US human rights report says less about Israel, more about Brazil
The State Department released on Tuesday the 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
The report said the conflict in the Gaza Strip "led to a rise in reports of human right violations," using nine pages to depict the situation. That is in contrast to more than 100 pages of reference in the 2023 report. The latest report did not mention the number of fatalities in Gaza, which had been contained in the previous report.
Meanwhile, the latest report criticized countries including Brazil and South Africa, whose governments are increasingly at odds with the Trump administration.
It said the human rights situation in Brazil declined during the year. It said, "The government undermined democratic debate by restricting access to online content deemed to 'undermine democracy,' disproportionately suppressing the speech of supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro" and others.
A State Department spokesperson said the latest report has been restructured in a way that removes redundancy and increases readability. The spokesperson added that the report also addresses abuses that had not previously been covered.
Western media outlets say the report highlights the diplomatic stance of the Trump administration.
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The Diplomat
an hour ago
- The Diplomat
China-US Policy Signaling and Perceptions
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Carla Freeman and Dr. Andrew Scobell – co-authors of 'The 2022 Pelosi Visit to Taiwan: Assessing US-China Signaling and Action-Reaction Dynamics (July 2025) – is the 474th in 'The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.' Freeman is a senior lecturer for International Affairs and director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Scobell is a distinguished fellow for China at the United States Institute of Peace and adjunct professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. Compare and contrast U.S. and Chinese policy signaling in crisis situations. As a preface, it's important to understand that signaling between nation-states becomes critical when information flows are low and the prospect of conflict between them is high. Signaling offers a way to reduce the risk of conflict by helping states influence each other's decisions through managing perceptions and communicating intentions through words and deeds. Our studies on U.S.-China signaling behavior examine two distinct periods when signaling was critical. Our first focuses on signaling during the first 100 days of the Biden administration, a period when information flows between the two sides were low. Our second analyzes the Pelosi visit to Taiwan, covering both the lead-up beginning in April 2022 through August 2022, when then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. The Pelosi visit has been called the 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' by some because the risk of escalation to military confrontation and conflict was very high given that Beijing viewed the visit as a significant provocation. The United States and China are not worlds apart in some facets of their signaling behavior. In practice, both sides message through informal and formal channels, demonstrations of military force, and non-actions to signal intent. In addition, both sides have difficulty interpreting each other's signals – misperceiving and misinterpreting them. Sometimes they miss a signal entirely. But there are also important differences in their signaling behavior. Some of these differences are rooted in structural factors, such as different political systems. China's centralized foreign and security policy apparatus and the party-military-state controlled nature of the media means that messaging through public channels is often remarkably consistent across different bureaucracies. Thus, a deviation from the chorus can constitute an important 'tell.' In contrast, the U.S. lacks the centralized control over messaging. Decentralized messaging in a crisis can send mixed signals. Administration policy itself may be consistent – as on the status of Taiwan – and policies coordinated at the cabinet level, but senior officials may deliver many public statements and off-the-cuff comments not intended as signals to a Chinese audience. For example, a U.S. president generally interacts directly with the media, sometimes leading to statements that may appear to be signals to the foreign country but may be aimed at a domestic audience. For example, some of President Biden's statements during the lead up to the Pelosi visit seem to reflect this. In addition, as did Pelosi herself, members of Congress may also choose to express their own views in official statements as well as in more impromptu responses to the media. Our research suggests other differences between the two sides' signaling. One is that China's signals seem calibrated while U.S. signals do not. Chinese signals escalated from bilateral diplomatic warnings to statements in international forums to underscore their importance –as in the case of Ambassador Zhang Jun's U.N. remarks – to military demonstrations and ultimately the suspension of bilateral cooperation in multiple areas, crippling military communication and global cooperation between the two sides. While contrasts between U.S. and Chinese signaling may be fundamentally structural, distinctions in the interpretation of signals may be attributable to different political cultures. The U.S. side appeared to tend to compartmentalize Chinese actions, seeing them as discrete moves rather than