Lithuania buys more weapons, beckons their makers to invest locally
WARSAW, Poland — Amid a surge in defense spending across Eastern Europe, Lithuania is advancing plans to purchase Leopard 2A8 tanks and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles while making efforts to attract investors that will develop its own defense industry.
Giedrimas Jeglinskas, the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament's Committee on National Security and Defence, told Defense News the country's authorities have decided to increase its level of military expenditure to between 5% and 6% of its GDP from 2026 to 2030.
This would place the nation atop of NATO in terms of spending. Similarly to the other two Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has boosted its military expenditure in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
'Our capability target is a division that we need to arm to make it a reality, so we need to increase spending to speed up the development of divisional assets. We need tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, air defense and some other high-tech assets to ensure this division's readiness,' Jeglinskas said.
'We need to arrive at the level which will allow us to deter potential aggression,'he added.
In December 2024, Lithuanian Defence Minister Dovilė Šakalienė inked a contract to buy 44 Leopard 2A8 tanks during an official visit to Germany. In Berlin, Šakalienė met with German officials to discuss issues related to the two nations' defense cooperation, including the heavy maneuver brigade of 4,800 personnel that the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, is to deploy to Lithuania in the summer of 2025. The move is designed to bolster NATO's eastern flank.
Last year, the State Defence Council, Lithuania's top defense decision-making body, authorized the country's National Defence Ministry to also kick off the acquisition of tracked CV90s, which are made by BAE Systems Hägglunds.
In 2025, Lithuania's defense spending is to total some €3.2 billion ($3.5 billion), or around 3.9% of the country's GDP, according to data from the National Defence Ministry.
Alongside their work to equip the new Infantry Division with new gear, Lithuanian officials are also developing a program similar to Estonia's initiative to lure weapon and ammunition makers to its Ämari military base.
As part of these efforts, Germany's Rheinmetall is carrying out a project to build a new ammunition plant in Lithuania, and Vilnius hopes to attract more defense industry players.
The Lithuanian Ministry of Economy and Innovation 'and the Ministry of National Defence are working tandem on the so-called Green Corridor to attract investors. Rheinmetall is one of those deals, and more producers are coming, as we're holding talks with several manufacturers of explosives,' according to Jeglinskas, who represents the co-ruling Union of Democrats for Lithuania.
In November 2024, Rheinmetall launched the construction of a plant to make 155 mm artillery ammunition in Lithuania. Located in Baisogala, the factory is to commence operations in mid-2026. As part of the €180 million investment, around 150 jobs are to be created locally.
'A state-of-the-art production facility, including a shell manufacturing and load assembly pack, is being built in the municipality on an area of around 340 hectares,' the German company said in a statement. Once completed, the plant 'will be able to produce tens of thousands of 155 mm calibre artillery shells per year.'
Jeglinskas said the Lithuanian government's responsibility is to support potential investors with a wide range of assistance, including financial aid, to attract more defense-focused investments.
'It's the government's role; the government needs to put money into certain companies, and state capital is needed is push forward such investments that are of strategic importance to Lithuania and its security,' the lawmaker said.
Meanwhile, in Estonia, the country's authorities are making efforts to settle producers of weapons, ammunition and equipment in different locations across the country. In addition to the defense industry park in Ämari, a larger defense park is to be made available for manufacturing projects by both domestic and foreign defense companies.
The national park's location is yet to be decided. Public tenders to select investors are scheduled for 2025, representatives of the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI), the country's military procurement agency, told Defense News.
