Fund Kaveri Engine campaign is more than a hashtag. India needs control over its fighter jets

The Print

6 days ago

Notwithstanding the above, we are at an inflection point. The recent experience of force application during Operation Sindoor has revealed the inescapable necessity of sovereign control over our weapon systems. The success of the Tejas programme, including Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), now hinges on our ability to field an engine that not only performs exceptionally well, but also isn't entirely reliant on foreign suppliers.
The proposed deliveries from General Electric (GE) Aerospace of the GE F404-IN20 engines for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A programme have already been delayed by over two years, and more delays are likely. GE has cited supply chain constraints, including disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and shortage of critical components, as reasons for delays. It has also apportioned part of the blame toward us by mentioning that the delay was primarily caused due to delayed orders from India. Since GE's F404 production line had been dormant for several years, the process of reactivating it takes considerable time and resources.
The 'Fund Kaveri Engine' campaign is currently trending on X. The hashtag is being promoted by aviation enthusiasts, defence reporters, strategic experts, and some popular figures on social media. At the heart of the campaign lies the grim realisation that our current aerospace dreams, especially in relation to developing a modern contemporary fighter aircraft, are hostage to foreign engine suppliers.
This article delves into the Kaveri programme's timeline, financial investments, current status, bottlenecks, and evaluates whether co-producing a new engine with an established original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or pursuing an independent programme is the better path.
The timeline
The Kaveri engine project, launched in 1989 by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), intended to power the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) with an indigenous low-bypass turbofan engine delivering 80 kN of thrust with afterburner. The early 1990s saw the development of the 'Kabini' core module, with the first prototype running in 1995 and all five ground-test prototypes tested by 1998. Flight tests were planned for 1999, and integration into the Tejas airframe was planned for 2000. However, the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests triggered international sanctions, limiting access to critical technologies and delaying progress.
In the meantime, LCA, rechristened as Tejas, made its first flight in January 2001. The Tejas was powered by a GE 404 engine.
The first high-altitude tests in Russia in 2004 revealed certain deficiencies, ending the hopes of equipping the first production variant of the Tejas aircraft with the Kaveri engine. In 2005, it was decided to procure 40 GE F404 engines for the Tejas. It was also decided to seek collaboration with France's Snecma for resolving issues with Kaveri. However, negotiations with Snecma collapsed in 2013 over technology transfer disputes. In 2008, the Kaveri was delinked from Tejas due to its inability to achieve the required performance targets. However, the development of the Kaveri by GTRE was allowed to continue for other future applications.
Along the route, there were couple of hits and misses including the damning Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report published in 2011. On the good side, the Kaveri Derivative Engine (KDE), a non-afterburner (dry) variant, was found suitable for the Ghatak UAV. Recently, BrahMos Aerospace's efforts have led to significant improvements in afterburner regime, leading to almost 80 kN of wet thrust. On the marine front, the Kaveri Marine Gas Turbine (KMGT) for naval applications has been tested and found suitable for smaller warships.
Investment
The Kaveri engine project has seen significant financial investment since its sanction in 1989. As per a government press release dated 29 November 2021, Rs 2,035.5 crore had been spent on the Kaveri programme by that date against the allotted amount of Rs 2,105 crore.
This amount in USD terms would be approximately 300 million. The exact expenditure incurred on the programme post 2021 is not readily available, however, going by the progress of the project, it could safely be assumed to be around $ 400 million to date.
In isolation, these appear to be large sums; however, when compared with the investment poured in by other successful engine manufacturers, it is significantly lower. The Kaveri engine, with approximately $400 million invested over 35 years, lags behind the $2–5 billion budgets of Safran, Rolls-Royce, and GE. The exact figures are not easily available, however, one could gauge the scale of investment from Safran's 2016 offer to invest €1 billion ($1.1 billion in 2016, approximately $1.3 billion in 2025) to revive the Kaveri programme, revealing the scale of funding required for advanced engine development.
Current status
As of May 2025, the Kaveri programme has gained a little momentum, fuelled by the increased awareness among the citizenry at large and aided by campaigns like 'Fund Kaveri Engine'. On 30 April 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced increased funding to accelerate the Kaveri engine programme, while speaking at a defence industry conclave in New Delhi.
The KDE, designed for the Ghatak UAV, delivers aprox 50 kN and is set for in-flight testing in 2025, with limited series production planned for 2025–2026. The engine's weight has been reduced to 1,180 kg from 1,423.78 kg, though it remains above the 1,000 kg target. The KMGT has met Navy specifications and now awaits testing for full validation.
