Government: Determined to Begin Construction and Development of a Modern Building for Al-Nadeem Hospital - Jordan News
Government: Launching a High-Speed Bus Route between Madaba and Amman
Prime Minister: The Government Cares About Citizens, and There Is No Place in the Public Sector for Those Who Don't Care اضافة اعلان Prime Minister: Field Visits Are Crucial in Shaping Policies and Decision-Making Prime Minister: Continuing Work on the Restoration, Rehabilitation, and Development of Tourist Sites in Madaba Prime Minister: Our Economy Is Capable, Resilient, and Strong Prime Minister Dr. Jaafar Husein affirmed on Tuesday that the government is determined to begin the construction and development of a modern, advanced building for Al-Nadeem Hospital, which will include a variety of specializations. The construction will begin this year and will be completed within four years. During the Cabinet session in Madaba, Husein announced the launch of a high-speed bus route between Madaba and Amman, which will operate 8 buses on fixed schedules, offering 52 trips daily, with direct government support. He emphasized the government's commitment to implementing projects that are agreed upon with elected councils in the governorates, as per the allocations in this year's budget and those that will be allocated in future years' budgets. Husein also stressed that the government cares about the citizens, and there is no place in the public sector for those who do not care. The Prime Minister highlighted the significant importance of field visits in shaping policies and decision-making. "What we see on the ground directly impacts our plans and developmental programs across all sectors, along with addressing urgent needs and quick interventions." He explained that Madaba is rich in its tourism and religious sites, which is a feature that must be harnessed and efforts should be made to highlight it. This is what will be worked on through tourism activation plans and projects aimed at this purpose. He confirmed that efforts will continue to complete the restoration, rehabilitation, and development of tourist sites in the governorate, as well as the completion of the second phase of the Christian Pilgrimage Trail and the readiness of the Dhiban Visitors Center to receive visitors soon. The Prime Minister also stated that the country's economy is capable, resilient, and strong, expressing optimism about the upcoming economic situation and the foreign investments and strategic projects that will be launched this year and next. Speaking about the Palestinian issue, Husein confirmed that the efforts led by His Majesty the King are dedicated to supporting and solidifying the steadfastness of the Palestinian people on their land. He emphasized that this is the only guarantee for the restoration of their full rights, foremost of which is their right to establish an independent sovereign state along the June 4, 1967 borders, based on the two-state solution.
Husein also affirmed that the war being waged by Israel on Gaza is a war against humanity. The entire international community must be concerned with ending this barbarism, which has targeted children, women, and civilians. Currently, it involves starving the people with the aim of displacement and expelling those who remain steadfast on their land.
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