
Despite Donald Trump's latest salvo, India-US mini deal is by no means dead
How did we even get here? India's recent shift in trade diplomacy, moving from a cautious approach to actively pursuing free trade agreements, reflects a strategic imperative to diversify trade partnerships and enhance its position in global supply chains. It is also a reflection of the need to explore alternatives to trade liberalisation, albeit guardedly, to the multilateral system, currently in an extended coma. This pivot is therefore driven by self-interest, the desire to expand exports, attract investment and counter potential geopolitical headwinds.
For President Donald Trump, trade diplomacy is the equivalent of levying punitive import tariffs on those countries that he believes have free-ridden on the open US market for decades. The script aimed at the MAGA constituency is irresistible: Use tariffs as a negotiating tool to extract concessions from 'errant' trading partners, bump up government revenues, reduce, or better, eliminate trade deficits and bring manufacturing back home to America. The fact that none of this, except strong-arming the EU, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea and perhaps India into concessions, will work does not restrain the President and his advisors for too long and need not detain us either. Trade deficits and limited but key manufacturing are manifestations of structural features of the US economy, but let that be a topic for another day.
For now, POTUS has announced a significant hardening of the trade stance against India, declaring a 25 per cent tariff on Indian exports effective August 1. The mini trade deal between India and US that was to be agreed upon after being deferred to August 1 is deferred again, but hopefully not abandoned. The 25 per cent threat, almost the same as the unenforced April 2 'Liberation Day' tariff of 26 per cent, is accompanied by an additional, as-yet-unspecified 'penalty' for India's continued substantial purchases of crude oil and defence equipment from Russia. The official justifications are India's 'far too high' tariffs, its 'most strenuous and obnoxious non-monetary trade barriers', and its strong energy and military ties with Russia. The fact that the President described India as a 'friend' in the same breath softens the blow, leaving the door ajar for further negotiations, but does nothing to alleviate his transactional nature, disregarding the harsh asymmetries in levels of development between India and the US. Thus, restoring the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) under which India gets non-reciprocal, duty-free treatment for several products to push development, while on the negotiating table, looks improbable even if US per capita income at $90,000 is 30 times that of India. Even if it were on the table, it is unlikely to have been a sticking point. A fallout of that is a dubious but de facto acknowledgement of the blunt narrative that India is the fastest-growing emerging market and soon to be fourth-largest global economy. In private, I think all negotiators will admit it is not a match of equals. In the parlance of golf, a handicap such as the GSP is justified.
What, then, could have been the sticking point? Perhaps agriculture and dairy. It is no secret that US lobbies are looking to sell more cheese, milk, maize, soy, corn, and other similar GM products. Throw in nuts and some fruits and you have the makings of a potential disruptor to the vast agriculture, including the dairy sector, in India, that accounts for roughly 45 per cent of employment. For India, this has been a red line due to the overwhelming number of small farmers, not to speak of potentially damaging political consequences.
Allowing highly subsidised US farm produce would spell political disaster. Especially, when the government has had to face severe criticism on the unsuccessful doubling of farmer income policy. Besides, the infamous farm laws had to be withdrawn and farmer protests managed. In this background, even a nuanced and limited opening of agriculture that protects small farmer interest, as some have argued, would fall prey to a carefully constructed narrative of the deal being anti-farmer, and therefore, against national interest. For this reason, India has maintained this stance in recent FTAs with Australia and the UK.
The US negotiators perhaps already know this only too well. President Trump's latest salvo is no doubt a negotiating strategy, buoyed in part by the success of similar threats to other countries. For example, the US signed a significant agreement in July with the European Union (EU), where the EU agreed to a 15 per cent tariff on most European goods, down from a threatened 30 per cent. Ditto for Vietnam (from 46 per cent to 20 per cent), Indonesia (from 32 per cent to 19 per cent) and Japan (from 25 per cent to 15 per cent).
