] Al-Joulani with PBS correspondent Martin Smith during the latter's visit to Idlib in January 2021 Nevertheless, several countries alleged JN or HTS involvement in terrorist plots outside of Syria, accusations that the group vehemently denied. In 2014, senior U.S. officials alleged the existence of a "Khorasan group" within JN, consisting of veteran jihadis who had participated in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, which was planning attacks on the West from Syria.[52] No successful attacks in the West or concrete attempts were ever pinned on the Khorasan group, and Al-Joulani denied its existence.[53] Russia also repeatedly accused HTS of involvement in planned terrorist attacks on Russian soil, accusations which the jihadi group repeatedly rejected as false propaganda intended to legitimize Russian strikes in Idlib.[54] Al-Sharaa Supported Jihad Against Israel, Continues To View It As An "Enemy" Despite disavowing global jihad and declaring that his group's jihad was limited to Syria, Al-Joulani continued to make vague threats to Israel while serving as HTS leader, telling the group's fighters in January 2018: "If Allah wills it we will reach not only Damascus, but Jerusalem awaits us as well."[55] Prior to toppling the Assad regime, Al-Joulani and chief HTS religious official 'Abd Al-Rahim 'Atoun – now a senior advisor to the president – made statements praising Hamas' October 7, 2023 attack on Israel and other attacks on Israeli Jews, and expressing support for Palestinian jihad against the Jewish state.[56] Al-Joulani praising the May 2021 "intifada" against Israel in a meeting with Idlib tribal leaders This stance of support for jihad against Israel did not end with the capture of Damascus; on December 8, 2024, an official HTS religious body headed by Dr. Mazhar Al-Ways – currently Syria's Justice Minister – issued a fatwa urging Palestinians to continue their jihad against Israel.[57] In the days following the capture of Damascus, a senior military official reportedly met with representatives of Palestinian armed factions and promised them that Syria would continue to support the Palestinian cause.[58] After toppling the Assad regime, Al-Sharaa made more conciliatory public statements, stressing that he had no intention of waging war against Israel. At the same time, he and senior officials of his government have repeatedly called for Israel to end its "aggression" in Syria and withdraw its forces from the country, in keeping with the 1974 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Syria, and have urged the international community to apply diplomatic pressure to induce Israel to do so.[59] In recent months, there was talk that Syria was moving towards normalizing relations with Israel, though no confirmation of such claims came from the Syrian government.[60] Attending an Arab League "Emergency Arab Summit for Palestine" held in Cairo in March, Al-Sharaa took a harsher tone, describing Israel as an "enemy" whose "aggressive expansion" threatens regional stability and promising that the Syrian nation will remain "at the side of its Palestinian siblings in every step of theirs towards liberation and justice." Discussing Israeli intervention in Syria, Al-Sharaa said: "How will we respond? That is something which we must not say now."[61] Al-Sharaa shaking hands with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the Arab League summit After Israeli airstrikes in Damascus in May and again in July, Al-Sharaa escalated his tone, accusing Israel of seeking to destabilize and divide Syria.[62] Condemning Israel in a July 17 speech that followed Israeli airstrikes on the Syrian Defense Ministry headquarters and other sites, Al-Sharaa nevertheless defended his decision not to go to war with Israel, insinuating that the Jewish state seeks to draw Syria into war to destabilize it and cause it further destruction.[63] 'Atoun has also made recent statements blaming Israel for instigating the 12-day conflict with Iran in June and declaring to "the Israeli enemy" that its military superiority does not guarantee its victory in Syria, as Syrians can foil attempts to divide their country.[64] The new Syrian government's relationship with Palestinian militant factions has been complicated. While Al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani have received a Palestinian Authority (PA) delegation in Damascus,[65] Al-Sharaa's government has also confiscated the weapons of several Palestinian factions and arrested Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials, as well as a Gaza-born HTS commander who ran a campaign raising funds for Gaza.[66] * Y. Kerman is a Research Fellow at MEMRI.
