
Chechen Akhmat Commander Alaudinov demands apology from Russian blogger over comments about Akhmat
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Apti Alaudinov, the head of the Chechen Akhmat special forces, has demanded an apology from MMA fighter and blogger Maks Divnich for denigrating comments made about the unit and its leadership.
Alaudinov's demand followed a video posted by Divnich on Telegram on 17 July, in which he described a confrontation with a soldier of Chechen origin at a swimming pool in Luhansk, Russian-occupied Ukraine. According to the blogger, the Chechen soldier behaved 'inappropriately' towards women and claimed to be a fighter from Akhmat.
In the video, one of the men involved in the incident can be heard shouting: 'You'll find out what Akhmat really is'. Divnich addressed Alaudinov directly, demanding an explanation for the behaviour of the alleged Akhmat fighter.
In a response video released on the evening of 19 July, Alaudinov denied that the individual involved had any connection to Akhmat and accused the blogger of discrediting the unit. According to Alaudinov, 'this person is a disgrace to the Chechen nation', 'was born and raised outside Chechnya', and 'has ended up exactly where he belongs'. Alaudinov added that the man had never served in the Akhmat special forces.
Alaudinov also demanded an apology from Divnich for continuing to reference Akhmat in his publications: 'You must apologise for smearing me in your video and in your text. We are a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Perhaps you are unaware, but there is criminal liability for this. It is called discrediting a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence', he said.
In response, Divnich called Alaudinov's statements manipulative.
'This is an outright lie. I clarified the next day that this scoundrel wasn't from Akhmat. Why this manipulation? Criminal liability? Is Apti Alaudinov going to file charges against me?' Divnich said.
In an updated version of the 17 July publication, edited at 14:29 Moscow time, Divnich specified that he had confirmed the soldier involved in the altercation had no affiliation with the Akhmat unit and had merely used its name.
Meanwhile, Alaudinov's Telegram channel featured reposts of several appeals calling on Divnich to apologise. Among them was a post from former Smolensk City Council deputy Maksim Baranov, who wrote: 'Maks Divnich must apologise to the heroes of the Special Military Operation [Russia's term for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine], to the fighters of the Sheikh Mansur Battalion, to our respected Hero of Russia, Lieutenant General Apti Aronovich Alaudinov, and to the heroes of the Akhmat special forces'.
Speaking to the state-run news agency RIA Novosti on Monday, Alaudinov said the punishment for inciting ethnic hatred should be toughened.
Currently, the offence carries a maximum sentence of six years.
The Luhansk incident is not the first public controversy involving Divnich. Previously, in 2023, he took part in protests against the construction of a mosque in Moscow.
Later, a video appeared online in which people in military uniform claimed they would oppose those protesting against the mosque's construction. According to the YouTube channel 'February Morning', the video featured Chechen security forces, although their nationality was not officially confirmed.
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