New world order, same old problems
Analysis: Iran today stands out as one of the few remaining Cold War antagonists of the United States. The recent conflict between Israel and Iran, and America's strikes on nuclear facilities, demonstrate the long shadow of the Cold War in the Middle East.
In the late 20th century, as the Cold War came to a close, politicians started to postulate what a post-Cold War world looked like. Perhaps the strongest perspective came from US President George H W Bush. In a 1990 address to Congress, pre-empting the first Gulf War, Bush outlined his idea of a 'new world order'.
The end of the Cold War marked a new era – one that Bush hoped would be 'freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.' This new world order has yet to emerge.
Instead, the early 21st century has remained characterised by many of the same issues of the Cold War world. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Arab Spring movement and the civil wars that emerged as a result have seen Cold War figures deposed and new governmental structures struggle to emerge.
Many of these conflicts appear the result of seeds sown decades ago. American support to anti-communist Mujahideen groups during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) paved the way for the Taliban's takeover in the late 1990s; similarly, American support for Saddam Hussein was justified in terms of Cold War geopolitics, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).
Israel is the nation in the region the United States is tied most closely to. Throughout the Cold War, it received major support from the United States and, as of 2022, remains the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign aid. Israel served Cold War geopolitics well: it provided America with a friendly nation in the Middle East, presented a counterweight to Soviet influence in the region, and, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Israel served as a strong ally against the Islamic Republic of Iran (a nation which rejected both Soviet and American ideology in a move against the bipolar nature of the Cold War world).
The recent conflict between Israel and Iran is not solely due to tension between the United States and Iran, or the United States and Russia (an Iranian ally). It is important to recognise the two nations have their own long-running tensions and in many ways their relationship mirrors the US-Soviet relationship of the Cold War.
Iran and Israel see themselves as major powers in the region and have engaged in open and covert warfare across the 21st century. Israeli espionage attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iranian support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and proxy war in neighbouring nations can all be seen as part of this geopolitical competition between the two. These Cold War parallels extend to nuclear proliferation in the region.
There is only one nation in the Middle East that possesses a nuclear weapons programme. Israel has long followed a policy of 'deliberate ambiguity' – to neither confirm nor deny – with regards to is nuclear arsenal. In 2023, Israel's Minister of Heritage Amihai Eliyahu told an interviewer that a nuclear strike on Gaza was 'one way' of dealing with Hamas, a comment that saw him reprimanded by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This is the closest Israel has ever come to making an official statement on their nuclear arsenal.
Furthermore, Israel is one of the only nations which is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has regularly refused efforts from the International Atomic Energy Agency to open its nuclear facilities for inspection.
Iran's alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapon – which New York Times journalist David E Sanger claimed 'is taking more time than any nuclear-armed nation in history' – follows the same logic that characterised the US-Soviet arms race. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence relies upon states possessing nuclear weapons in the first place. As long as Iran's major rival maintains a nuclear arsenal, then Iran requires one as well. The recent American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities is likely to further reinforce the necessity of a nuclear weapons program to Iranian policymakers.
When the Soviet Union dissolved in the 1990s, the state of Ukraine transferred its nuclear arsenal to Russia for assurances of independence and sovereignty. Today, Ukraine enters its third year of defending against a wholescale Russian invasion. What lesson are states such as Iran expected to take from this? Increased nuclear proliferation heightens global risk, but can a nation which is threatened by its nuclear-armed geopolitical rival be expected to forgo the attainment of nuclear weapons? This rationale justified the arms race of the Cold War, and it will continue to justify Iran's pursuit of a nuclear arsenal if diplomacy continues to be ignored.
Our Government can, and should, do more on the international stage. New Zealand can push for further arms reduction or limitation agreements through organisations such as the United Nations, and it can promote diplomatic efforts instead of conflict. We do not need to follow the idea of a new world order set out by politicians and policymakers in the late 20th century, but some of those ideals remain a worthy objective.
