
Lake Chad Basin governments should redouble efforts against terror group Iswap
Since 2021, Islamic State West Africa Province (Iswap) has intensified its footprint in Cameroon's Far North Region through increased extortion of communities and a spate of brutal attacks on military barracks in Borno (Nigeria) and Logone-et-Chari.
These twin tactics reveal Iswap's goal of extending its zone of influence and replenishing its resources. Governments in the area need to act with urgency, as the effects strain local livelihoods.
Several Logone-et-Chari villages and islands are heavily influenced by Iswap. The group, a breakaway faction of Boko Haram, has appointed Ibn Umar and Malam Ba'ana, two of its leading figures, to handle 'taxation' and zakat collection in this part of Cameroon.
On 4 January, about 20 Iswap fighters arrived in Wuyan Yachi and announced a raft of 'tax' increases. These included ₦40,000 ($26) per field after each harvest for farmers, up from ₦10,000 ($6); and ₦25,000 ($16) per bag of fish instead of ₦15,000 ($10) for fishermen. Those who don't pay are executed by Iswap.
Localities heavily influenced by Iswap
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research reveals four main reasons for Iswap's increased extortion. These are to finance its expansion in Nigeria, deal with the effects of military operations on its finances, reduce the impact of the naira's fall on its finances (the naira is the commonly used currency in the Lake Chad Basin border areas), and counteract Nigeria's measures to combat terror financing.
First, Iswap wants to establish itself in Nigeria's northeastern states of Taraba, Gombe and Bauchi, which have so far been spared its abuses. It also wants to reach the North West and North Central regions. Cells have been set up in Kogi State in North Central, for example, and are expected to grow.
Such a project requires money to pay combatants and buy weapons, ammunition, materials for manufacturing improvised explosive devices, and vehicles (such as motorcycles and canoes). Iswap also needs to support an alternative governance system in the localities it controls, to forge a social pact between civilians and insurgents. In that regard, the group seeks to fund its so-called charitable works, as occurs in some Lake Chad Basin communities under its control.
Second, various military offensives – including Operation Lake Sanity, Lafiya Dole, Hadin Kai and Emergence 4 – have taken their toll on Boko Haram's human resources, arsenal and assets in the Lake Chad Basin. They have also disrupted the group's funding sources, such as cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, illicit trafficking, agriculture, livestock farming and fishing.
Operation Lake Sanity 2, for example, eliminated more than 310 Boko Haram fighters, neutralised several insurgent bases, destroyed logistical assembly points, seized large quantities of weapons and rescued numerous civilians. Military counter-offensives are currently on the wane as they await renewal (e.g. Lake Sanity, Alpha and Emergence 4), so Iswap is taking advantage of the situation to revive its economy of violence.
Third, since 2022, Nigeria has been going through an economic crisis triggered by rising inflation following a fall in the naira against the US dollar. In August 2024, inflation reached 29.9%, its highest level since 1996, and the naira fell to ₦1,524 to the dollar, representing a 230% loss in value.
This fall has reduced Boko Haram's finances – most of which are held in naira – and spurred efforts to raise money mainly through extortion. In Logone-et-Chari, when the naira falls, Iswap demands users pay their fees in the more stable currency of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, the CFA franc.
Fourth is the Nigerian government's efforts since 2019 to cut off the funding Boko Haram factions received from outside. These efforts include restrictive banking measures such as the 2022 change in the design of naira banknotes and setting a maximum withdrawal limit at ATMs.
Prosecutions and convictions of those involved in terrorist financing have also been secured, contributing to the progress made in fighting terror financing. Iswap is now using extortion to mitigate these obstacles.
The upsurge in Iswap attacks on military positions is intended to force communities to collaborate by degrading the capacity of security forces to intervene. Between 8 March and 26 April, the group claimed responsibility for at least five attacks on military barracks in Logone-et-Chari. The effect is an increase in local communities' fragility and an expansion in the spectrum of violence as Iswap gains ground.
To free the population from Iswap's diktat, Cameroon and Nigeria must take action on three levels: military, administrative and diplomatic. The governments must strengthen their military presence and security arrangements in the affected areas and islands, be present throughout the zone, and carry out frequent offensive operations using ground and air forces. Military offensives, which have recently decreased, must be reinforced.
Civil-military actions could help improve collaboration between the community and the defence and security forces, breaking the trust Iswap has established with the local population in the process. Public health campaigns conducted by the military, like those in 2024 in Darak, and civil-military discussions should be reactivated.
Cameroon's government should also provide vital infrastructure on the islands – such as drinking water points, health centres, schools, agricultural inputs and fishing equipment – to counterbalance Iswap's services to the communities.