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The republics' leaders know they and Afghanistan are 'neighbors forever' and do not have the luxury of retreating to North America if things go wrong, so policy must acknowledge geography. Uzbekistan's engagement with the Taliban began long before NATO evacuated Afghanistan in August 2021. In 1997, then-Uzbek president Islam Karimov proposed the Six plus Two Group on Afghanistan,which grew from an understanding that dialogue and a political settlement, nor armed force, was the path to peace. The group was unable to persuade the warring sides – the Taliban and the United Front (formerly the Northern Alliance) – to pursue a March 2018, Uzbekistan hosted the Tashkent Conference that urged direct peace talks without preconditions between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Taliban said it would only negotiate with the United States, the "foreign occupying force,' and demanded the departure of foreign troops before the start of negotiations. In July 2022, Tashkent hosted a conference on Afghanistan, attended by representatives of 30 countries. It was an opportunity for the international community to take the measure of Taliban officials and for the Taliban to encourage investment in Afghanistan and seek the release of Afghan assets seized by the West after the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The tone of the event was forward-looking, but Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev, '…reiterated the international community's conditions for formal diplomatic recognition, namely 'forming a broad representation of all layers of the Afghan society in state governance, ensuring basic human rights and freedoms, especially of women and all ethnic and confessional groups.'' Tashkent has consistently called for engaging with Taliban-run Afghanistan, including unfreezing the $9 billion in state assets that were seized by American and European authorities after the ouster of the Kabul government in August 2021 Central Asia is a water-stressed region and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are in the 'severe water stress' category. The construction of the Qosh Tepa canal in Afghanistan threatened to increase tensions between the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan by reducing the water flow of the Amu Darya River by 15-20% - a disaster for Central Asia agriculture. (In Uzbekistan, agriculture accounts for 25% of GDP and about 26% of the labor force.) In April 2025, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan agreed to cooperate in sharing the water resources in the Amu Darya River Basin. The republics are concerned as 'a significant reduction in the Amu Darya's flow could lead to ecosystem degradation, increased soil salinity, and deteriorating living conditions for populations downstream…[and] could hinder efforts to restore the Aral Sea and further exacerbate the region's environmental challenges.' Though Uzbekistan has not recognized the government of Taliban-run Afghanistan, the agreement on transboundary water resources demonstrates bilateral relations are becoming 'increasingly institutionalized.' Tashkent prioritizes its interests to address not just water resources but the threat of terrorist groups, 20 of which may be sheltering in Afghanistan. This effort will require serious diplomacy by all parties and is an opportunity for Uzbekistan (and the U.S.) to provide technical assistance to ensure the canal is built to minimize excessive water loss and soil salinization. Uzbekistan should take the opportunity to substitute crops less thirsty than cotton for the country's growing textile sector which plans to grow textile exports to $10 billion, and continue to import cotton from Turkey, China, and Bangladesh. (Uzbekistan also imports cotton from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan but should take the opportunity to lead the region away from crops that deplete its water supply.) One step to peacefully resolve the water problem is to make Afghanistan a party to the 1992 Almaty Agreement which regulates water allocations based on the Soviet-era shares of water among the then-Soviet Central Asia republics. The agreement is implemented by the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia (ICWC) and making Afghanistan a member of the ICWC is a way to make it part of the solution and not the problem. It will teach the Taliban the 'rules of the road' in Central Asia and ensure the republics' officials have a clear understanding of Taliban personalities, motivations, and priorities. Other connectivity initiatives are: The Termez free economic zone which offers a 2-week visa for Afghan visitors and features a customs office, a hotel, storage facilities, and capacity to handle 100,000 trucks and 900,000 tons of goods a year. Trans-Afghan railway, a $7 billion, 765-kilometer link to Pakistan's ports that is expected to cut transport costs by 30–40%. And Uzbekistan may soon conduct preliminary studies on extending the railway from Hairatan to Herat, a jumping-off point for trade with Iran and Turkmenistan. Surkhan–Puli-Khumri Power Line, a 1,000 MW line to support electrification of Afghan transport, and that may potentially link to the CASA-1000 power project, a joint venture between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. (Uzbekistan is already the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan's electricity imports.) Once operational, the line will increase Uzbekistan's