China's ‘Wolf Warrior' Diplomacy Persists in Latin America

The Diplomat

18 hours ago

China's 'wolf warrior' diplomacy gained traction during the COVID-19 pandemic, largely as a result of mounting international criticism toward Xi Jinping's authoritarian governance model and, more specifically, his government's handling of the novel coronavirus, which originated in China.
These tensions were compounded by a turbulent period in China-U.S. relations, triggered by the onset of the trade war under Donald Trump's first administration. This hostile climate forced China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to adopt a reactive stance toward Washington's offensives, one that often deviated from the principles of dialogue and mutual respect.
Within this context, Chinese diplomats embraced a combative, nationalistic style aimed at discrediting any narrative that challenged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or tarnished China's global image. This approach became known as 'wolf warrior diplomacy,' a reference to the 2017 Chinese action film 'Wolf Warrior 2,' whose tagline warned: 'Even if they're thousands of miles away, anyone who offends China will pay.'
A Diplomatic Retreat?
With the waning of the pandemic, the era of wolf warrior diplomacy seemed to recede. As COVID-19 death tolls declined, the most intense international outcries over repression in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang began to fade. Although U.N. experts and democratic states continued to voice concerns about these issues, the international media response lacked the intensity seen in 2020, with the global uproar over the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, or in 2022, when a U.N. report detailed 'grave human rights violations' against Uyghurs.
Signals of a return to conventional diplomacy became apparent even within the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, where Xi urged party members to adopt a more civil tone with foreign counterparts: 'We must pay attention to our tone, be open and confident, modest and humble, and strive to present a credible, lovable, and respectable image of China,' he declared in 2021.
Similarly, the resumption of high-level dialogue between Beijing and Washington, particularly following Xi's bilateral meeting with then-U.S. President Joe Biden at the 2024 APEC Forum in San Francisco, offered grounds for pivoting away from aggressive posturing and toward diplomatic engagement between strategic rivals.
This shift was reflected in the initial Chinese diplomatic responses to provocations by Trump's second administration. The Chinese foreign service appeared unusually composed amid the uncertainty and bombast of the U.S. president. This was evident in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks after the first round of tariffs imposed by the U.S. in March 2025. 'Major powers should fulfill their international obligations… and not seek to bully or take advantage of the weak,' he said.
To be sure, certain Chinese diplomats found themselves forced to respond in kind to Trump's attacks. The Chinese embassy in Washington, for instance, stated, 'If what the United States wants is war – be it a tariff war, a trade war, or any other kind of war – we are ready to fight until the end.' Still, such declarations have not signaled a full return to the pandemic-era wolf warrior approach as an official mode of political communication, but rather a reactive strategy in response to certain decisions that undermine China's interests in strategic sectors and regions.
Indeed, most Chinese embassies around the world have focused on highlighting the harmful effects of the trade war on global commerce, articulating China's perspective via social media, Chinese state media, and local newspapers. In early 2025, Wang Yi published an op-ed in the Mexican daily La Jornada, asserting: 'We must jointly reject unilateralism and defend the multilateral trading system centered on the World Trade Organization. Together, we must advocate for an equal, orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.'
As such, leading analysts like Duan Xiaolin and Tyler Jost have recently stated that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no longer interested in promoting wolf warrior diplomacy. Some take this argument further, suggesting that the torch of (anti-)diplomatic bluster has passed not to China, but to senior figures in the Make America Great Again movement: examples include the Oval Office humiliation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, jabs at the European Union during the Munich Security Conference, or Trump's threats about annexing Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal.
From Central America to Colombia
Nevertheless, in Latin America – particularly in Central America – the wolf warrior spirit remains active and visible. This may be driven by geopolitical pressures, as the U.S. seeks to preserve its hegemony in the region amid China's growing assertiveness and its campaign to win diplomatic recognition from countries like Guatemala, Belize, and Paraguay, which still maintain ties with Taipei.
Among the most outspoken wolf warriors in the region is Xu Tiefei, the political counselor at the Chinese embassy in Costa Rica, known for his anti-U.S. rhetoric. In 2020, responding to conspiracy theories about COVID-19's artificial origin, Xu tweeted: 'As far as I know, the most infamous flu virus in recent history is H1N1, which originated in the U.S. in 2009. It killed nearly 20,000 people in that same year and later spread to over 200 countries and regions.' Following U.S. announcements of cooperation with Rodrigo Chaves' government to counter alleged Chinese cybercriminal activity in Costa Rica, Xu tweeted a statement from the embassy with his own mocking comment: 'Guided by the North, it will lose its direction.'
In Panama, the Chinese embassy has also continued its offensive tone since the days of Wei Qiang, the first Chinese ambassador to the country. In a recent statement condemning U.S. pressure over the Panama Canal, the embassy remarked: 'It is well known who is orchestrating the global wave of wiretapping and surveillance, and who is the biggest source of cyberattacks' – a not-so-subtle reference to the U.S. The statement added, 'The United States is the country that has inflicted the greatest harm on Panama throughout its history.'
In Colombia, Ambassador Zhu Jingyang has likewise adopted a confrontational and undiplomatic tone. His recent social media skirmishes have drawn attention. In response to a Deutsche Welle report on DeepSeek's self-censorship regarding sensitive topics for Beijing – such as the Tiananmen massacre – Zhu snapped: 'We know they're stupid, but not that stupid. Hilarious!' Elsewhere, Zhu accused the local outlet Entorno of spreading 'fake news' – without evidence – after it published a story about the so-called Chinese debt trap in the Global South.
These episodes suggest that wolf warrior diplomacy has not entirely vanished, at least not in Latin America. Despite Xi Jinping's attempts to project a more moderate image in recent years, Trump's return to the White House has reactivated confrontational rhetoric on certain fronts. It's no coincidence that Chinese ambassadors in countries like Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia – where the U.S. has stepped up the pressure on cybersecurity, infrastructure, and trade, respectively – have taken on a combative stance. As long as Latin America remains a strategic battleground in the China-U.S. rivalry, the combative streak in China's diplomacy will linger.
This article is part of a research project by the center Expediente Abierto on Chinese digital propaganda in Latin America. The initial findings of the study are available here.