Call for parliamentary debate on SAPS crisis
"This was confirmed not so long ago by NPA's National Director of Public Prosecutions Shamila Batohi who highlighted the infiltration of the prosecuting authority which made it impossible to prosecute cases effectively."
"Essentially, the ANC government, through individuals like Senzo Mchunu, has transformed the state into a haven for gangsters masquerading as leaders."
The EFF's Statement on the Damning Allegations Made by General Mkhwanazi and the Urgent Call for the Suspension of Minister Senzo Mchunu
-This level of coordination, resourcing, and political protection confirms the EFF's long-held view that the ANC-led government has become a… pic.twitter.com/S6L1tNaFfG
— Economic Freedom Fighters (@EFFSouthAfrica) July 6, 2025
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The Star
2 hours ago
- The Star
Political leaders raise questions over who knew about allegations against Senzo Mchunu
There has been mixed reaction to the question of whether President Cyril Ramaphosa might have been aware for some time of the allegations of political interference against Police Minister Senzo Mchunu, made public on Sunday by KwaZulu-Natal Police Commissioner General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi. Mkhwanazi accused Mchunu of obstructing critical investigations by dismantling the Political Killings Task Team. Mkhwanazi made explosive claims during a press briefing claiming that Mchunu ordered the unilateral disbandment of the team and transferred 121 politically sensitive dockets to Deputy National Commissioner for Crime Detection, Shadrack Sibiya's office, where they have since been allegedly "neutralised". 'These actions constitute political interference of the highest order and are a direct threat to the rule of law…This kind of conduct undermines the entire South African Criminal Justice System,' Mkhwanazi said during the explosive briefing. Mkhwanazi highlighted communications between Mchunu and a businessman as a crucial piece of evidence. Despite Mchunu's parliamentary denial of knowing the businessman, Mkhwanazi asserts that a widely circulated social media phone recording contradicts this claim. This recording is considered one of the most damning pieces of evidence. Both Mchunu and Sibiya have denied the allegations. His allegations also implicate senior police officials in corruption and political interference which have since set-off calls for Ramaphosa to immediately investigate and get accountability at the highest levels of government. A party official from the GNU, who requested anonymity, said the Phala Phala saga was coming back to haunt Ramaphosa, because it was left unsolved. "It's really dangerous for us right now to assume that President Ramaphosa knew of this. But the person (Mchunu) who is accused here is the same person who was defending him during the Phala Phala scandal. So we can't take it away from anyone who would say Ramaphosa is involved in a cover-up," the official said. Another senior politician from the EFF said Ramaphosa was surrounding himself with allies that could succeed him to protect him from being prosecuted on the Phala Phala matter as soon as he leaves office in 2029. "If he (Ramaphosa) is not succeeded by someone who is in his corner then it could be his political enemy who would want him to be prosecuted, so he has to be involved in protecting his political ally (Mchunu)," the EFF source said. uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) spokesperson Nhlamulo Ndhlela claimed Ramaphosa knew of the accusations towards Mchunu and was planning to cover it up. "What is happening in this country pertaining to national security has gone far beyond a 'grave concern'. If Ramaphosa can cover up Phala Phala, would it not be surprising if he was involved in covering up Mchunu's alleged shenanigans?" Ndhlela asked. He said Ramaphosa had a tendency of covering-up high profile matters. 'We have written many times regarding political killings in KZN and Ramaphosa has since done nothing to curb that situation and now it has come to light that there is also a cover-up there,' he said. However, Build One SA (BOSA) leader Mmusi Maimane warned against jumping to conclusions before an investigation is launched. "I'm wary of us taking the way of the president having been involved in this new matter because this might limit his ability to act if we take it that way and we would then have to leave it to the Deputy President Paul Mashatile to make pronouncements," Maimane said. "I say we wait for the Special Investigation Unit's proclamation and give it 30 days for us to be able to move forward. However, Maimane added that if there were any truth that there are people who knew about the allegations Mkhwanazi brought forward, they should be put on special leave or suspended, regardless of who it was. Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya did not respond to questions on whether Ramaphosa knew about the allegations. However on Sunday after Mkhwanazi's bombshell, the presidency noted the statements made by Mkhwanazi and said it is a matter of grave national security concern that is receiving the highest priority attention. President Ramaphosa will outline the actions to be taken on this matter on his return from the BRICS Leaders' Summit. ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula said the party took these allegations in a serious light. "These allegations touch on the very integrity of the criminal justice system and the constitutional obligation of the state to protect South Africans. "We call upon president Cyril Ramaphosa to act with the urgency and seriousness this matter demands. The ANC reaffirms its commitment to give full protection to whistle-blowers, investigators and officers of the law," Mbalula said. Allegations made by Mkhwanazi have brought the work of the Political Killings Task Team into focus. This unit was established in 2018 in response to a surge in political assassinations within KZN. Its formation followed a directive from an Inter-Ministerial Committee, initiated after Ramaphosa's visit to the family of ANC activist Musawenkosi Qashana Mchunu, who was fatally shot in Plessislaer. Since its inception, the task team has investigated 612 cases, leading to 436 arrests and the recovery of 156 firearms. Of these, 55 firearms have been ballistically linked to politically motivated killings. Mkhwanazi also disclosed that 35 police officers were arrested for attempting to obstruct these investigations. [email protected]