Some of these countries are our competitors for labour-intensive products such as jewellery, textiles, footwear, leather, toys and handicrafts and will have cheaper access into the US market, at least for now. Coercion has been defined as success in the US and countries have caved in to mitigate the risk of even greater economic disruption to their economies. India might be willing to give concessions in areas like data localisation requirements, digital services taxes and even digital trade rules. It should be noted that India abolished the Equalisation Levy, aka the 'Google Tax', in 2024. It was a tax measure on digital transactions by non-resident companies earning revenue from users in India without a physical presence. Agriculture, however, is a different kettle of fish.
What a difference a few weeks has made. From being 'very close' to being completed, the India-US mini deal hangs in the balance, although it is by no means dead. Scarlett O'Hara's line from Gone with the Wind — 'tomorrow is another day' — captures the enduring optimism, but in the present, it reflects a capricious and fragile global state in which uncertainty reigns supreme and the exercise of discretion is a crafty manifestation of power.
The writer is dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, and professor of Economics at Shiv Nadar University. Views are personal
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Indian Express
27 minutes ago
- Indian Express
As Trump's fresh threats loom, India still has a slight tariff edge over China but loses advantage with Vietnam
Despite fresh tariff escalation threats and the prospect of higher duties under the new regime announced by US President Donald Trump that could take effect from August 7, India continues to have a relative advantage on a key metric being tracked by policymakers in New Delhi – the tariff differential with China. As on August 1, China had the highest effective tariff rate (ETR) of the US's major trading partners, with India with a comparative advantage of around 20 percentage points. While tariffs on China remain at 34 per cent, the total ETR inclusive of the tariff rate at the end of 2024 came to around 42 per cent, according to Fitch Ratings' updated ETR Monitor that reflects the July 27 and July 31 announcements of new reciprocal tariff rates for most trading partners of the US. While India is slightly over 21 per cent, according to the latest data, the overall effective tariff rate for the US across all its trading partners is now 17 per cent — about 8 percentage points lower than Fitch's ETR Monitor of April 3, 2025, when higher reciprocal tariffs were originally announced, but around 3 percentage points higher than the estimate at the end of June 2025. The ETR represents total duties as a percentage of total imports and changes, with shifts in import share by country of origin and product mix. With Vietnam, though, India now has lost a slight advantage in ETR terms after additional tariffs kicked in, as against an advantage up to end-2024. This is despite Trump's rhetoric against transhipped goods and his administration's efforts to neutralise China's supply bases in ASEAN. And going forward, given Trump's frustration with India on not agreeing to his terms for a deal, this disadvantage is likely to fester. That is likely to be the case till Delhi gets a deal of some kind with Washington DC, but the situation could, however, change for the worse going forward, with Trump warning Monday that he would raise the tariff on India 'substantially' for buying Russian oil. Amid all the upheaval thrown up by America's tariff action, the assumptions that the Indian policymaker had implicitly factored in include that Washington DC will maintain a differential of 10-20 per cent in tariffs between China and countries such as India; and that a trade deal with the US needs to be clinched precisely for ensuring the gap in tariffs between India and China is maintained, even with a limited early-harvest type of deal. New Delhi did back out at the last minute from signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (a trade deal among Asia-Pacific countries including China) given the sensitivities of agri livelihoods. A higher-than-anticipated US tariff rate, especially on a comparative basis, could dent India's growth prospects, economists said. Though Trump did not specify the rate of penalty for India on account of Russian oil and defence imports, earlier statements made by Trump indicate that it could be to the tune of 100 per cent. This way, India stands to potentially lose the US tariff advantage vis-a-vis China at least till the time a