Trump speaks on economic worries and roils foreign elections: From the Politics Desk
In today's edition, we have the first comments from Kristen Welker's exclusive interview with President Donald Trump. Plus, we're looking at another U.S. ally — after Canada — that has seen its upcoming election roiled by Trump as he reshapes not just American politics but global politics as well.
— Scott Bland
Trump downplays recession fears, saying the U.S. would be 'OK' in the long term
By Alexandra Marquez
President Donald Trump on Friday downplayed concerns about potential economic trouble, saying everything would be 'OK' in the long term, even if the U.S economy experienced a recession in the short term.
Asked twice by 'Meet the Press' moderator Kristen Welker whether it would be OK in the long term if there was a recession in the short term, the president said, 'Look, yeah, it's — everything's OK. What we are — I said, this is a transition period. I think we're going to do fantastically.'
Following up, Welker asked Trump if he was worried about a recession, to which he responded, 'No.' Asked whether he thinks one could happen, Trump replied, 'Anything can happen, but I think we're going to have the greatest economy in the history of our country.'
The remarks come as analysts on Wall Street are increasingly worried that the country could face a recession due to Trump's changing tariff policy.
'Well, you know, you say, 'Some people on Wall Street say' — well, I tell you something else. Some people on Wall Street say that we're going to have the greatest economy in history. Why don't you talk about them?' Trump said during the interview at his Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida.
'There are many people on Wall Street say this is going to be the greatest windfall ever happen,' the president added.
According to initial measurements released by the Commerce Department on Wednesday, the U.S. economy shrunk by 0.3% in the first quarter of 2025, a reduction largely driven by a fall in exports and a boost in imports ahead of Trump's expected tariffs.
On Wednesday, while meeting with members of his Cabinet, Trump deflected blame for the first-quarter gross domestic product numbers, saying that it was a result of the economy former President Joe Biden left behind.
'You probably saw some numbers today,' Trump said, 'and I have to start off by saying, that's Biden.'
After Canadian election, Trump could drag down conservatives in Australia too
By Mahalia Dobson
Days after a Canadian election that hinged on who would best stand up to U.S. President Donald Trump, he is at the center of an election in another liberal democracy.
Trust in the United States is plummeting in Australia, which votes Saturday amid global financial turmoil sparked by tariffs Trump has imposed on trading partners around the world including Australia, a U.S. ally and vital security partner in countering China.
As in Canada, Australia's opposition conservative party, the Liberal Party, was primed to win before Trump returned to office, thanks to public anger over the cost of living and record-high home prices. But it has since lost support among voters increasingly concerned about how their government will handle Trump.
A poll released last month by the Lowy Institute, a research foundation, found only 36% of Australians expressed any level of trust in the United States — the lowest in the annual poll's two-decade history.
While 81% of Australians disapprove of Trump's tariffs, the vast majority (80%) continue to say the U.S. alliance is important for Australia's security.
Those numbers reflect the economic and security dichotomy Australia faces: how to balance its security ties with the U.S. and its trade interests with China.
🗞️ Today's other top stories
📃 Trump's wish list: Trump released a budget proposal calling for cuts to programs related to public health, education and clean energy, and boosts in spending for the military and border security. Read more →
🥊 Trump vs. Harvard: Trump said in a Truth Social post that his administration is 'going to be taking away Harvard's Tax Exempt Status.' Read more →
🥊 Trump vs. NPR & PBS: Trump signed an executive order directing the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to stop funding NPR and PBS. Read more →
🥊 Trump vs. law firms: Attorneys who have been critical of law firms striking deals with Trump are forming their own firm to represent clients targeted by the White House. Read more →
🌎 Rubio's world: Secretary of State Marco Rubio's new role as national security adviser is the latest example of his swift rise in Trump's orbit. Rubio has sought to establish his role as a close Trump ally after being initially caught off guard by some of Trump's early foreign policy announcements. Read more →
👀 Eyes on 2026: Trump's strategy for the 2026 midterms is taking shape, with the White House in close consultation with congressional leaders, his political operation raising millions for aligned outside groups, and his party looking to energize his core supporters. Read more →