Daily Maverick
3 hours ago
- Daily Maverick
Tshwane city manager faces ANC push for removal, three years on
The ANC wants to remove highly regarded Tshwane city manager Johann Mettler, three years after his appointment. Gauteng MEC for Local Government Jacob Mamabolo has weighed in with a letter about Mettler's appointment, showing that threats by the city's governing coalition to get rid of Mettler are becoming more serious. The three issues now raised by the provincial leader – who has oversight powers over the metro – were not flagged at the time of the appointment. Mettler is regarded as one of South Africa's most qualified and technocratic city managers: he has an LLM from Lund University in Sweden, an LLB and BProc from the University of the Western Cape, and has worked in local government since 1995. He has served as an administrator brought in to stabilise dysfunctional municipalities and was city manager of the Drakenstein and Nelson Mandela Bay councils. 'Whatever legal pretext the ANC coalition devises, the point is that the party would prefer one of their own deployed cadres – not an independent professional – in the job of municipal manager,' said Cilliers Brink, the DA Tshwane caucus leader and former mayor. He said Mettler had come under attack in council several times. 'The most notable of these attacks happened when it became clear that the city would not drop the case against the Rooiwaal Five, city officials implicated in the irregular tender award to a consortium of ANC funder Edwin Sodi.' Sodi won the tender for repairs to the Rooiwaal Waste-Water Treatment Plant, which were botched and caused severe downstream water contamination, most notably affecting the Hammanskraal community. Brink has written to Tshwane Mayor Nasiphi Moya of ActionSA about the growing attacks on the city manager. 'ActionSA's position is clear and consistent: we will not support the removal of any senior manager unless there is a clear, lawful and governance-based reason for doing so. [We] will not compromise the integrity of governance in Tshwane for the sake of political expediency. We remain committed to a principled, lawful and stable administration that serves the best interests of residents,' the party said. Mamabolo has now raised concerns – three years after the fact – about the interview panel for Mettler's appointment and his qualifications under the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). Brink, who was mayor at the time of Mettler's appointment, said the panel that made the appointment complied with regulations for senior managers. Mettler had also completed the MFMA qualifications he needed. '…The legal implications of asking council to reverse an appointment at this stage remain uncertain and require careful consideration,' ActionSA said. The ANC holds 75 of 214 seats in the Tshwane council and governs with support from the EFF (23) and ActionSA (19), along with smaller parties. The DA has 69 seats. The attempt to axe Mettler could destabilise governance in South Africa's capital.
Daily Maverick
3 hours ago
- Daily Maverick
Domestic power struggles likely to complicate US brokered Rwanda-DRC peace deal
Peace efforts must acknowledge the deeply political nature of the eastern DRC crisis, including the fallout from the collapsed power-sharing deal between Joseph Kabila and Félix Tshisekedi. Recent efforts to resolve the M23 crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have taken a new turn. After the breakdown of the Angola-led Luanda talks in mid-December 2024, a joint East African Community-Southern African Development Community attempt to merge the Luanda and Nairobi processes started in early 2025. However, Qatar ultimately facilitated the April Doha dialogue between Kinshasa and the M23 rebel group with its political affiliate, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). Then, on 27 June, regional talks spearheaded by the US led to a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. The US-brokered negotiations aim to secure the Rwandan forces' withdrawal from eastern DRC and end Rwanda's support to AFC/M23. The incentive for doing so is the DRC's commitment to neutralising the Forces Démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) armed group – Rwanda's main security concern in east DRC. Despite its significance, the deal faces criticism for trading Congolese sovereignty for US access to critical minerals, as part of a transactional form of peace mediation. Previous agreements that bargained Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for actions against the FDLR failed after they were repeatedly violated, leading to more violence. The current plan for FDLR neutralisation and Rwandan withdrawal was developed initially under the Luanda process – before M23's takeover of Goma and Bukavu – making it outdated. It fails to address the question of military operations against the FDLR in rebel-held territory, and doesn't deal with the Rwandan and rebel presence far outside zones of FDLR influence. Congolese and US efforts