as part of a pattern or escalatory ladder. In contrast, the Chinese side seemed intent on discerning strategic intent behind American statements and actions, perhaps as a result of a view that U.S. behaviors as part of a pattern of increasing support for Taiwan's independence. Explain the role and relevance of U.S. and Chinese messengers and messaging. One contrast we've drawn between the U.S. and Chinese sides is that although many statements on the U.S. side are made by different messengers, on the Chinese side, many different messengers generally deliver the same basic message. But this is not always so. One example in the lead up to the Pelosi visit crisis was the incendiary tweet by Hu Xijin on July 29. Not only American interviewees but also Chinese interviewees were divided over whether the former Global Times editor-in-chief arguing that China's military would be justified to use military means to prevent Pelosi's plane from landing in Taipei was an authoritative signal. Certainly, the Pentagon took the threat seriously. It is also worth underscoring that although there is an expectation that messaging between leaders offers the greatest clarity in crises, sometimes even leader-level signals are hard to interpret. Our report showed that the Chinese side saw the call [between Presidents Biden and Xi in July 2022] as reflecting an agreement between Biden and Xi that Pelosi would not visit Taiwan. Some U.S. experts felt Biden made clear during the call that he would not do anything to stop Pelosi's visit. What did the 2022 Pelosi visit reveal about perception and assumption gaps between American and Chinese policymakers? One of the useful aspects of these reports is that they present different views of the same events by experts and policymakers from the two sides in their own words. This offers rare insights into the different perceptions and assumptions that shape each side's interpretations. What is clear is that there are significant gaps between the two sides in these areas that help suggest why the two sides tend to talk past each other. For example, the Chinese side appears to have underappreciated the degree to which domestic political considerations influenced and constrained Biden's ability and willingness to pressure Pelosi. Similarly, the U.S. side may have underestimated how the approaching 20th Party Congress may have affected Beijing's flexibility. Even more fundamentally, with the two sides each seeing the other as a strategic rival, the assumption is that each side is pursuing strategic goals. Thus, the Chinese side viewed the Pelosi visit as a move in a U.S. strategy to increase support for Taiwan independence. The U.S. side saw China's reaction to Pelosi's visit as disproportionate to a situation for which there was a precedent – 25 years before, then-U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan. U.S. experts saw China use the Pelosi visit as an opportunity to advance its military closer to Taiwanese territory. Identify the components of effective policy signaling that could mitigate risk in U.S.-China misperceptions and miscalculations. The components of effective signaling are straightforward but the complexities lie in combining the right elements wrapped in sturdy packaging for delivery by a reputable mail carrier. Simply put, a clear message delivered by multiple authoritative messengers to a target audience works best. Of course, there are no guarantees since signals are prone to (mis)interpretation in a crisis, with each side tending to assume malevolence and deception on the part of the other. Assess the action-reaction dynamics of effective and ineffective signaling between U.S. and Chinese policymakers and interlocutors and its implications for bilateral communication more broadly. The difference between effective and ineffective signaling ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. That said, what can make a significant difference is sustaining trusted relationships between individuals on both sides through regular official talks and ongoing track two dialogues as well as developing and exercising designated channels of communication. If these elements are not in place before the precipitation of a crisis action-reaction dynamics tend to take on a life of their own with elevated escalation potential.
Japan Times
9 hours ago
- Japan Times
South Korean President Lee to visit Japan for summit with Ishiba, Seoul says
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will visit Japan between Aug. 23 and Aug. 24 and hold a summit with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Lee's office said at a briefing on Wednesday. The leaders will discuss ways to improve regional peace and boost trilateral cooperation with Washington, Kang Yu-jung, Lee's spokesperson, told reporters. Kang did not specify the date of the summit during Lee's two-day visit. Lee has in the past been critical of efforts by administrations in Seoul to improve ties with Tokyo, though when he met Ishiba for their first summit on the sidelines of a Group of Seven meeting in Canada in June they vowed to deepen the relationship. Ties between the U.S. allies have often been strained, rooted in historical disputes stemming from Japan's colonial rule over the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Their second summit meeting will also take place as the Asian economic powerhouses grapple with the implications of U.S. tariffs imposed by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Lee's trip to Japan comes just ahead of his visit to the United States, where he is scheduled to hold a summit with Trump on Aug. 25.