💰 Meme coin murmurs: Some Senate Republicans are raising concerns about Trump's offer of a private dinner and White House tour to investors in his meme coin. Read more →
✍️ Sounding the alarm: Democratic senators issued a letter calling on the Trump administration to investigate deals between Elon Musk's Starlink and foreign countries, alleging Musk used his perch at the White House to further the agreements. Read more →
🐶 DOGE in the states: More than 20 states have established their own Departments of Government Efficiency, but the state-level versions have taken more modest approaches to cutting government programs and jobs. Read more →
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Daily Mail
24 minutes ago
- Daily Mail
Sir Keir Starmer urges sanctions on Putin over meeting with Zelensky
Sir Keir Starmer yesterday led calls to force Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table after Europe's unprecedented White House diplomacy put the ball back in the Russian dictator's court. The Prime Minister suggested possible sanctions for Putin after co-chairing a virtual Coalition of the Willing meeting, debriefing their day trip to Washington DC and planning for the future. US President Donald Trump also warned of a 'rough situation' if Moscow does not make peace as he pushed for Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky to meet Putin in Switzerland in the next two weeks. A Downing Street spokesman said last night: 'The leaders discussed how further pressure – including through sanctions – could be placed on Putin until he showed he was ready to take serious action to end his illegal invasion.' German chancellor Friedrich Merz laid down the gauntlet to the Kremlin over any potential talks, saying: 'We don't know whether the Russian president will have the courage to attend such a summit.' Hinting at more sanctions as Russia again barraged Ukrainian cities with 270 drones and ten missiles in an overnight attack, he added: 'Therefore, persuasion is needed.' It followed Monday's extraordinary meeting in Washington where Mr Zelensky and the US President were joined by Sir Keir, chancellor Merz and the leaders of France, Italy, Finland, the EU and Nato. Sir Keir hailed a 'breakthrough' after the unprecedented gathering garnered a US commitment to military involvement in security guarantees for Ukraine. Mr Zelensky hopes to have such a proposal in writing within the next ten days to strengthen his hand before heading to any meeting with Putin to discuss territory. The US administration's unorthodox, realpolitik negotiations offer the most significant hope of bringing peace to Europe since Russia's invasion in February 2022. But there remains real fear in Ukraine that they could be sold out as the White House seems loath to pressure Moscow with sanctions and military might, instead turning the screws diplomatically on Kyiv. Ukrainian journalist Peter Zalmayev told the Daily Mail: 'The message that Ukraine and Europe need to get through to Trump is that his getting the Nobel Peace Prize depends not on whether he ends the war in Ukraine, but on how he ends it.' Mr Trump broke off Monday's talks to call Putin and update him on progress, during which the two superpowers agreed to set up a bilateral meeting between the Russian tyrant and Mr Zelensky. The President was typically bullish afterwards, saying the two adversaries are 'getting along a little bit better than I thought' despite 'tremendous bad blood'. He told Fox News that 'otherwise I wouldn't have set up the [bilateral] meeting, I would've set up a three – a trilat'. But he cautioned: 'We're going to find out about president Putin in the next couple of weeks... It's possible he doesn't want to make a deal.' He added: 'I hope president Putin is going to be good and if he's not, then it's going to be a rough situation. And I hope that Zelensky will do what he has to do. He has to show some flexibility also. The thing is a mess.' Yesterday, the Kremlin appeared to be dragging its heels over the plan, which would see a meeting with Mr Trump follow the one-on-one between the Russian and Ukrainian leaders. Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told Russian state TV: 'Without respect for Russia's security... without full respect for the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people who live in Ukraine, there can be no talk of any long-term agreements.' Further muddying the waters, a source in Mr Trump's administration claimed it was Putin who suggested a meeting without the US President. During their call, Putin told Mr Trump: 'You don't have to come – I want to see him one on one,' Politico reported. It was also claimed Putin suggested they meet in Moscow – a clear non-starter for Kyiv, with Geneva one possible venue. The Swiss confirmed that if Putin was visiting for peace talks, the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for the dictator would not be acted upon.
