China-US Policy Signaling and Perceptions

The Diplomat

4 days ago

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Carla Freeman and Dr. Andrew Scobell – co-authors of 'The 2022 Pelosi Visit to Taiwan: Assessing US-China Signaling and Action-Reaction Dynamics (July 2025) – is the 474th in 'The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.' Freeman is a senior lecturer for International Affairs and director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Scobell is a distinguished fellow for China at the United States Institute of Peace and adjunct professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University.
Compare and contrast U.S. and Chinese policy signaling in crisis situations.
As a preface, it's important to understand that signaling between nation-states becomes critical when information flows are low and the prospect of conflict between them is high. Signaling offers a way to reduce the risk of conflict by helping states influence each other's decisions through managing perceptions and communicating intentions through words and deeds.
Our studies on U.S.-China signaling behavior examine two distinct periods when signaling was critical. Our first focuses on signaling during the first 100 days of the Biden administration, a period when information flows between the two sides were low. Our second analyzes the Pelosi visit to Taiwan, covering both the lead-up beginning in April 2022 through August 2022, when then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. The Pelosi visit has been called the 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' by some because the risk of escalation to military confrontation and conflict was very high given that Beijing viewed the visit as a significant provocation.
The United States and China are not worlds apart in some facets of their signaling behavior. In practice, both sides message through informal and formal channels, demonstrations of military force, and non-actions to signal intent. In addition, both sides have difficulty interpreting each other's signals – misperceiving and misinterpreting them. Sometimes they miss a signal entirely.
But there are also important differences in their signaling behavior. Some of these differences are rooted in structural factors, such as different political systems. China's centralized foreign and security policy apparatus and the party-military-state controlled nature of the media means that messaging through public channels is often remarkably consistent across different bureaucracies. Thus, a deviation from the chorus can constitute an important 'tell.'
In contrast, the U.S. lacks the centralized control over messaging. Decentralized messaging in a crisis can send mixed signals. Administration policy itself may be consistent – as on the status of Taiwan – and policies coordinated at the cabinet level, but senior officials may deliver many public statements and off-the-cuff comments not intended as signals to a Chinese audience. For example, a U.S. president generally interacts directly with the media, sometimes leading to statements that may appear to be signals to the foreign country but may be aimed at a domestic audience. For example, some of President Biden's statements during the lead up to the Pelosi visit seem to reflect this. In addition, as did Pelosi herself, members of Congress may also choose to express their own views in official statements as well as in more impromptu responses to the media.
Our research suggests other differences between the two sides' signaling. One is that China's signals seem calibrated while U.S. signals do not. Chinese signals escalated from bilateral diplomatic warnings to statements in international forums to underscore their importance –as in the case of Ambassador Zhang Jun's U.N. remarks – to military demonstrations and ultimately the suspension of bilateral cooperation in multiple areas, crippling military communication and global cooperation between the two sides.
While contrasts between U.S. and Chinese signaling may be fundamentally structural, distinctions in the interpretation of signals may be attributable to different political cultures. The U.S. side appeared to tend to compartmentalize Chinese actions, seeing them as discrete moves rather than as part of a pattern or escalatory ladder. In contrast, the Chinese side seemed intent on discerning strategic intent behind American statements and actions, perhaps as a result of a view that U.S. behaviors as part of a pattern of increasing support for Taiwan's independence.
Explain the role and relevance of U.S. and Chinese messengers and messaging.
One contrast we've drawn between the U.S. and Chinese sides is that although many statements on the U.S. side are made by different messengers, on the Chinese side, many different messengers generally deliver the same basic message. But this is not always so. One example in the lead up to the Pelosi visit crisis was the incendiary tweet by Hu Xijin on July 29. Not only American interviewees but also Chinese interviewees were divided over whether the former Global Times editor-in-chief arguing that China's military would be justified to use military means to prevent Pelosi's plane from landing in Taipei was an authoritative signal. Certainly, the Pentagon took the threat seriously.
It is also worth underscoring that although there is an expectation that messaging between leaders offers the greatest clarity in crises, sometimes even leader-level signals are hard to interpret. Our report showed that the Chinese side saw the call [between Presidents Biden and Xi in July 2022] as reflecting an agreement between Biden and Xi that Pelosi would not visit Taiwan. Some U.S. experts felt Biden made clear during the call that he would not do anything to stop Pelosi's visit.
What did the 2022 Pelosi visit reveal about perception and assumption gaps between American and Chinese policymakers?
One of the useful aspects of these reports is that they present different views of the same events by experts and policymakers from the two sides in their own words. This offers rare insights into the different perceptions and assumptions that shape each side's interpretations. What is clear is that there are significant gaps between the two sides in these areas that help suggest why the two sides tend to talk past each other.
For example, the Chinese side appears to have underappreciated the degree to which domestic political considerations influenced and constrained Biden's ability and willingness to pressure Pelosi. Similarly, the U.S. side may have underestimated how the approaching 20th Party Congress may have affected Beijing's flexibility. Even more fundamentally, with the two sides each seeing the other as a strategic rival, the assumption is that each side is pursuing strategic goals. Thus, the Chinese side viewed the Pelosi visit as a move in a U.S. strategy to increase support for Taiwan independence. The U.S. side saw China's reaction to Pelosi's visit as disproportionate to a situation for which there was a precedent – 25 years before, then-U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan. U.S. experts saw China use the Pelosi visit as an opportunity to advance its military closer to Taiwanese territory.
Identify the components of effective policy signaling that could mitigate risk in U.S.-China misperceptions and miscalculations.
The components of effective signaling are straightforward but the complexities lie in combining the right elements wrapped in sturdy packaging for delivery by a reputable mail carrier. Simply put, a clear message delivered by multiple authoritative messengers to a target audience works best. Of course, there are no guarantees since signals are prone to (mis)interpretation in a crisis, with each side tending to assume malevolence and deception on the part of the other.
Assess the action-reaction dynamics of effective and ineffective signaling between U.S. and Chinese policymakers and interlocutors and its implications for bilateral communication more broadly.
The difference between effective and ineffective signaling ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. That said, what can make a significant difference is sustaining trusted relationships between individuals on both sides through regular official talks and ongoing track two dialogues as well as developing and exercising designated channels of communication. If these elements are not in place before the precipitation of a crisis action-reaction dynamics tend to take on a life of their own with elevated escalation potential.