
China's strategy in Korea: rewriting history to weaponize it
went into the history of China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea. And you know, you're talking about thousands of years … and many wars. And Korea actually used to be a part of China. And after listening for 10 minutes, I realized that it's not so easy.
Xi's alleged comment is more than a historical misstatement – it reveals Beijing's broader strategy to position China as the cultural and political center of East Asia. This influence campaign relies not just on power but also on narrative.
By invoking a civilizational legacy, China casts itself as the region's rightful hegemon, with the supposed moral authority to interfere in the affairs of neighbors like Korea. Alarmingly, as Trump's remarks show, even global leaders can be influenced by this revisionist framing.
This narrative drives Beijing's opposition to South Korea's deployment of the US-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system and South Korea's participation in the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). But that's just the start.
China has pressured Seoul over defense policy, culture and diplomacy. In response to disagreements, it has used unofficial trade sanctions – targeting Korean firms like Lotte, restricting tourism and banning Korean entertainment.
It even objects to joint US-Korean military exercises held on Korean soil and frequently protests visits by Korean officials to US military bases or strategy meetings. These actions aim to limit Seoul's autonomy, treat South Korea as a vassal rather than a sovereign partner of the US, and dissuade the US from exerting influence in South Korea.
China's historical claims collapse under scrutiny. Korea has been continuously governed by ethnic Koreans, including during the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897) – a contemporary of China's Qing dynasty. While Joseon maintained a tributary relationship with China, it was symbolic rather than political.
The Korean court chose its own kings, managed foreign policy and never fell under Beijing's direct control.
'China is a civilization pretending to be a state.' This oft-quoted remark captures a vital truth about China's identity and its claims over others.
In fact, for nearly half of its recorded history, much or all of imperial China was ruled by non-Han peoples, primarily from Manchuria and Mongolia. The dynasties they established – such as the Liao, Jin, Western Xia, Yuan and Qing – played major roles in shaping the territorial boundaries and ethnic makeup of late imperial and modern China.
During the Qing dynasty, under Manchu rule, Han Chinese men were forced to adopt the queue hairstyle – shaving the front of the head and braiding the rest. Seen as a symbol of submission, it clashed with Confucian values that regarded cutting hair as disrespectful. For Han Chinese, who saw their hair as a sign of filial piety and cultural identity, the queue was deeply humiliating – but they complied.
In all these cases – and this is crucial – China accepted dynasties led by non-Han rulers as legitimate Chinese dynasties. The Manchus and Mongols were accepted as legitimate rulers of China by virtue not of blood but of the fact they governed through Chinese institutions.
In this sense, China's identity has historically been more civic than ethnic, much like that of the US. Just as the US has been led by people who embraced and upheld American ideals – but not always by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants – China has been ruled by outsiders who preserved and advanced Chinese civilization. This makes Beijing's modern reliance on Han-centric historical claims all the more disingenuous
In contrast, Korea remained unconquered by foreign powers during those periods. Both the Goryeo and Joseon dynasties preserved political independence while maintaining diplomatic and cultural ties with China.
Ironically, during the very periods China now cites to assert regional authority, Korea remained sovereign – while the Han Chinese were under the rule of non-Han dynasties.
Yet Beijing continues to invoke this flawed historical narrative to pressure Seoul into curbing its defense cooperation with Washington.
By opposing missile defense systems, condemning trilateral cooperation with Japan and interfering in domestic education over historical topics like the Goguryeo kingdom, China behaves as though Korea's sovereignty were negotiable.
This is not merely a distortion of the past. It's a calculated effort to undermine Korea's sovereignty and challenge the US foreign policy framework that treats Northeast Asian states as independent and equal partners.
It's also part of a broader pattern of historical revisionism aimed at serving political objectives. By asserting such claims, China seeks to legitimize interference in Korean affairs.
South Korea and the United States have every right to define their military posture, conduct independent diplomacy and shape their shared future together – without seeking Beijing's approval. The US-South Korea alliance is built on mutual respect and shared democratic values, not on civilizational myths or distorted histories. It remains a vital pillar of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Washington must maintain a clear-eyed view of China's historical revisionism as a strategic tool – and firmly reject any notion that Korean defense policy requires Beijing's consent. To do otherwise would not only erode South Korea's sovereignty but also embolden China's growing influence across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Hanjin Lew, a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs, is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.
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