Reviving May 17 Agreement could be a solution for Lebanon

Arab News

3 days ago

https://arab.news/ycrnj
Historians describe it as a perfect failure: because it was both perfect and it failed. It was also called mission impossible because of the Syrian opposition to it. The May 17 Agreement of 1983 between Israel and Lebanon, however, remains the only official document negotiated directly between the two states — and there are many reasons why we should go back to it to get us out of the current impasse.
Yes, we are at an impasse and there are very good reasons for it. Simply put, there are too many overlapping conversations happening at the same time, between the wrong people, and they need to be separated to get the right results. This is heavily dependent on who is discussing what: the interlocutor is key.
The optics are bad, as when the government makes promises, they are almost immediately contradicted by Hezbollah. Lebanon is losing credibility and we are being lectured about missed opportunities and about being 'left behind' while the region moves forward. It is painful to watch and there are rumors of resignations and of the government collapsing. This is the last thing we need.
The core problem is and has always been the Israel-Lebanon border. In 1983, it was the Palestine Liberation Organization launching rockets and operations across it, while today it is the arms of Hezbollah and Israel's attacks and invasions to counter them.
The government of Lebanon is working on two fronts. It is negotiating its relations with Israel after a war that it did not participate in and had no say on how it started or how it ended. At the same time, it is negotiating with Hezbollah over the application of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which Lebanon has twice committed to — firstly in 2006 under the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and then in November 2024 under Najib Mikati.
Both cases were huge feats of internal and external diplomacy, which should be seen as a success of the Lebanese system and not as a failure. But both agreements were for no more than a cessation of hostilities, which is less than a ceasefire and certainly far from an end to the state of war between the two countries.
The debate over Hezbollah's arms has to remain internal and is no less complicated than that over the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in the US. The narrative is tied to that of resistance to the 22-year Israeli occupation of south Lebanon between 1978 and 2000, which the Lebanese state recognizes. In a nutshell, Hezbollah can give up its arms but not its status as a resistance force.
Disarming Hezbollah is about the future of the country, while Hezbollah's resistance is part of its past. It is also about coming to terms with a humiliating military defeat while maintaining the glories of past successes. This is a delicate balance that can only be achieved through conversations within the party, between the party and its community, and with the rest of the country. This is also tied to reconstruction and recovery, both from last year's war and the economic and financial crisis. Trust me, it is difficult enough without external participation and it has to happen in-house.
Disarming Hezbollah is about the future of the country, while Hezbollah's resistance is part of its past.
Nadim Shehadi
In comparison, the question of relations with Israel is straightforward — and this is where reviving the May 17 Agreement comes in. It was a result of Israel and Lebanon engaging in direct state-to-state negotiations, with American facilitation and guarantees. The agreement was approved by the Lebanese parliament after long discussions, with every point of the text widely discussed.
In his recently published memoirs, former Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem emphasized that it was not a peace treaty and did not result in the normalization of relations, such as an exchange of ambassadors. It was also not connected with the Syrian presence in the country — this was the only way to sell it internally. In a way, all three parties approached the negotiations with widely differing expectations.
David Kimche, the Israeli negotiator, has described how every point was hotly debated and had to be sold to all the different parties in Lebanon. He explained that his Lebanese counterpart Antoine Fattal was a Chaldean by religion, his deputy and head of the military committee was Shiite and the civilian members included another Shiite, a Sunni Muslim, a Maronite and a Greek Orthodox Catholic. It was inconceivable that such a team could agree on any major issue, especially as each had to separately consult with their community leaders. Fattal pointed out that his delegation was like a convoy that had to continuously adjust its speed to that of the slowest ship.
Salem recounted how, with the approval of US envoy Philip Habib, President Amine Gemayel had to withdraw from the agreement after Israel insisted on conditions about a simultaneous Syrian withdrawal that were not part of the text. There was already enough pressure from Damascus against the agreement — under the slogan that the two paths, those of Lebanon and Syria, were intertwined. Hafez Assad was obviously concerned that an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would trigger calls for Syria to do the same, which is what ultimately happened after Israel did finally withdraw in 2000.
The main reason for the Lebanese government to revive the May 17 Agreement is to regain the initiative and earn credibility by owning the process and separating the Israeli component from the internal Lebanese discussion with Hezbollah. It would be almost impossible to initiate such a direct state-to-state process with Israel, but it is feasible to pick up where they left off and move forward. As Fattal explained about the complexity of Lebanon's internal situation, the overall package is more important than the contents.
• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser.
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