deal is struck, even if Beijing, too, faces the same penalty for importing from Russia. China is the largest buyer of Russian oil, at about 2 million barrels per day, followed by India (just under 2 million a day) and Turkey. China had agreed to cut tariffs on US goods to 10 per cent from 125 per cent in May, while the US had agreed to lower tariffs on Chinese goods to 30 per cent from 145 per cent. But with respect to Russian oil, Trump has been singling out India, while being largely silent on China. Given how talks between Indian and US negotiators have proceeded so far, an interim deal still seems distant and is unlikely to be clinched before September, with October a possible outer deadline. Indications are a sixth round of talks between the two negotiating teams will take discussions forward on August 25. India's government has asked it various ministries to come up with potential giveaways to sweeten the deal for the upcoming negotiations. Once the official level discussions wrap up, there is a sense that a final call on the deal could come down to a conversation between the two leaders, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump. For India, the best-case scenario would be to get a deal of some sort now, and then build on that in the future negotiations that could run into 2026, experts said. The effective duty on Chinese products on a landed basis across US ports in commodity categories where Indian producers are reasonably competitive is being tracked constantly. The net tariff differential with India, and how that curve continues to move, is of particular interest here, given the belief that Washington DC would ensure a reasonable tariff differential between China and India. Officials said a 10-20 per cent differential is expected to tide over some of India's structural downsides — infrastructural bottlenecks, logistics woes, high interest cost, the cost of doing business, corruption, etc. US and Chinese officials wrapped up two days of discussions in Stockholm last week, with no breakthrough announced. After the talks, China's top trade negotiator Li Chenggang declared that the two sides agreed to push for an extension of a 90-day tariff truce struck in mid-May, without specifying when and for how long this extension kicks in. Anil Sasi is National Business Editor with the Indian Express and writes on business and finance issues. He has worked with The Hindu Business Line and Business Standard and is an alumnus of Delhi University. ... Read More

Mint
27 minutes ago
- Mint
Highway Infrastructure IPO day 1: GMP, subscription status, review, registrar, other details. Apply or not?
Highway Infrastructure IPO day 1: The initial public offering (IPO) of Highway Infrastructure Limited has opened today and will remain open until 7 August 2025. The Indian infrastructure company has declared the Highway Infrastructure IPO price band at ₹ 65 to ₹ 70 per equity share. The company aims to raise ₹ 130 crore from this fresh capital-cum offer for sale. The public issue is proposed for listing on the BSE and the NSE. Meanwhile, company shares are available in the grey market at a robust premium. According to market observers, Highway Infrastructure shares are available at a premium of ₹ 41 in the grey market today. This means today's Highway Infrastructure IPO GMP (Grey Market Premium) is ₹ 41. Bidding for the Highway Infrastructure IPO will begin at 10:00 AM today and will remain open until 5:00 PM on each bid date. 1] Highway Infrastructure IPO GMP today: According to market observers, shares of the company are available at a premium of ₹ 41 in the grey market today. 2] Highway Infrastructure IPO price: The infrastructure company has declared a price band of ₹ 65 to ₹ 70 per equity share for the public issue. 3] Highway Infrastructure IPO date: Bidding for the public issue has opened today and will remain open until 7 August 2025. 4] Highway Infrastructure IPO size: The company aims to raise ₹ 130 crore from this public issue, of which ₹ 97.52 crore is aimed at the issuance of fresh shares. The rest, ₹ 32.48 crore, is reserved for the OFS route. 5] Highway Infrastructure IPO lot size: A bidder can apply in lots, and one lot of the public offer comprises 211 company shares. 6] Highway Infrastructure IPO registrar: Bigshare Services Pvt Ltd has been appointed the official registrar of the public offer. 7] Highway Infrastructure IPO allotment date: The most likely date for share allocation is 8 August 2025. 8] Highway Infrastructure IPO lead manager: Pantomath Capital Advisors has been appointed lead manager of the public issue. 9] Highway Infrastructure IPO listing date: The most likely date for the share listing is 12 August 2025. 