FOCUS: Nippon Steel buyout spat hints at business fragility in U.S.
U.S. President Donald Trump's bid to attract investment threatens to undermine the appetite for corporate spending in an ironic twist, with the 18-month saga over Nippon Steel Corp.'s buyout of United States Steel Corp. showing the growing vulnerability of businesses in the U.S. market, according to analysts.
The U.S. administration's earlier blocking of the $14.1 billion takeover deal was clearly driven by political motives and corporate executives will no longer be able to make decisions regarding their U.S. operations based only business criteria, they said.
The wrangling in the high-profile case could lead global companies to think twice about making sizeable investments and acquisitions in the world's largest economy, with many moving to reduce their exposure to the U.S. market.
"I do think many companies are pausing investments and major capital expenditures, not only because of the Nippon-U.S. Steel deal but due to general uncertainty surrounding political and economic dynamics in Washington," said Zack Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Trump had repeatedly rejected Nippon Steel's plan to take full control of U.S. Steel.
But Nippon Steel, the world's fourth-largest steel producer, and U.S. Steel, the 29th largest, said Wednesday following Trump's approval of the buyout plan that they had signed a national security agreement with the U.S. government and finalized the acquisition transaction.
Under the deal, the Japanese steelmaker is obliged to invest $11 billion by 2028 on bolstering the U.S. steelmaker's operations, far more than the previously planned $2.7 billion.
The U.S. government also obtained a golden share allowing it to veto key management decisions, such as when reducing investment, shedding production capacity in the United States or closing plants.
Nippon Steel CEO Eiji Hashimoto told a press conference on Thursday that his company had learned from a year and a half of negotiations with the U.S. government that a flexible management strategy is required.
The top executive said it had been believed that governments should not get involved in business deals.
"But now...governments are strengthening their involvement in economic and business matters through industrial policy," he said.
Trump's predecessor, Joe Biden, initially blocked the purchase of U.S. Steel on national security grounds, saying the manufacturing icon, based in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania -- a key battleground state in the 2024 presidential election -- should be "American-owned and American-operated."
Trump also opposed the deal during the presidential race, saying the acquisition of a minority stake in U.S. Steel would not cause any issues, but foreign ownership of the company would not be good psychologically. He ordered a new review of the deal by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States in April with a deadline for Trump to make a final decision initially set for June 5.
"Because predictability is insanely low right now in the United States, Japanese companies are going to cut back the percentage of their business in the country," said Keisuke Hanyuda, the chief executive of Owls Consulting Group.
While rising costs must be dealt with, "The last thing a business wants is to lose predictability," said Hanyuda, a former Japanese trade ministry official in charge of trade talks.
Nippon Steel is betting on firm demand for high-tensile strength steel in the U.S. market, capitalizing on its advanced production technology for high-end steel plates used in products such as electric vehicles.
The United States is one of three growth markets for the Japanese steelmaker, compensating for shrinking domestic demand.
Under Trump, the steel, aluminum, auto and semiconductor sectors have been targeted by specific tariffs driven by political pressures and companies in these industries should consider other markets for growth to hedge their risks, analysts say.
Earlier this month, Trump signed an order doubling the tariffs on steel and aluminum imports to 50 percent.
"I think Japanese companies will have a difficult time purchasing famous American companies in sectors that President Trump prioritizes, such as autos, steel, aluminum, and chipmaking," Cooper at the American Enterprise Institute said, though investment in other sectors may still be viable.
"But any Japanese company that is considering a major deal in the United States should develop a detailed political strategy before announcing a deal, lest they suffer similar roadblocks as Nippon Steel," he said.
The United States remains a lucrative market with high growth potential but some global companies are beginning to reduce their reliance on it after the tariffs imposed by Trump, Hanyuda said.
The European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, have resumed economic partnership negotiations, while the EU is also looking at Japan, which is part of a trans-Pacific free trade pact that took effect in 2018 without the United States.
Related coverage:
U.S. Steel's strategic importance growing: Nippon Steel CEO
Nippon Steel finalizes deal to make U.S. Steel wholly owned
Trump effectively approves Nippon Steel's takeover of U.S. Steel
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