electricity exports to Afghanistan by 70%, delivering up to 24 million kWh daily or 6 billion kWh annually. The project spans 245.6 kilometers, with 45 kilometers on Uzbek territory—already completed—and 200.6 kilometers in Afghanistan. The capacity of this line will not only enhance power availability but also facilitate the electrification of the Hairatan–Mazar-i-Sharif railroad, reducing transportation costs by replacing diesel-powered trains with cleaner electric locomotives. Uzbekistan sees many opportunities in Afghanistan and in 2024 trade climbed to $1.1 billion, most of that exports from Uzbekistan. There are commercial opportunities to be sure, but Tashkent does not want to contain Afghanistan, but to use it as a regional bridge, and not just for trade. There are concerns Afghanistan is a potential source of future transnational terrorism, though that may be stymied by intelligence sharing between the Taliban and the U.S., who share concerns about the Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-K) presence in Afghanistan. More trade will not necessarily make Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State change their policies but more economic opportunity may make it harder for them to find recruits, and efforts like funding madrassas in Afghanistan may help detoxify the educational system. And the Taliban can build legitimacy if they are seen to be putting the peoples' welfare first by encouraging trade and business. That won't be favored by the U.S., but after two decades of mayhem in the Hindu Kush, much instigated by America, Washington should encourage action – by anyone - that allows Afghanistan to build infrastructure and make money by means other than poppy cultivation. Outside meddling in Afghanistan usually leads to tears, but if Tashkent can work with the moderate, outward-looking Taliban based in Kabul that want to improve the economy, it may subtly tip the balance against the hard-liners in Kandahar. (Yes, Siraj Haqqani and Mullah Omar are the 'moderates' but that is where we are right now.) Uzbekistan may have a role in the future exploitation of critical minerals in Central Asia and can help the U.S. build a secure critical mineral supply chain. According to Visual Capitalist, 'Out of the 50 minerals deemed critical by the U.S. government, the U.S. is 100% reliant on imports for 12 of them, and over 50% reliant for another 321 critical minerals.' Central Asia and Afghanistan are endowed with critical minerals but their isolated location presents a difficult transport problem. Also, mining and processing rare earths requires a lot of water which is in short supply in the region, though a new Chinese technology may triple production speed and reduce pollution, but will put China in a key position, something the U.S. will probably oppose. Andrew Korybko notes that partial completion of the Trans-Afghan railway may still benefit the republics if they can backhaul Afghanistan's minerals for processing in the republics or in Russia or China. The republics will need to secure investment for local, sustainable processing of the minerals (with off-take agreements), but Washington and Brussels must make serious offers to keep the stuff out of Russian and Chinese hands. (Exhortations by Washington to 'do the right thing' and not sell to China and Russia, backed by the hint of sanctions, are a tax on Central Asia and only diminish America's standing in the region.) Uzbekistan, a double-landlocked country, faces hurdles accessing global markets. Connectivity with Afghanistan offers a pathway to South Asia, particularly through Pakistan's seaports Karachi and Gwadar, though Uzbekistan is improving trade relations with Iran as its ports Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, and access to the North-South Transport Corridor, are 'Plan B' if the trans-Afghan route is untenable. Over the past decade, Tashkent has sought to make Central Asia a 'safe neighborhood,' and many of Uzbekistan's priorities, such as peacefully settling border disputes with the neighboring republics and encouraging a broad-based government in Kabul, are shared by Washington, but the Central Asia republics have a broader definition of the regional security, one that is grounded in diplomacy human development, and trade, and that includes trade and normal political relations with Russia, China, Iran, and Afghanistan. Central Asian is no longer a platform for the NATO campaign against the Taliban, but will it become a platform to engage the Taliban, who probably aren't going anywhere despite Washington's ongoing economic warfare. In April, Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced he is ready to work with the European Union (EU) and other international partners to support Afghanistan's development 'to overcome the current crises,' a policy that was welcomed by the Taliban. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa, President of the European Council, visited Uzbekistan in April with the intent, in von der Leyen's words, 'to take our partnership with Central Asia to the next level.' Aside from the standard fare of promoting European foreign direct investment to the region, securing access to critical minerals, and promoting educational exchanges, Central Asia's putative European partners should move smartly to work with the republics to ensure Afghanistan a productive member of the region and no longer a source of terrorism and narcotics. The failed NATO mission in Afghanistan, though it included European troops, is seen as an American loss, giving Europe more post-war maneuver room in Central Asia. And Europe will rely more than America on East-West trade from Asia via the Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor, so it may be the right partner right now for Central Asia. But the Central Asian republics aren't waiting for the EU and international partners to get to work. In May 2025, shortly after Mirziyoyev's announcement, Tashkent commissioned the Termez Dialogue on Connectivity Between Central and South Asia as a permanent platform for regional connectivity. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan both favor an 'economy first' policy with their neighbors, which the republics call "acceptance of reality" in the wake of the West's failed nation-building project in Afghanistan. The same week the republics' delegates convened in Termez, Uzbekistan to plan to boost Central and South Asian connectivity, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan agreed to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. CPEC has fallen short of the partners' expectations, so it remains to be seen if including Afghanistan is a smart move or will just burn more of China's money. And on the heels of the Termez meeting, Iran and China launched a railway route from Xian in western China to the Aprin dry port near Iran's capital, Tehran. The route will reportedly cut travel time from 30 days via sea to 15 days and will avoid the Strait of Malacca and the Hormuz Strait, chokepoints the U.S. Navy hoped to exploit in future conflicts. The route will not pass through Afghanistan but is Beijing's vote of confidence in the region as a connectivity space. Uzbekistan and the other Central Asia republics helped NATO in Afghanistan but it was all for naught, so now it's time for get back to basics - economic and social development - via initiatives like the Uzbekistan 2030 Strategy, and promoting good governance and increasing civic engagement through initiatives like the Center for Progressive Reforms. Washington should focus on how it can assist these sorts of efforts by the republics and not be distracted and agitated by their commonsense wish to not isolate neighboring Afghanistan. By James Durso for More Top Reads From this article on
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A U.S. intelligence worker charged with trying to leak state secrets to a foreign spy agency was hired as a 22-year-old with little professional experience outside the cash register at a local grocery store, The Daily Beast can reveal. His professional experience prior to joining a U.S. national security agency was remarkably similar to that of Thomas Fugate, who has just been appointed to lead terror prevention at the Department of Homeland Security. A cybersecurity graduate of Florida Polytechnic University, Nathan Vilas Laatsch is the second national security official in two days whom The Daily Beast has revealed to have virtually no professional experience other than working at a grocery store before being hired by a U.S national security agency at the age of 22. Laatsch, now 28, a computer scientist with 'top secret' clearance at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Virginia, was hired under the last Trump administration. He was arrested last week, accused of attempting to pass sensitive information to Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND). When Laatsch was hired for the role with a Top Secret security clearance at the age of 22 in August 2019, he had just stopped working as a cashier at Publix supermarket in Plant City, Florida, according to his LinkedIn account. His skills included 'providing customer service,' 'handling moderate amounts of money,' and 'operating a cash register.' It allegedly proved to be a terrible appointment. Laatsch was arrested last week after an FBI counterintelligence operation. Thomas Fugate, who graduated from college just 12 months ago, has been tasked by Trump with tackling U.S. extremism while leading the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships at the Department of Homeland Security, having been employed as a 'Cross Functional Team Member' at a grocery store less than two years ago. Fugate had also been working as a neighborhood gardener just five years ago. There is no suggestion he has done anything illegal. In March 2025, the FBI commenced an operation after receiving a tip that Laatsch had contacted the BND, stating that he 'did not agree or align with the values of this [Trump] administration.' He allegedly stated he was prepared to share 'completed intelligence products, some unprocessed intelligence, and other assorted classified documentation,' according to court documents quoted by the Department of Justice. He stated that he was interested in German 'citizenship' because he did not 'expect things here to improve in the long term,' and was not seeking 'material compensation.' On May 14, an undercover FBI agent allegedly advised Laatsch that they were prepared to receive additional classified information. Between May 15 and May 27, Laatsch is accused of transcribing multiple pages of notes while logged into his classified workstation, folding the notes, and exfiltrating the classified information in his clothing. On May 29, Laatsch arrived at a prearranged location in northern Virginia, where he was arrested. He made his initial court appearance in the Eastern District of Virginia the following day. The DIA has been approached for comment but has not yet responded.
