The future of Turkey's Kurds

Al-Ahram Weekly

16-07-2025

Fighters from the Kurdistan Workers Party have been laying down their arms in ceremonies conducted within the framework of Turkish-Kurdish peace negotiations
On 11 July, a group of 30 fighters from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – half of them women – placed their weapons in a large cauldron in front of the historic Jasana cave in northern Iraq and set them alight.
The symbolic disarmament ceremony – described as historic – was conducted in the framework of the ongoing Kurdish-Turkish peace negotiations that are being conducted beneath the slogan 'a terror-free Turkey.'
The ceremony came in response to a video message aired two days earlier from PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to his followers. 'I believe in the power of politics and societal peace, not weapons, and I call on you to put this principle into practice,' he said.
The iconic PKK leader has been held in near solitary confinement in the Imralı Prison near Istanbul since 1999. This was his first publicised video message in 26 years. It follows an earlier written message in February calling on all PKK groups to lay down their arms.
'The PKK must dissolve itself,' it read. 'Convene your congress and take the decision to integrate with the state and society.'
The PKK members' symbolic gesture received a very positive response from Ankara. 'Today marks a new day, a new chapter in history. The doors to a great, strong Turkey— Century of Turkey — have been fully opened,' Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during a meeting of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 12 July.
Describing the disarmament ceremony as a victory for Turkey's 86 million citizens, Turks, Kurds and Arabs, he said, 'the Republic of Turkey is our shared home, our common roof. All 86 million of us are one, united, and brothers for eternity.'
Urging the public to have confidence in the government that is working to secure a better future, he said that 'we will facilitate the process with care and urgency, without harming anyone, and closely monitor the laying down of weapons.'
The PKK has been under increasing pressure to disarm. Its leader's decisions followed by its members' historic gesture of good faith cannot be viewed separately from developments in Syria following the overthrow of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in December 2024.
Soon afterwards, Turkey succeeded in bringing Syria's neighbouring states together in a high-level meeting hosted by Jordan in March to forge a regional anti-terrorism coalition, primarily aiming to combat the Islamic State (IS) group and the PKK, which Turkey has designated as a terrorist organisation.
Analysts believe that the PKK has come to recognise that the militant option will yield at best limited results, especially in view of regional and international developments.
Part of the group's networks in Syria and Iraq have collapsed under sustained Turkish military pressure. In Syria, the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have experienced internal rifts. To the east, the PKK sustained setbacks as a consequence of the Israeli attack against Iran. Prior to this, Israel and its Western backers succeeded in neutralising segments of Iran's regional proxies, thereby reducing Tehran's support for the PKK.
Another likely factor informing the PKK decision to disarm is the shift in US policy towards Syria. On 30 June, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order lifting sanctions on Syria. Prior to this, on 5 June, the US withdrew over 500 troops from three bases in northeastern Syria, and on 17 June it withdrew forces from two additional bases in that area.
The moves suggest that the Trump administration is accelerating the reduction of the US military presence in Syria and by extension US support for the SDF, which, according to some analysts, is a source of concern for the PKK.
At the same time, the Trump administration is keen to support the new Syrian leadership and has echoed Interim Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa's calls for national unity.
Meanwhile, since the opening of the parliamentary season last autumn, when Erdogan's far-right ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli walked over to shake hands with the leader of the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party, Ankara has increasingly leaned into a major shift in its policy towards the Kurdish rights movement.
In April, Erdogan met with a delegation from the DEM to discuss prospects for reviving the Turkish-Kurdish peace process that he had abandoned in 2015. More recently, on 24 June, Bahçeli called on all Turkish parties to support a new peace initiative that promised to make Turkey free of terrorism.
The MHP and Bahçeli personally had long been fervent opponents of dialogue with the PKK.
Turkey's current approach to the PKK is shaped by three key factors. The first is Erdogan's determination to secure support for a new constitution, which is currently being drafted. Secondly, he is desperate to contain the growing influence of the opposition parties, above all the People's Republican Party (CHP), which has been gaining remarkably in the polls.
The third is the need to counter the Israeli threat. Tel Aviv's invective against Turkey has become increasingly strident, most recently in response to Ankara's defence of Iran's right to complete its nuclear programme. Bahçeli, perhaps reflecting the concerns of the Turkish leadership in general regarding Israeli behaviour in the region, warned that Turkey might be Israel's next target after Iran.
Despite the hopes raised by the PKK arms-burning ceremony and its reception in Ankara, the road to peace and the PKK's integration into Turkish political life is unlikely to be smooth. One of the foremost obstacles is Turkish scepticism and mistrust. According to some Turkish assessments, the PKK still owns hidden arsenals of weapons. Ankara also fears that the PKK fighters in Iraq might merge with Iranian-backed militias.
The mistrust is also mutual. In the long run, PKK leaders worry that their fighters will not obtain the necessary legal protections from potential witch hunts after an agreement. Turkey has never articulated a concrete vision for resolving the conflict politically and in terms of legal guarantees.
In addition, the PKK is concerned by the threat of continued Turkish military operations despite ongoing negotiations. In recent months, Turkey has launched frequent strikes against PKK strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming dozens of casualties.
If, to the PKK leadership, this betrays a lack of good faith, the Turkish leadership argues that a two-pronged approach – military operations in tandem with dialogue – is needed to push effectively for a peaceful solution.
Perhaps it has the PKK's more hardline nationalist wing in mind. The 'Qandil faction,' as it is called, has previously opposed unilateral disarmament and organisational dismantlement. This faction still subscribes to armed struggle as the most effective means to secure Kurdish rights in the face of what it regards the systemic Turkish antagonism to and marginalisation of the country's large Kurdish minority.
It also argues that this struggle has helped focus international attention on the question of Kurdish national, political, and cultural rights.
Ankara may be calculating that the military dimension of its two-pronged approach will drive a wedge between this faction and the Ocalan faction, weakening the negotiating hand of the latter. Be that as it may, any peace process will have to navigate through obstacles posed by the hardline factions on both sides, whether the Kurdish militants or the far right Turkish ethnonationalists.
But perhaps more crucially, to move forward a peace process needs clarity in the form of a concrete vision or roadmap – and this, so far, remains lacking.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 17 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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