
Seeking emerging currency bargains, investors take fresh look at Asia
Currencies like South Korea's won, the Indonesian rupiah, and the Indian rupee rank among the most undervalued in emerging markets relative to their historic average, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Beyond attractive valuations, fresh economic stimulus in China and signs of progress in U.S.-Asia trade negotiations are adding to the region's allure.
The potential for Asian currencies to strengthen was on full display earlier this month, when a sharp surge in the Taiwanese dollar spread across the region. That helped the cohort catch up with their developed- and emerging-market peers, which had been outperforming following the dollar's decline after U.S. President Donald Trump's early-April tariff announcement.
"On a fundamental basis, it's been cheap for a long time,' said Claudia Calich, head of EM debt at M&G Investment Management, adding that investors including herself had been underinvested in Asia thanks to higher carry opportunities in Latin America. "It's finally started correcting a little, but even then it's still relatively cheap.'
Korea's won, which plummeted last month in response to Trump's barrage of "reciprocal' tariffs, is a prime candidate for further gains, according to Goldman Sachs Group and Barclays.
Goldman strategists — who looked at the extent of undervaluation, possible conversion of dollar assets, and the role of the yuan — for their picks, also expect Malaysia's ringgit and the South African rand to appreciate. Barclays analysts see significant scope for gains in the Singapore and Taiwanese dollars too.
Sentiment toward Asia's depressed currencies has already improved, as concerns about Trump's policies tarnish the appeal of the dollar and trade-deal hopes improve appetite toward EM assets.
A Bloomberg index of Asian currencies has gained around 3% since its low in April. Global funds have been snapping up local currency bonds in Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea this month, data shows. Selling pressure on the greenback has been so strong that Hong Kong's monetary authority was forced to intervene to maintain its peg.
While many market watchers expect a degree of appreciation in Asian currencies, whether the gains will last beyond catch-up moves remains to be seen.
The relative stability of the yuan as a managed currency can be a double-edged sword in that it can reduce volatile swings across Asia but also cap rapid gains. Beijing has signaled that it's not ready to let the yuan strengthen dramatically against the U.S. currency.
The dollar regained some ground last week as Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell signaled the central bank was not in a hurry to adjust interest rates. That's led to many Asian currencies paring some of their earlier gains.
"I don't think we're necessarily in the global growth environment now where Asian currencies are going to meaningfully outperform,' said Grant Webster, co-head of EM sovereign debt and currencies at Ninety One in London.
Still, the dominance of the dollar has been so ingrained in investors' mindset that a dent in that perception has been enough to create wild swings. Investors have no option but to prepare for future episodes like the Taiwanese dollar's epic surge.
When scouting for potential winners, "the focus is on the ones that haven't' gained much yet, said Dominic Schnider, head of global FX and commodities at the chief investment office of UBS Group's wealth management unit. In emerging Asia, "some of these currencies just from a valuation angle do look cheap.'
Stacked bundles of South Korean 50,000 won banknotes ahead of lunar new year holidays at the Bank of Korea headquarters in Seoul on Jan. 14 |
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The Diplomat
2 days ago
- The Diplomat
Can India Survive the Trade War?
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NHK
2 days ago
- NHK
India PM Modi expresses defiance against US tariff policy
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Japan Times
2 days ago
- Japan Times
Trump's attack on Goldman could prompt watering down of Wall Street's independent analysis
U.S. President Donald Trump's criticism of Goldman Sachs' research on tariff risks could prompt some analysts to water down their research, investors and academics said, an outcome that could leave investors with less reliable information. The reams of research that banks such as Goldman produce are used by institutional investors, such as hedge funds and asset managers, in deciding how to allocate capital. Trump's comments — in which he lambasted Goldman, its economics team and CEO David Solomon and accused them of making "a bad prediction" — have triggered a debate on Wall Street about the possible fallout, according to interviews with banking industry sources and investors. At one Wall Street bank, Trump's comments spurred informal conversations among staff, a source familiar with the matter said. The source said they also discussed how to incorporate government data in the wake of Trump's decision to fire the head of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, claiming — without evidence — that its data had been politicized. Still, the bank was not considering changing the way research operates. "This is going to come down to a person's ability to withstand a barrage of criticism from the Oval Office, and the extent to which these banks provide support for their chief economists," said Dave Rosenberg of Rosenberg Research, who has worked in the economics departments at several banks. "If we notice that research is being watered down ... then we'll know that this has had an effect." Jack Ablin, chief investment strategist at Cresset Capital, said if banks do start self-censoring, smaller investors who do not have the resources to do their own analysis are likely to suffer most. Trump's criticism is his latest attack on corporate America and other institutions, and is a break from historical norms, where presidents have typically avoided calling out private companies and executives for things they do not like. Some companies that have considered passing on tariff costs to customers have faced public criticism, and Trump, who came to politics after running businesses, has intervened directly in private business decisions by making a deal with Nvidia to give a portion of its revenues from sales to China of AI chips to the government. Trump "certainly is taking a number of steps that diverge from the traditional view of the respective roles of the government and private industry,' said Henry Hu, a securities law professor at the University of Texas. In a social media post earlier this week, Trump said foreign companies and governments were mostly absorbing the cost of his tariffs, counter to Goldman's research. "Given that sell-side Wall Street analyst predictions have been about as accurate as random guessing, small investors will do just fine with the president exercising his First Amendment right about flawed Wall Street research," a White House official said. On Wednesday, Goldman's U.S. head economist David Mericle defended its research on CNBC, vowing to "keep doing" what the bank considers informative research. Goldman declined requests for further comment. Other major banks, including Wells Fargo, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America and Citigroup, declined to comment. There has already been evidence of self-censorship. A senior JPMorgan Asset Management investment strategist, Michael Cembalest, earlier this year said during a webinar that he refrained from voicing some of his thoughts on U.S. tariffs publicly. Shortly after Cembalest's comments, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's CEO, said that he expects analysts to speak their minds. Both Cembalest and the bank declined to comment for this story. Hu said there is a risk involved in even appearing to give way to political pressure. "Goldman's reputational capital is at stake here,' he said. "If their views on the economy become biased, and they are shown to be wrong, why would anyone choose Goldman to advise them on anything?' Mike Mayo, banking analyst at Wells Fargo, said independent research is critical for an investment bank's reputation. "Investment banks live and die by their reputation and independence. That transcends all other considerations." Wall Street research has long been tightly overseen, one source said, with supervisory analysts reviewing research reports to ensure that language is not inflammatory, emotive or partisan and that reports are objective and cite sources. That person said that if analysts feel unable to speak openly then investors will pay more or take greater risk. Liquidity will suffer and there will be less foreign participation in U.S. markets, the person said. It was large losses by smaller investors that triggered the first major probe of Wall Street research in the aftermath of the dot-com stock bubble of the late 1990s. Eliot Spitzer, then New York's attorney general, found that Wall Street analysts had swapped their honest opinions for unwarranted "buy" ratings on companies to help their banks win underwriting and advisory business. The result: a $1.5 billion global settlement payout by Wall Street and lifetime bans for some analysts. It remains to be seen whether the current kerfuffle will have an outsized impact on Wall Street or if it is a storm in a teacup, said Steve Sosnick, market strategist at IBKR. "It does raise a lot of questions," he added.