10] Highway Infrastructure IPO review: Assigning a 'subscribe' tag to the public issue, Shivani Nyati, Head of Wealth at Swastika Investmart, said, "At the IPO upper band, the valuation stands at 18.06x FY25 earnings, with a post-issue market capitalisation of ₹ 5,020 million; the IPO is considered fully priced. The company's order book stands strong at ₹ 6,663 million as of May 2025, mainly from EPC projects. The IPO is recommended as a "SUBSCRIBE – LISTING GAIN AND LONG TERM" for investors seeking exposure to India's infrastructure sector." On whether one should apply to the public issue or not, Gaurav Goel, Founder and Director at Fynocrat Technologies, said, "Highway Infrastructure Limited is backed by a robust order book of ₹ 6,200 crore and a strong track record in executing highway and bridge projects across India. Profitability has improved in recent years, with PAT rising to ₹ 22.4 crore in FY25, while return ratios remain healthy. The company has also managed steady deleveraging, reducing its debt-equity ratio to 0.61 in FY25." However, Goel said that EBITDA margins remain modest at 6–7%, significantly below larger peers, and the IPO valuation at ~30x FY25 earnings appears demanding for a company of this scale. While the fundamentals are stable and sector tailwinds remain supportive, better value exists among established peers with stronger profitability. "The IPO offers an opportunity for near-term gains on the back of sector momentum and balance sheet strength, though long-term investors may prefer larger peers trading at more attractive valuations," Gaurav Goel of Fynocrat Technologies said. Disclaimer: The views and recommendations made above are those of individual analysts or broking companies, and not of Mint. We advise investors to check with certified experts before making any investment decisions.


Hans India
29 minutes ago
- Hans India
‘Every patriotic Indian has sought answers on China'
New Delhi: The Congress on Monday said every patriotic Indian has sought answers on China since the 2020 Galwan incident but the Modi government has chosen to obfuscate and hide the truth with its policy of 'DDLJ -- deny, distract, lie, and justify'. The opposition party also alleged that the Modi government is responsible for the biggest territorial setback India has faced since 1962, and accused it of pursuing 'normalisation' with a hostile China because of its cowardice and misplaced economic priorities. The Congress' attack on the government came on a day the Supreme Court censured Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi over his alleged derogatory remarks about the Indian Army during his Bharat Jodo Yatra. The apex court, however, stayed the proceedings initiated in the matter against Gandhi before a Lucknow court. The top court told Gandhi, 'How do you get to know that 2,000 sq km of Indian territory has been occupied by Chinese? Were you there? Do you have any credible material?' Congress general secretary in-charge communications Jairam Ramesh said ever since 20 brave soldiers were martyred in Galwan on June 15, 2020, every patriotic Indian has sought answers. 'Yet instead of providing answers, the Modi government for the past five years has chosen to obfuscate and hide the truth with its policy of 'DDLJ -- deny, distract, lie, and justify',' he said. In a post on X, Ramesh went on to ask a series of questions. 'Why did the Prime Minister give a clean chit to China saying 'Na koi hamari seema mein ghus aaya hai, na hi koi ghusa hua hai' on 19 June 2020, only four days after our soldiers heroically sacrificed their lives for the country in Galwan?' Ramesh said. 'Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi has said: 'We want to go back to the status quo of April 2020'. Does the withdrawal agreement of 21 October, 2024, take us back to the status quo?' he said. Are Indian patrols not required to take Chinese concurrence to access their Patrolling Points in Depsang, Demchok, and Chumar, whereas earlier they were able to freely exercise India's territorial rights, Ramesh added. Are Indian patrols not prevented from accessing their Patrolling Points in Galwan, Hot Spring, and Pangong Tso by 'buffer zones' that lie predominantly within the Indian claim line, he further asked. 'Was it not widely reported in 2020 that 1,000 sq km of eastern Ladakh had come under Chinese control, including 900 sq km in Depsang? Did the SP of Leh not submit a paper at the annual Director General of Police Conference in which he stated that India had lost access to 26 out of 65 Patrolling Points in eastern Ladakh?' Ramesh said.