to obtain a Rwandan withdrawal before signing the deal failed, making Rwanda's retreat conditional on anti-FDLR measures. Given the FDLR's deep entrenchment and the lack of clear criteria for 'neutralisation', these terms risk prolonging both Rwandan and rebel occupation, rather than ending it. AFC/M23 leadership has called the Rwanda-DRC peace agreement a 'useful, but limited, step'. The deal is meant to provide leverage for a settlement with AFC/M23, which Kinshasa hopes to sign before a Washington heads of state summit in July. M23 has announced new rounds of talks, though progress has stalled. AFC/M23 accuses the DRC government of refusing concessions, while Kinshasa questions the rebellion's willingness to withdraw. Although AFC/M23 says confidence-building measures are needed to start talks, it ultimately favours a political settlement that ensures its long-term influence in eastern DRC. Kinshasa, however, prefers rebel integration on a case-by-case basis, seeing AFC/M23 as largely beholden to Rwandan interests – an assessment consistently backed by United Nations reports. The challenge is that a Rwandan withdrawal, while necessary for a domestic peace process, might also bury the deal's prospects, as Rwandan backing has been central to M23's strength in any negotiations. Domestic political complexities further complicate peace talks, particularly since former president Joseph Kabila resurfaced. The difficult relationship between President Félix Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23 is shaped by internal power struggles with Kabila. After a bargain with Kabila brought Tshisekedi to power in 2019, political control largely remained with Kabila. To compensate for this, Tshisekedi relied on regional diplomacy, enhancing security and economic cooperation with Rwanda and initiating dialogue with exiled M23 leaders. When he broke with Kabila in 2020 and consolidated power, Rwandan cooperation and M23 dialogue ended, enabling the group's resurgence in November 2021. The collapse of this power-sharing arrangement prompted Corneille Nangaa, former electoral commission chair and facilitator of the 2019 deal, to form the M23-aligned AFC. This hardened Kinshasa's stance, reinforcing its refusal to negotiate and efforts to weaken the exiled Kabila, considered the architect of the AFC/M23 alliance. In late 2024, Kabila re-emerged with fellow Katangan politician Moïse Katumbi to oppose Tshisekedi's proposed constitutional reforms. They made joint calls for national dialogue alongside opposition figures like Martin Fayulu, who was sidelined by the Kabila-Tshisekedi 2019 power-sharing deal. Kinshasa used legal and political means to target Kabila. He returned to the DRC in May 2025 via rebel-held eastern territory, where he remains. Kabila's motives remain speculative, ranging from a sincere desire for peace to personal and political gain. He positions himself as a key actor in an eventual peace process by engaging in local dialogues with communities, religious and customary leaders, and rebel authorities in the eastern DRC. Inspired by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that ended the 2002 Second Congo War, Kabila hopes a national dialogue would allow for renewed political bargaining, reversing political and legal actions against him, his family and allies. One setting for such a dialogue is the National Episcopal Conference of Congo-Church of Christ in Congo (CENCO-ECC) peace initiative, which proposes a broad conversation on the root causes of conflict in the east, potentially involving rebel groups. However, the government seeks to exclude AFC/M23 and its allies. Encouraged by Fayulu's recent outreach to form a 'camp de la Patrie', Tshisekedi is framing national dialogue around a divide between a 'republican front' and a 'rebel front' linked to Rwanda, the AFC/M23 and Kabila. He hopes the peace deal with Rwanda will strengthen his domestic position and lead to a unity government opposed to the country's balkanisation. Kabila's relations with M23 and Rwanda remain ambiguous. While both might consider him useful for gaining leverage, past experiences make them wary. He also lacks regional backing. Ugandan military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba recently blamed Kabila for regional instability and opposed Kabila's call for foreign forces to withdraw. Instead, Uganda signed a bilateral agreement expanding military operations in eastern DRC, aligning with Tshisekedi despite Uganda's ambiguous stance on M23. While Kabila may use the M23 crisis to reassert his political relevance, Tshisekedi's approach appears driven by a desire to sideline him. The result is growing political fragmentation that could undermine peace prospects. Yet the alternative – broad political inclusion – carries risks too, potentially providing legitimacy and political payoffs to insurgent violence. The question of inclusion must be approached cautiously, drawing lessons from past peace deals that prioritised integration but failed to resolve underlying issues. For the Rwanda-DRC deal to provide a route to peace, implementation must be thorough, requiring sustained US engagement and pressure. Peace efforts must also acknowledge the deeply political nature of the eastern DRC crisis. That includes the fallout from the collapsed power-sharing deal between Kabila and Tshisekedi, growing polarisation, democratic backsliding and deteriorating governance. Nevertheless, the Doha process and particularly the CENCO-ECC initiative should not become politicised by the struggle between Kabila and Tshisekedi. A CENCO-ECC-led national dialogue could examine how insurgent violence and politics have become so intertwined, enabling a shift from a culture of impunity to a path of justice, accountability and peace. DM
