Ukraine ceasefire: how might an end to fighting be enforced?

The Guardian

14-03-2025

Ending a war is seldom straightforward. Even agreeing to a ceasefire comes with complications. Though Ukraine signed up to a 30-day ceasefire proposal after discussions with the US in Jeddah this week, the joint statement between the two does not begin to explain how a halt in fighting might be enforced.
'Monitoring has to begin immediately,' says John Foreman, a former British defence attache to Moscow and Kyiv. 'If there's meant to be a 30-day ceasefire, the big question is whether it is adhered to.' Given Russia has a record of violating ceasefires and peace agreements, a robust process is critical.
Recent history in Ukraine underlines the challenge. A dedicated Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission of as many as 1,000 people running dozens of unarmed vehicle patrols a day was responsible for monitoring the end of hostilities in Ukraine's eastern Donbas on both sides of the frontline as part of the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015.
The OSCE, which represents 57 states in Europe, North America and central Asia, was chosen because Russia and Ukraine are both members. But it struggled to keep a lid on tensions, counting 486 civilian casualties and 400,000 ceasefire violations in 2017. Though that dropped to 91 casualties and 93,902 violations in 2021, it was less than two months later that Russia launched its full scale invasion.
Samir Puri, an analyst with the Chatham House thinktank and a former OSCE monitor with the Ukraine mission, says the task is much greater now: 'In 2015, the OSCE was largely monitoring a shorter frontline in the Donbas, where the Ukrainian army was mostly facing separatist militias. Now the frontline is far longer, with two full militaries each with significant weapon systems at their disposal.'
Modern technology – drones, airborne and satellite reconnaissance – makes ceasefire monitoring easier in 2025. Puri recalls that a decade ago, the OSCE mission had only four drones, which Russia-backed separatists 'would use for target practice now and again'. But while that may reduce the number of observers needed, it does not help with enforcement if a ceasefire is breached.
A similar point was even made by the Russian president on Thursday. Who will control the ceasefire, Vladimir Putin asked rhetorically at a press conference in Moscow, when the front is 2,000km (1,243 miles) long? It could require several thousand monitors, able to communicate and deconflict across both sides of the contact line
Though European countries, led by the UK and France, have talked about creating a 'reassurance force' to guarantee Ukraine's security in the event of a lasting peace, its organisers are emphatic that they are not troops who will enforce quiet at the front. 'They are not peacekeepers,' one said, describing instead a force that will secure Ukraine's airspace, sea lanes and critical infrastructure.
Yet monitoring, Foreman argues, is essential for restraining and building confidence between once warring parties. 'You have to trust – and verify,' he says, adding: 'The problem is that, for Ukraine, ceasefire monitoring has very bad associations because of what happened after the Minsk agreements'. A poorly enforced ceasefire could easily lead to an outbreak of renewed fighting, he says.
Given the history, it is probably unlikely that the OSCE will host a repeat monitoring initiative. The 2014 mission ended as a result of Russia's February 2022 invasion and its withdrawal of cooperation shortly after. An alternative might be for monitoring to take place under UN auspices, but that would require Russia to agree to a security council resolution to set it up.
Puri wonders if there is another practical possibility, where a demilitarised zone is established on both sides of the current frontline (in Korea, where there has never been a peace agreement after the 1950 to 1953 war, it is 4km wide) and where Russia has its own parallel reassurance force composed of troops from 'broadly friendly countries' such as China, able to communicate with counterparts in Ukraine.
Ultimately a lasting peace will only be possible if neither side tries to undermine it with acts of provocation and aggression. Some ceasefires, such as in Korea or Cyprus, have endured because neither side ultimately wanted to restart fullscale fighting. But Russia's hostility to Ukraine has been so great, and many believe Putin's long-term goal of dominating his country's neighbour remains unchanged.
Despite that backdrop, it is not yet clear how the ceasefire proposed by the US would even be monitored to prevent or restrain violations. As Foreman concludes: 'There are so many obstacles that need to be dealt with before we can get to peace.'