Challenges
It is important to study in detail the challenges in the past so that we can address them in the future. The issues were largely related to money, material, management, manpower, and managing expectations.
Money: Sporadic and insufficient funding denied the programme the necessary momentum.
Material: Sanctions imposed in 1998 restricted access to critical materials, such as high-performance alloys, essential for jet engine efficiency. Some of those sanctions were subsequently lifted however, the access remains restricted.
Manpower: Most of our high performers, including IIT graduates, seek employment in the West. It was always a challenge to find talent on a government salary. Besides low inductions, the attrition rate of skilled manpower was high.
Management of expectation: Early expectations to integrate Kaveri with Tejas without intermediate platform testing were overly ambitious. More realistic timelines would have emerged if the project leadership had considered factors like the non-availability of testing infrastructure, including a high-altitude test bed and flight-test bed. We should have also anticipated delays in developing advanced subsystems like single-crystal turbine blades and aerothermal systems owing to our limited prior expertise.
Also read: Lessons for airpower from Operation Sindoor—unified command to tech advancements
The way forward
The Kaveri experience is a story of a glass more than half full. We have developed a functional engine and accrued in the process a plethora of data points and experience, at a relatively low cost. The stage is now set to leverage this knowledge to build better.
However, I would like to add a word of caution here. Kaveri is a fully mature engine now. The possibility of improvement in performance and weight, in the same design, from hereon is very limited. Even if we consider an optimistic scenario, we would achieve 55 kN in dry and 85 kN in wet thrust regimes. However, we would need an engine that produces 100kN plus for our AMCA and Tejas Mk2. We would need to develop a separate engine, which we could call Kaveri 2.0, that addresses the critical shortfall in Kaveri 1.0. The lessons learnt so far would definitely be useful.
In essence, the campaign, or call to action, should be: Fund Indigenous Engine.
In that regard, we will have a choice to make: either we develop one on our own, or we seek external help from existing manufacturers.
Developing an engine of our own offers obvious advantages of complete ownership of intellectual property. We would have the strategic flexibility in terms of exports and building ancillary engine applications. The downside could be measured in terms of time and treasure. It would likely take 10-15 years and over $ 2 billion. There is also the possibility of time and cost overruns.
Alternatively, we could partner with a proven OEM like Safran, GE, or Rolls-Royce. The selected OEM could provide access to advanced technologies, such as single-crystal blades, advanced cooling systems, and advanced digital engine controls, which we currently lack. In such a scenario, the risk of failure is low, although the cost concerns remain. The choice of the OEM would depend on a lot of factors, including cost, degree of ToT, and other strategic concerns. A partnership with an OEM like Safran, which has expressed interest in co-developing a 110–130 kN engine for the AMCA, could bridge critical gaps in materials, testing, and manufacturing while allowing India to retain significant IP rights. Such a collaboration could deliver a production-ready engine within 7–10 years, aligning with the production timelines of Tejas Mk2 and AMCA, while building domestic expertise for future independent programs.
The bottom line would be the degree of sovereign control we would be able to exercise over the finished product in terms of development, testing, upgrading, and selling. As long as the industry partner is unable to throttle our access and ability to manage our product as we see fit, it should be acceptable to co-develop an engine with a foreign OEM.
Take the case of Tejas, for example. There are various systems and subsystems besides the engine that we import for our aircraft ( Elta radar, Martin Baker ejection seat, Cobham inflight refuelling probe, Russian and Israeli-made air-to-air missiles, certain avionics, Line Replaceable Unit (LRUs), and so on). However, none of these equipment suppliers acting alone or even in concert can cause prolonged grounding of the fleet. We retain adequate spare depth and alternative options, including indigenous alternatives, to tide us over a potential supply restriction. In sum, we retain adequate sovereign control over our aircraft, but for the want of an engine, which remains a critical dependency.
Conclusion
The 'Fund Kaveri Engine' campaign has created awareness and galvanised widespread support among the experts as well as concerned citizens. Recent experiences from Operation Sindoor have revealed to us the strategic imperative of a robust indigenous defence ecosystem. The need for an indigenous aero engine has now become an urgent national demand. The political, scientific, and military leadership is aware of this crucial requirement. All we need now is sustained funding, international collaboration, and public momentum to see this mission reach a logical conclusion.
Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd) is a former IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @Ahlawat2012. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)