Finally, the authorities in Cameroon's Far North Region and Nigeria's Borno State should strengthen their collaboration to enable joint security, administration and infrastructure projects between the two countries. This could help end Iswap's domination in this cross-border area. DM
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Daily Maverick
14-07-2025
- Daily Maverick
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Remote and poorly resourced outposts are soft targets for attacks, and a weak point in regional counter-terrorism efforts. At least 15 confirmed Islamic State West Africa Province (Iswap) attacks have targeted military outposts across the Lake Chad region this year. Common to this campaign, which the group calls Camp Holocaust, is that the targets were isolated, under-resourced, and often in border zones where state presence is lacking. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research shows that in May, Iswap overran Nigeria's 27 Task Force Brigade in Buni Gari and 50 Task Force Battalion in Marte, and mounted a twin assault on the Nigeria-Cameroon joint base in Wulgo and Cameroon's Soueram outpost. These locations — like those hit earlier this year in Malam Fatori and Goniri, among others — were civilian communities situated far from fortified urban centres. Many had been virtually destroyed by insurgents, and military outposts were set up there to facilitate stabilisation and resettlement. Poor roads, the risk of ambush and improvised explosive devices, and vast, ungoverned terrain make them vulnerable and difficult to reinforce. Sites of Iswap attacks on remote military bases These outposts have become Iswap's softest targets and a strategic weak point in regional counter-insurgency efforts. Analysis of the group's tactical trends reveals a pivot to fast-moving assaults by large numbers of fighters with light but sophisticated weapons, nighttime raids, and modified commercial drones to drop explosives to shock troops into disarray. Recent defectors undergoing a government deradicalisation programme in Maiduguri told ISS that Iswap's tactical prowess had been aided by at least six trainers from the Middle East deployed by Islamic State. Military targets are attacked in order to seize weapons to reduce reliance on smuggling and consolidate territorial control, allowing for the extortion of civilians and securing resources for operations and expansion. Two Nigerian Boko Haram war veterans said the outposts were 'in the middle of nowhere' and undermanned, yet needed to cover a wide area. Where battalions should have about 800 personnel, many had far fewer, or were under-resourced for the area size and number of sub-units. Political officials across the Lake Chad Basin are aware of the problem. Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum has repeatedly raised the alarm, and the Nigerian senate recently urged the military to redeploy troops in response to renewed attacks. However, without mass recruitment, this is difficult. The military is already overstretched and engaged in counter-insurgency operations countrywide. Geography presents another challenge. Lake Chad's islands, swamps and porous borders offer Iswap natural cover and operational flexibility, while complicating the various states' military logistics. The governments of the four Lake Chad Basin countries — Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria — have ceded much of this territory as they lack adequate amphibious or naval capabilities. Nigeria has used air power for the lake areas and hard-to-reach dry lands. But Iswap has adapted by digging bunkers at their homes and bases on Lake Chad's islands, where they live with their families, to avoid detection and airstrikes, ex-fighters told ISS. On dry land, airstrikes are delivering blows, but are infrequent. Reinforcements often arrive too late because of the outposts' remoteness, the distances between them, and limited human and logistical resources. In one of its most devastating attacks, Iswap attacked Nigeria's 149 Battalion in Malam Fatori on the Niger border on 24 January, killing at least 20 soldiers, including the commander. No reinforcements Survivors said the fight lasted three hours, but no reinforcements came — neither from nearby units nor via air support, allowing the insurgents to strip the base of arms. This illustrates the breakdown of a standard response tactic, which, say military insiders, should involve each unit holding its ground, buying time for backup via ground or air. But these outposts lack the human resources and equipment to sustain such resistance, say Nigerian politicians. The implications are profound. Not only is Iswap bolstering its arsenal, it is also expanding its territorial control in a region where governments are already thinly present. The cost is not just strategic; it is financial and political. The attacks have resulted in heavy equipment losses for Nigeria and Cameroon, and replacing them is costly and slow. Moreover, repeated base attacks damage troops' morale and public trust in states' capacity to protect. The neglect of infrastructure and services leaves remote outposts dangerously exposed. If terrorists were to capture a city like Maiduguri, they would achieve a symbolic triumph that would cost Nigeria's government politically and at the polls. However, allowing Iswap to consolidate control on the rural fringes is just as dangerous, as these areas could serve as staging posts for terror attacks on urban centres. A major rethink is required. States, especially Nigeria, which is the worst hit and main theatre, must reconsider deployment density and resourcing in remote rural areas. One model is creating well-resourced 'paired garrisons' — bases close together to enable quick reinforcement. A similar arrangement exists in Dikwa, Nigeria — but when Marte, 25km away, was attacked on 12 March 2025, Dikwa could not respond as it was under-resourced, according to ISS field data and sources familiar with the formations. Therefore increasing outposts is not enough; they must be well resourced, with sufficient deployments of troops and equipment, and be rapidly mobile. In addition, strengthening and expanding naval and amphibious capabilities and formations is critical as a more proactive strategy. Iswap's sanctuary in the Lake Chad islands — where rival Boko Haram is also strong — cannot be dislodged through airstrikes alone or by overstretched ground forces. The Multinational Joint Task Force's naval units could disrupt militants' activities and apply pressure in locations the insurgents use as command centres. Critical gap Another critical gap is civilian cooperation, which has weakened due to human rights abuses committed as part of state counter-terrorism responses, and local communities' fear of insurgent reprisals. In some cases, such as the January Malam Fatori attack, residents had seen militants gathering or advancing much earlier, but did not alert the military. This demonstrates civilians' lack of trust in the military and a weak intelligence pipeline, underscoring the importance of strengthening both. Working with communities through safe reporting and informant protection protocols is vital for this. Given the frequency of nighttime attacks, Nigerian and Cameroonian troops must prepare accordingly. Heightened surveillance, a real-time communication system between outposts and air units, and constant preparedness can improve response and reinforcements. DM