Japan Times
9 hours ago
- Japan Times
Putin is about to outplay Trump again in Alaska
Ukrainian and European leaders are worried Donald Trump will get played for a second time when and if he meets his Russian counterpart in a meeting tentatively scheduled to take place in Alaska on Friday, and they're right to be nervous. Indeed, if Trump wants to emerge from the talks a master negotiator rather than a pushover, his smartest move would have been to postpone the summit until it's better prepared. Trump isn't wrong to try sitting down with U.S. foes and rivals, even where more conventional leaders would avoid the risk. But hastily arranged encounters rarely result as hoped and everything about the visit by Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow that produced the Alaska invitation last week screams confusion. With so much fog on the American side, it's best to understand what Friday's scheduled meeting is really about from the point of view of Vladimir Putin. To him, this is a windfall he can use both to defuse Trump's threat of sanctions and further his war effort. That's what happened earlier this year, when the former KGB handler made good use of Trump's obvious desperation to secure a peace deal in Ukraine and an economic reset with Moscow. No matter how much Trump was willing to give away, including sanctions relief, Putin saw just one thing: a strategic opportunity. With the U.S. no longer willing to help arm Ukraine's defense, except — as eventually persuaded — when paid, Putin did the only logical thing: He upped the pace of his war effort, both on land and in the air, to take advantage of Kyiv's weakening position. Eventually, even Trump had to acknowledge he was getting strung along. Faced with an Aug. 8 deadline before the U.S. imposed financial consequences on Russia for its intransigence, Putin's task when Witkoff arrived in Moscow was once again to do just enough to stall any U.S. action, while making sure any concrete outcomes would strengthen Russia's position. So far, that's going swimmingly. He got something for nothing. The first priority was to keep Volodymyr Zelenskyy out of the room, rather than have the three-way meeting that Trump — to his credit — was suggesting. The Ukrainian leader's presence would require actual negotiation, making Russian disinterest hard to hide. By insisting on a bilateral sit down with Trump, Putin can seek to propose terms this U.S. administration might accept, but he knows Ukraine can't. That would once again make Zelenskyy the person Trump blames for standing in the way of peace, taking the pressure off Putin. The second goal was to find a location for the meeting that would demonstrate, both to Russians and to leaders around the world, that Putin is no longer a pariah avoiding travel for fear of arrest under a war crimes warrant the International Criminal Court issued against him in 2023. Indeed, this would be Putin's first visit to the U.S. (outside trips to the United Nations in New York) since 2007, before his invasion of Georgia the following year. A summit in Alaska — a U.S. state that once belonged to the Russian Empire — would send a strong signal of Putin's rehabilitation, while also pointing to the Kremlin's long historical reach as a great power. Trump's invitation alone is a win for the Kremlin. If the summit also serves to delay U.S. sanctions or produces a "peace' plan that sows dissension between Ukraine and its allies, all the more so. But any genuine path to a lasting end to hostilities will need a lot more pressure, both financial and military, as well as preparation. If an account in Germany's Bild magazine is correct, Putin and his officials ran rings around Witkoff when they met the U.S. real estate-developer-turned-diplomat last week, leaving him confused about what was on offer. Whatever Witkoff may have misunderstood, it was enough for the U.S. president to say land swaps were on the table, when they aren't. What the Kremlin appears ready to consider is that Ukraine should hand over parts of the Donbas that Russia hasn't yet been able to conquer, in exchange for a ceasefire. So, not a land swap, but land handed over in perpetuity in exchange for a truce that's probably temporary. According to Bild, the Russian "offer' may also have required Ukraine to first withdraw its troops from much larger areas of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces that Russia also claims to have annexed but has yet been unable to occupy. The Kremlin may also be willing to offer a truce in its air war to ward off sanctions, but that's less of a concession than it seems. Unlike two years ago, when that was a one-way fight, Ukraine's newly built long-range drones and missiles are doing increasing damage to Russian energy and military assets. On Monday, they hit a factory making guidance systems for Russia's missiles near the city of Nizhny Novgorod, about 440 kilometers (270 miles) east of Moscow. A truce might at this point be welcomed by both sides. Ukrainians know they'll to have to cede control of territory to end Putin's invasion. But they have in mind the kinds of concessions made to the Josef Stalin in Germany at the end of World War II. He secured control over the eastern half of that country for the Soviet Union, but West Germany retained its sovereign claim over the east and — eventually — got it back. Just as important is that after a brief attempt at seizing all of Berlin, the Kremlin left West Germany to prosper in peace. There's no indication Putin wants that kind of deal. It would do nothing to further his actual goals in going to war, which were to secure control over a de-militarized Ukraine as well as U.S. acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence in Europe, uncontested by NATO. Putin never hides this. It's what he means when he says he's happy to talk about a ceasefire, just as soon as the "root causes' of the war are addressed. There will be a time and place for a Trump-Putin summit. But it's unlikely to be this week in Alaska. Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East.
