Our writers' 100-word verdicts on Trump's first 100 days
As he marks his 100th day back in office, here is how five columnists for The Times analyse his performance, in precisely 100 words apiece.
Napoleon's whirlwind 100-day comeback in 1815 shook up the world order before his defeat at Waterloo. Trump's running start could have a more lasting impact. The big questions: will he run out of steam, will he embed his changes before the 2026 midterms, will the courts thwart him, will Musk's shimmering self-invention as a techno Robespierre become a liability?
Focus will shift to all-out trade war with China. Is that winnable? Will it spill into a military conflict? The Chinese assessment is
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EVN Report
11 hours ago
- EVN Report
What Does Armenia Stand to Gain? Musings on the Washington Signing
On August 8, 2025, during a meeting at the White House between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, documents were signed that not only have serious significance in the context of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but also aspire to fundamentally transform the security architecture formed in the South Caucasus as a result of the Armenian-Russian-Azerbaijani trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The trilateral and bilateral documents signed at the Washington summit became the subject of heated discussions in Armenia, ones that show no signs of abating. This article seeks to advance that conversation by drawing parallels between the political events of spring 2018, known as the 'Velvet Revolution,' and current perceptions of the Washington process. It will also examine the interdependence of the economy, military power, and negotiation dynamics to address a widely asked and legitimate question: What does Armenia stand to gain from this process? Finally, it will outline the political realities and variables of which the Washington process is either a component or a consequence. It is important to note that the primary aim of this article is not to enumerate all the advantages or disadvantages of the signed agreements for Armenia. Its focus lies elsewhere, as outlined below. The analysis draws heavily on the key ideas presented in Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers', Thomas Schelling's 'Arms and Influence' and Fred Charles Iklé's 'Every War Must End.' Don't Confuse the Beginning With the End: The Imperative of Effective and Purposeful Work One of the enduring misjudgments following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, including by some members of the incoming administration, was treating those events as an endpoint rather than a beginning. The sense of victory was premature, a moment to celebrate rather than a mandate to act. In reality, 2018 marked a new beginning, an opportunity whose success could only be measured by the effectiveness of the steps and processes that followed. Yet, in hindsight, misreading the moment, misaligning priorities, neglecting the military imbalance and ineffective work in key areas led to serious failures not only in domestic and foreign policy, but also overshadowed the very political achievements of 2018. For many, the 'revolution' they once embraced became a source of caution, and some even came to question their participation. The documents signed in Washington did, indeed, formalize the status quo surrounding Artsakh, enshrining the results recorded on the battlefield. However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue is far from concluded. This is not an end, not a final reality, but the beginning of a new process, one that, whether we want it or not, is already unfolding. It is no coincidence that Nerses Kopalyan, who directly participated in the negotiations, notes that during meetings with the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council, American officials framed the Washington summit not as 'a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty.' In other words, while some objective developments do not hinge on Armenia, the final outcome of the agreements reached in Washington will depend on the government's subsequent efforts. The ruling party cannot assume that signing the accords guarantees peace or justifies a lighter pace of work. Instead, they must learn from previous mistakes, and try to protect and advance Armenian interests to the fullest within the evolving framework. Without drawing a direct parallel to the May 5, 1994 ceasefire in Bishkek that ended the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, it should be emphasized that Azerbaijan pursued a consistent strategy from that point onward. Baku strengthened its economy, enabling significant investments in its military, particularly acquiring modern weapons, and conducted effective foreign policy that complemented its internal capabilities ( internal balancing ) with strategic alliances ( external balancing ). Subsequently, in line with established political science principles, these efforts were directly reflected on the battlefield, and in subsequent negotiations. Azerbaijan continued to work with this same logic even after the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020. There may be different opinions about whether Armenia gained more than it lost in these accords, with strong arguments on both sides. What is undeniable, however, is that the agreements have given us breathing room, a chance to regain our footing. The existing playing field is complemented by a new, significantly important dimension—with its own challenges and opportunities. The side that acts with greater intelligence and effectiveness will ultimately benefit the most. In Bishkek, Azerbaijan emerged as the losing side, but through sustained effort it transformed that position into a winning one. How Armenia proceeds after Washington depends precisely on us. In his book 'Every War Must End,' prominent American military expert Fred Charles Iklé specifically emphasizes this—no document establishes a final status quo; the outcomes depend on how the parties act afterward. The Three Year Window of Opportunity Negotiation outcomes are not detached from economic, military, and diplomatic realities; they are deeply interconnected. That is, a side that is economically and militarily weaker, and with more limited diplomatic capacity, cannot enter negotiations from a position of strength and secure greater gains than its stronger counterpart. There may be exceptions when, under certain conjunctural conditions, the weaker side benefits beyond what its own resources would allow. Yet, the general pattern of history is clear: economic potential translates into military capability, military capability into influence, and that influence is then leveraged diplomatically to elicit desired behavior from the other party. Parallel to all this, however, one cannot underestimate the impact of geographical position, the development of state institutions, the effectiveness of state governance, and the presence of political will. Economic Strength, Military Power and Peace The launch of the Washington process opens new horizons for Armenia's economic development. Proposed American investments can serve as a powerful catalyst, sparking interest from other countries and attracting additional capital. It is possible that Armenia will become a participant in the creation of major corridors connecting East and West, which in turn can generate additional financial resources . The prospect of deterring the threat of war for at least three years, combined with an official U.S. presence in southern Armenia—with clear economic and business interests, offers not only an additional layer of security, but also the