China's Progress Toward Military Supremacy
Explain this statement in your book: China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) 'has become a global actor, but it is not yet a global power.'
The PLA has become more actively involved beyond China's immediate periphery, but usually in very modest ways. Examples include counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Middle East, and a single overseas base in Djibouti. These are all non-combat-focused missions that involve no more than a few thousand troops. There are also strong constraints on the PLA's ability to deploy larger contingents abroad, including the lack of a global command structure and limited global logistics infrastructure.
This means that while the PLA can project influence and shape the security environment, it cannot conduct the same range of combat missions that the U.S. military can based on our forward presence of hundreds of thousands of troops in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. China has avoided a larger commitment because it has opted to focus on priorities closer to home, and because it tries not to get too enmeshed in foreign conflicts.
Examine the PLA's concept of 'strategic discipline.'
China has a military strategy that requires the PLA to be most ready for domestic emergencies and conflicts with neighbors, with a focus on Taiwan. Starting from a low level of modernization decades ago, they have pragmatically followed this strategy over successive administrations – favoring long-term acquisition and piece-by-piece military reforms over global deployments that would have overstretched their capabilities, and near-term escalations that would have complicated their force buildup. Even in Asia, they have kept conflicts at a low level, usually favoring 'gray zone' tactics over outright use of force.
Exercising strategic patience has resulted in a military that is far more advanced than it would have been had they been distracted. But it also came at the price of real-world experience since they have avoided becoming involved in full-blown armed conflicts since the 1980s. To bridge this gap, they have accelerated their training but top Chinese leaders including Xi Jinping still critique PLA personnel as being unready for combat.
Analyze how the PLA's expansion of overseas basing could bolster its ability to deny access for U.S. forces.
The PLA has a single traditional overseas base in Djibouti and is in negotiations with several other countries, concentrated around Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, for new bases or operating locations. The PLA could conceivably use a presence in these locations to create problems for nearby U.S. forces, especially if the PLA ever deploys combat capabilities such as missiles or special forces.
The larger challenge, however, is not overseas PLA bases but Chinese economic and political influence with countries across the Global South that host U.S. bases or that could provide other kinds of support. Beijing might seek to use that influence to restrict the U.S. military's ability to deploy and sustain forces in a future conflict and reduce our ability to pull together a coalition.
How might the PLA exercise military supremacy in a plausible Taiwan Strait conflict?
China has regarded a cross-strait conflict as its main planning scenario since the early 1990s. The immediate goal is leveraging military power to deter Taiwan independence, but the PLA also needs to be able to use force to compel reunification. Xi has given them a deadline of 2027 to be ready.
They have several options on the table, including different kinds of blockades, operations against Taiwan's offshore islands, and even a full-scale invasion. They are actively training for and rehearsing these kinds of operations. They are also thinking through the complications of those operations and trying to find solutions to them. Logistics is one example where they have been deploying new capabilities to move troops and equipment.
However, a large campaign against Taiwan would involve heavy risks for the PLA. Taiwan has been learning lessons from Ukraine in how to counter an opposing force and the United States may intervene. There would also be significant economic risks for China as countries line up to impose sanctions. These factors give Xi and his political allies pause in dramatically escalating tensions with Taiwan.
Assess the impact of intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition on China's quest for military supremacy.
An intensification of U.S.-China rivalry has created some complications for the PLA's modernization. They now need to compete more than ever for influence and access in distant theaters where the United States has long enjoyed strategic advantages. They are also increasingly worried about Washington strengthening its allies, which Beijing fears is encouraging states such as Japan and the Philippines to press more firmly in their territorial disputes with China. In addition, U.S. export control restrictions under the last couple administrations are making it harder for China to acquire technology necessary for its military modernization, such as advanced semiconductors. Operationally, there are growing risks of collisions at sea and in the air, and growing concerns about escalation in the space and cyber realms, and about dangers in the nuclear domain as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal. Leaders on both sides are considering what they need to do to prevent crises and effectively manage them if they occur.
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