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Analysis: Iran today stands out as one of the few remaining Cold War antagonists of the United States. The recent conflict between Israel and Iran, and America's strikes on nuclear facilities, demonstrate the long shadow of the Cold War in the Middle East. In the late 20th century, as the Cold War came to a close, politicians started to postulate what a post-Cold War world looked like. Perhaps the strongest perspective came from US President George H W Bush. In a 1990 address to Congress, pre-empting the first Gulf War, Bush outlined his idea of a 'new world order'. The end of the Cold War marked a new era – one that Bush hoped would be 'freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.' This new world order has yet to emerge. Instead, the early 21st century has remained characterised by many of the same issues of the Cold War world. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Arab Spring movement and the civil wars that emerged as a result have seen Cold War figures deposed and new governmental structures struggle to emerge. Many of these conflicts appear the result of seeds sown decades ago. American support to anti-communist Mujahideen groups during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) paved the way for the Taliban's takeover in the late 1990s; similarly, American support for Saddam Hussein was justified in terms of Cold War geopolitics, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Israel is the nation in the region the United States is tied most closely to. Throughout the Cold War, it received major support from the United States and, as of 2022, remains the largest cumulative recipient of American foreign aid. Israel served Cold War geopolitics well: it provided America with a friendly nation in the Middle East, presented a counterweight to Soviet influence in the region, and, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Israel served as a strong ally against the Islamic Republic of Iran (a nation which rejected both Soviet and American ideology in a move against the bipolar nature of the Cold War world). The recent conflict between Israel and Iran is not solely due to tension between the United States and Iran, or the United States and Russia (an Iranian ally). It is important to recognise the two nations have their own long-running tensions and in many ways their relationship mirrors the US-Soviet relationship of the Cold War. Iran and Israel see themselves as major powers in the region and have engaged in open and covert warfare across the 21st century. Israeli espionage attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iranian support of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and proxy war in neighbouring nations can all be seen as part of this geopolitical competition between the two. These Cold War parallels extend to nuclear proliferation in the region. There is only one nation in the Middle East that possesses a nuclear weapons programme. Israel has long followed a policy of 'deliberate ambiguity' – to neither confirm nor deny – with regards to is nuclear arsenal. In 2023, Israel's Minister of Heritage Amihai Eliyahu told an interviewer that a nuclear strike on Gaza was 'one way' of dealing with Hamas, a comment that saw him reprimanded by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This is the closest Israel has ever come to making an official statement on their nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, Israel is one of the only nations which is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has regularly refused efforts from the International Atomic Energy Agency to open its nuclear facilities for inspection. Iran's alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapon – which New York Times journalist David E Sanger claimed 'is taking more time than any nuclear-armed nation in history' – follows the same logic that characterised the US-Soviet arms race. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence relies upon states possessing nuclear weapons in the first place. As long as Iran's major rival maintains a nuclear arsenal, then Iran requires one as well. The recent American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities is likely to further reinforce the necessity of a nuclear weapons program to Iranian policymakers. When the Soviet Union dissolved in the 1990s, the state of Ukraine transferred its nuclear arsenal to Russia for assurances of independence and sovereignty. Today, Ukraine enters its third year of defending against a wholescale Russian invasion. What lesson are states such as Iran expected to take from this? Increased nuclear proliferation heightens global risk, but can a nation which is threatened by its nuclear-armed geopolitical rival be expected to forgo the attainment of nuclear weapons? This rationale justified the arms race of the Cold War, and it will continue to justify Iran's pursuit of a nuclear arsenal if diplomacy continues to be ignored. Our Government can, and should, do more on the international stage. New Zealand can push for further arms reduction or limitation agreements through organisations such as the United Nations, and it can promote diplomatic efforts instead of conflict. We do not need to follow the idea of a new world order set out by politicians and policymakers in the late 20th century, but some of those ideals remain a worthy objective.