Spectator
39 minutes ago
- Spectator
Trump must not give Kim Jong Un the recognition he craves
When dealing with rogue states, being pessimistic often means being realistic. The much-anticipated summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin last week allowed the Russian leader to relish the bright Alaskan lights of summitry with Trump, buy the precious commodity of time, all while maintaining his ambition to defeat Ukraine. Amidst this week's numerous meetings between Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a resolution to the Ukraine war remains elusive. But we must not forget that hours before Trump and Putin met in Alaska, another high-level meeting took place in Pyongyang between Kim Jong Un and the Chairman of Russia's state Duma. It was a stark reminder that ending the Ukraine war on the battlefield is not going to end the ties between Pyongyang and Moscow. The date of 15 August 2025 now holds significance for the trajectory of the Ukraine war, but whether it marks the start of a drawn-out process of negotiations between Moscow, Washington, and Kyiv or continued lip service from Putin remains to be seen. Yet for different reasons, 15 August is also a day of commemoration on the Korean Peninsula, signifying the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule as the second world war neared its conclusion. Unusually, it is one of the only public holidays celebrated across both sides of the Demilitarised Zone. For North Korea, the occasion is a moment to chastise the once-imperial power of Japan, and – on some but not all years – host military parades in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square. After all, according to North Korea's false narrative, Kim Il Sung led an anti-Japanese guerrilla movement all by himself in the 1930s. In South Korea, 15 August marks the day the country became a separate state to the communist North in 1948 and often witnesses the South Korean president outlining their vision for inter-Korean relations and, of course, their relations with Japan. Hours before Trump and Putin were to meet, the visit by yet another confidante of Putin to Pyongyang only stressed how the Ukraine war is not over and any deal acceptable to all sides is a long way off. It was not just Trump who would roll out the red carpet for Putin. Kim Jong Un would do the same to Vyacheslav Volodin, who would later deliver a letter to the North Korean leader from Putin himself, thanking him for North Korea's military support in his fight against Ukraine. This week's meetings between Trump, Zelenskyy, and European Union leaders make clear that whilst the interests most directly at stake in the war remain those of Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington, there are other parties. The escalating North Korea-Russia relationship – which Kim Jong Un once again described as 'invincible' – has meant that South Korea is no longer a peripheral observer to the war. With military and missile technology likely heading from Moscow to Pyongyang – which will be relished by North Korea in helping to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities – a swift conclusion to the war is firmly in Seoul's interests. Yet, although South Korea has supplied tanks, howitzers, and FA-50 fighter jets to Poland, which subsequently transfers the arms to Ukraine, Seoul remains reluctant to supply lethal assistance directly. Just over a week after having met Putin, Zelenskyy, and Western leaders, Trump will host South Korea's leftist President Lee Jae-myung in Washington on 25 August for the first summit between the two leaders. Whilst the infamous tariffs – which negotiations between Seoul and Washington have reduced to 15 per cent – will dominate talks, another topic of discussion will be the US-South Korean alliance amidst Trump's calls for South Korea to pay more for the US's extended deterrence and security guarantee. How to deal with the intractable issue of North Korea will also likely feature at a time when left-wing Lee has proclaimed that South Korea does not seek to 'absorb' the North and wishes to 'usher in a new era of peace on the Korean Peninsula'. Speaking of peace on the Korean Peninsula is all well and good, but akin to the case of Russia, Seoul must not underestimate Pyongyang's penchant and strategy for continued delinquency. For all Trump's intentions to meet Kim Jong Un and Lee's calls for reconciliation and dialogue with Seoul's northern neighbour, Seoul and Washington must make clear how the world cannot give Kim Jong Un what he wants, namely international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. The easy way to convince North Korea to improve its behaviour may be to ease sanctions, but Seoul and Washington must resist this time-old urge. Giving Pyongyang benefits will only lead to further abuse, a logic which can also apply to Russia. There is no such thing as a free lunch. As global eyes were fixed on Alaska, Kim Jong Un lauded the 'friendship and unity' between North Korean and Russian soldiers in the ongoing fight against 'a mutual enemy'. Identifying this undefined mutual enemy, however, was no Sisyphean task: it was not just Ukraine or the United States but also the broader West. For as long as we must wait for the next Trump-Putin or Trump-Kim meeting – in Moscow or elsewhere – Russia and its allies will not relent in forging a 'coalition of the willing', united in their opposition of the United States, its allies, and its leadership of international order. For this reason, the West cannot capitulate.
Spectator
40 minutes ago
- Spectator
Can Friedrich Merz save Germany from becoming irrelevant?
Friedrich Merz arrived in Washington this week alongside Europe's most senior leaders, ostensibly to coordinate the continent's response to Trump's Ukraine designs. Here was Germany's moment to demonstrate the leadership it perpetually claims to seek – a chance to shape the conversation that will determine Europe's security architecture for years to come. Instead, before the Chancellor could even present his case to the Americans, his own foreign minister Johann Wadephul delivered a masterclass in diplomatic self-sabotage from Berlin. Germany must play 'an important role' in any future peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, declared the CDU politician, before categorically ruling out German soldiers on Ukrainian soil. 