potential to significantly improve Armenia's strategic position. Paul Kennedy, in his seminal work ' The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, ' emphasizes that the triumph and collapse of great powers has often been conditioned not only by the results of wars, but by the economic strength cultivated before and during conflicts. Expanding production capabilities has enabled greater investments in armed forces, while military growth, in turn, has allowed powers not only to defend their own borders, but also expand them. This pattern can be seen in the France of Napoleon Bonaparte, the subsequent century-long hegemony of the British Empire, the German Empire and Nazi Germany before the two World Wars, and later, in the global reach of the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945. In all these cases, the development of economic capabilities led to an increase in military potential, which—alongside other important factors such as effective state governance, political will, and work ethic—contributed to achieving political success. We currently see how China is rapidly transforming accumulated economic power into military power , which in turn dramatically increases its political weight. The same logic operates in the cases of Germany and Japan . Looking at the post–Bishkek ceasefire period, the contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan is stark. Azerbaijan, by steadily building its economic potential, was able to channel greater resources into its military, an investment that proved decisive in shaping later military-political outcomes. Armenia, by contrast, faced a confluence of debilitating factors: the imposed blockade, entrenched corruption (also present in Azerbaijan), and an inefficient state apparatus. These constraints stifled economic growth and, in turn, left the country without the economic or military capacity needed to meet emerging military-political challenges. Moreover, in the case of Armenia, what is called ' retrenchement ' in international relations occurred. Starting from 1994, Armenia appeared as the main guarantor of Artsakh's security, which meant that Armenia's economic and military potential, as well as alliance capabilities, should have been sufficient to protect not only Armenia's, but also Artsakh's security. However, time showed that Armenia's capabilities, measured relative to Azerbaijan's , were insufficient not only for Artsakh's, but even for Armenia's own security. As a result, we lost not only Artsakh, but also about 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian territory. We now see the same process in Russia's case: with the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia's influence is weakening or receding in other regions, particularly in Syria and the South Caucasus . Azerbaijan's 'Bargaining Power' and Washington's Soft Deterrence for Armenia Many in Armenia feel that Azerbaijan has benefited more from these agreements than Armenia. While arguments and counterarguments can be made, a key distinction remains: unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is able to defend its borders with its own forces and, until recently, effectively used the threat of renewed war as leverage in negotiations. Moreover, Azerbaijan's security was not at risk without the Washington agreements, whereas Armenia's was. One of Armenia's main achievements from the Washington agreement has been preventing a possible Azerbaijani offensive in the near term. We often overlook that since November 9, 2020, Armenia has not been able to defend its borders solely with its own forces. After the Jermuk battles of 2022, it finally became clear that Russia would not honor its alliance obligations toward Armenia. In response, at Yerevan's request, the EU monitoring mission was deployed along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. To be fair, since their arrival, ceasefire violations have significantly decreased , and Armenia has not lost even a single square kilometer of territory due to military actions. Prominent American economist and professor of foreign policy and national security Thomas Schelling, in his book ' Arms and Influence ,' notes that 'bargaining power' in negotiations is conditioned by the ability to cause physical pain to the adversary (power to hurt). Schelling argues that it is precisely this desire to avoid pain that weakens one's negotiation positions and compels them toward concessions. He calls this process 'the diplomacy of violence,' the purpose of which is to extract the desired result under the credible threat of using weapons and causing pain, without getting involved in real war. The Washington process allows Armenia to crack the above-described coercive framework imposed by Azerbaijan since November 9, 2020. The active involvement of the United States in the process of regulating Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the construction of 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' in southern Armenia, as well as President Trump's personal interest give Armenia a weighty soft deterrence mechanism to deter new Azerbaijani aggression. It is no coincidence that during a press conference, Trump emphasized that the parties can call him in case of problems. These factors, in addition to the presence of the EU monitoring mission, significantly strengthen Armenia's external balancing potential. The success of the process largely depends on whether the Armenian government will be able to use this window of relative stability to strengthen Armenia's military power to such an extent that it becomes as self-sufficient as possible. The question is clear: how many days can Armenia defend its borders with its own forces, and what price must the aggressor pay? It is important to realize that every ceasefire or agreement, including a peace treaty, is more stable when the cost of war outweighs the political gains expected as a result. This is the formula that can make the expected peace more stable. And finally, following the advice of Paul Kennedy and Fred Charles Iklé, the Armenian government should make the most of the three-year window provided by the Washington process. This requires remaining vigilant and resisting the temptation to prioritize highly visible, short-term projects that appeal to daily public needs at the expense of critical defense spending. Restoring military balance must go hand in hand with investments that foster long-term economic growth and strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity. Conclusion Despite heavy losses, Armenia now has an opportunity to significantly strengthen its security system. How we do this depends on us. The government should present a roadmap outlining specific programs, action plans and timelines for implementing the commitments set out in the documents, including for example, Armenia's complete unblocking. Public uncertainty around the Washington process remains high, and it is the duty of state officials to address these doubts with transparency and facts. Opposition forces should closely follow, monitor, and constructively criticize the government's actions, demanding more effective work. It should be realized that criticism devoid of substance does not produce results, and too often creates an environment in which authorities feel less pressure to perform. Armenian civil society also has an important role to play. Not constrained by the struggle for power, civil society organizations, expert groups, and independent analysts can bring impartiality and professionalism to the debate, providing a necessary counterweight between the government's overly optimistic narratives and the opposition's overly pessimistic perspectives.
