APMDC attempting bond issue violating Constitutional requirements: Jagan
The YSRCP president and former Chief Minister Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy said in a post on 'X' on Sunday that Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation (APMDC) was attempting another Bond (NCD) issue on June 24, on terms violative of the Constitution, in an unprecedented manner.
Private parties were being given access to the Consolidated Fund of the State disregarding Constitutional safeguards, violating Articles 203 and 204. This amounts to permitting APMDC to borrow against the security of the Fund, in violation of Article 293(1) of the Constitution, he said. Further, an exclusive charge is given to the Bond (NCD) holders of the APMDC on all the future revenue of the APMDC. Additionally, government mineral wealth worth ₹1,91,000 crore was mortgaged to NCD (bond) holders.
This was nothing short of cheating the public. In this regard, a case was pending at the A.P. High Court, which was admitted and notices were served on all the respondents to file counters. When the matter was sub judice, it was inappropriate for the government to allow APMDC to go ahead with the bond issue, he said, adding that it was indeed disheartening that the government was disregarding the Constitution and the future of the State.
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She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More