'That would presumably overwhelm us,' he explained with the sort of defeatist precision that has become his government's signature. In a single sentence, Wadephul had kneecapped his own Chancellor's negotiating position, advertising Germany's limitations rather than its capabilities to anyone listening. This wasn't merely unfortunate timing – it was the latest instalment in a pattern of cabinet colleagues undermining Merz's already tentative efforts at international leadership. Whether on defence spending, migration policy or economic reform, the Chancellor finds himself repeatedly ambushed by ministers who seem determined to advertise Germany's unwillingness to shoulder serious responsibilities. One might call it capitulation before the first battle was fought, but this represents something more systematic: the crystallisation of a political culture that has made strategic irrelevance into an art form. Here lies the exquisite tragedy of modern Germany: a nation trapped between its aspirations and its neuroses, too large to be irrelevant yet too terrified to actually lead. While Merz and other European leaders huddle in the White House, desperately hoping to dissuade Trump from striking a deal at Kyiv's expense, political Berlin sends its familiar signal: Yes, we speak of responsibility. No, we won't actually take it. The coalition has made itself thoroughly comfortable in this culture of irresponsibility. Vice-Chancellor Lars Klingbeil offered a textbook example of political evasion in his recent television interview, declaring that 'naturally we must also assume responsibility as Europeans when it comes to security guarantees'. Whether this involves troops, training, money, or something else entirely 'must all be clarified in the coming days'. What sounds like commitment is actually an escape hatch – the political equivalent of agreeing to meet for lunch 'sometime soon'. Few politicians dare acknowledge the challenges that Russian imperial ambition actually poses to Germany. CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter represents a rare voice of clarity, reminding his colleague Wadephul that European peace cannot be guaranteed without military backing – including ground troops if necessary. Germany, Kiesewetter argues, cannot lead from Central Europe whilst simultaneously refusing engagement where it matters. The mathematics are brutal but simple: you cannot exercise leadership whilst advertising your unwillingness to pay its price. Yet this is precisely Germany's chosen strategy, demanding a seat at the top table whilst openly declaring vast swathes of policy off-limits. Chancellor Merz understands that Germany cannot define its role through economic power alone. Since taking office, he has tentatively begun moving Germany back towards leadership responsibility. But the resistance is formidable – within his own party, throughout the coalition, and amongst a public that has grown comfortable with foreign policy free-riding. The result is that Germany is stuck in an interstitial position: too significant to be ignored, too anxious to genuinely lead. Whilst Washington discusses Ukraine's and Europe's future, Berlin resembles a spectator at its own continent's strategic deliberations. It wanted to be an actor yet seems content remaining in the audience. This dysfunction extends far beyond foreign policy. The coalition's domestic paralysis mirrors its international timidity. When asked about the government's future direction, Klingbeil couldn't even feign enthusiasm for his own coalition. Rather than articulating any compelling vision, he made clear that he views this partnership as little more than a marriage of convenience – one held together primarily by fear of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party (AfD). Defining oneself solely in opposition to populists represents political dwarfism of the highest order. Those serious about defeating populism cannot practise politics purely ex negativo. They must offer positive alternatives, compelling visions, genuine leadership. Instead, Klingbeil offered warmed-over social democratic orthodoxy: higher taxes for high earners. But lack of revenue isn't Germany's problem. Rather, astronomical debt and a bloated welfare state burden the republic with obligations that will eventually crush future generations. Precisely when populists will find their richest hunting grounds. If Klingbeil genuinely wants to defeat populism, he must confront Germans with uncomfortable truths: they will need to work more and longer to save the pension system. Social spending must be cut – the state cannot continue housing every applicant in city centres. Real change requires discomfort for those who have arranged their lives at public expense. Klingbeil should also cease attacking coalition partners who dare speak inconvenient truths. When Trade Minister Katherina Reiche recently demanded Germans work harder, this wasn't pandering to the right – it was acknowledging a bitter reality. The coalition catastrophically underestimates German citizens by assuming they cannot handle genuine reforms. The necessary cuts would be entirely explicable. Everyone understands that deterring Russia carries costs. Everyone can calculate that fewer young workers cannot indefinitely finance more retirees' pensions. This requires basic arithmetic, not advanced mathematics. The irony is exquisite: by merely managing stagnation, the coalition achieves precisely what Klingbeil claims to oppose. Nothing feeds populists like politics' inability to address change. If the Union and SPD continue this path, they can watch the AfD overtake them in the next election. Germany's predicament extends beyond coalition politics to a fundamental crisis of strategic imagination. The country that once produced visionaries like Adenauer and Erhard, the architects of post-war European integration, now struggles to articulate any coherent vision of its role in a rapidly changing world. This matters far beyond Germany's borders. Europe desperately needs German leadership as it confronts Russian aggression, Chinese economic warfare, and American strategic uncertainty. Instead, it receives hesitation, half-measures, and the perpetual promise that someone else will handle the difficult decisions. The tragedy is that Germany possesses the resources, influence, and historical experience necessary for genuine leadership. What it lacks is the political courage to embrace the responsibilities that leadership entails. Until Berlin overcomes its preference for strategic irrelevance over strategic engagement, Europe will remain dangerously dependent on powers whose interests may not align with European security. Germany's choice is stark: lead or become irrelevant. The current strategy of wanting influence without responsibility represents the worst of both worlds and is a recipe for strategic marginalisation disguised as pragmatic restraint. The question is whether German politicians will recognise this reality before their nation's window for meaningful leadership closes entirely. Current evidence suggests they may prefer the comfort of managed decline to the challenges of actual leadership. If so, Germany's partners should plan accordingly.