Libyan Express
13-07-2025
- Libyan Express
Misurata cement plant moves closer to launch
Libya's LAIP accelerates progress on Misurata cement plant The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAIP) is continuing preparations for the launch of the Misurata Cement Plant, as part of its broader strategy to implement industrial projects that support Libya's economic development. The technical committee overseeing the project, appointed by LAIP, held its tenth meeting of the year on Tuesday at the portfolio's headquarters in Tripoli. The meeting focused on reviewing key technical and logistical requirements to ensure the project proceeds according to schedule. Discussions included coordination with the National Oil Corporation to secure the supply of natural gas and heavy fuel oil required for the plant's operations. The committee also examined ongoing communication with the General Electricity Company of Libya to explore options for providing the necessary electrical power to the site. The committee further addressed infrastructure planning, particularly engagement with the Ministry of Transport regarding the construction of a 10-kilometre paved road linking the project site to the national road network — a critical step for accessibility and logistics. In addition, an agreement was reached with the Industrial Research Centre to carry out a geological survey aimed at updating previous studies and assessing the long-term availability of raw materials at the site. The results will support the plant's sustainability, with operations projected to span up to 50 years. Subcommittees also presented technical reports evaluating the current status of engineering works, carried out in collaboration with several local consulting firms. The committee reviewed the existing contract with the Chinese company Sinoma – Wuhan, and initiated negotiations to revise specific provisions as part of a renewed contractual arrangement. These activities form part of LAIP's ongoing efforts to complete pre-operational preparations and ensure that installation works commence within the designated timeframe, in accordance with approved technical and engineering standards.
Tatler Asia
08-07-2025
- Tatler Asia
The wave of lay-offs in the first half of 2025: The consumer goods industry – a ‘safe fortress' in the crisis is also starting to shake
The first half of 2025 has seen a fresh wave of lay-offs sweep across global markets, as companies recalibrate in the face of ongoing economic volatility. Data from Intellizence and CNN shows that more than 5,700 businesses executed mass lay-offs throughout 2024, and the momentum has carried into this year, with over 190 companies following suit. After two years marked by significant downsizing across technology, media, finance, manufacturing, retail, and energy, the tide has yet to turn. Even the consumer goods sector, long seen as a 'safe fortress' in times of turmoil, has not escaped unscathed, with major reductions announced by two of its most prominent names. Yet beyond the grim statistics, there may be signs of a deeper transformation taking shape in the framework of the global economy. Read now: 41 per cent of employers plan to cut roles that AI can replace by 2030 In just the first half of 2025, a host of multinational corporations across varied industries have unveiled wide-scale lay-offs. Meta, parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, has confirmed the dismissal of around 3,600 employees, viewed as underperformers, representing 5 per cent of its workforce. Starbucks followed suit, announcing plans to shed 1,100 roles while also cancelling hundreds of incoming positions, citing the need to streamline operations and refocus the brand's priorities. Amazon, too, continued trimming headcount, particularly in its communications and sustainability divisions, raising its total lay-offs to 27,000 over the past three years. This wave has not remained confined to tech and retail. It has extended to financial institutions and consumer goods conglomerates. DBS Bank, Southeast Asia's largest financial group, plans to reduce its workforce by 4,000 over the next three years across 19 markets. Strikingly, even stalwart consumer brands, typically resilient during economic storms, are no longer exempt. Procter & Gamble confirmed it will eliminate approximately 7,000 roles, predominantly in administrative and office-based functions. Shortly after, Unilever drew headlines when it revealed a plan to cut 7,500 positions globally: nearly 6 per cent of its total workforce. Read more: This Chinese unicorn company uses AI to help Unilever and L'Oréal with their content Behind these seemingly unconnected announcements lies a quieter, more deliberate trend. As the cost of raw materials continues to rise and AI and automation technologies gather pace, businesses are being pushed to refine their models. In doing so, human capital is increasingly under review.
