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The Diplomat
5 days ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
China-US Policy Signaling and Perceptions
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Carla Freeman and Dr. Andrew Scobell – co-authors of 'The 2022 Pelosi Visit to Taiwan: Assessing US-China Signaling and Action-Reaction Dynamics (July 2025) – is the 474th in 'The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.' Freeman is a senior lecturer for International Affairs and director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and Scobell is a distinguished fellow for China at the United States Institute of Peace and adjunct professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. Compare and contrast U.S. and Chinese policy signaling in crisis situations. As a preface, it's important to understand that signaling between nation-states becomes critical when information flows are low and the prospect of conflict between them is high. Signaling offers a way to reduce the risk of conflict by helping states influence each other's decisions through managing perceptions and communicating intentions through words and deeds. Our studies on U.S.-China signaling behavior examine two distinct periods when signaling was critical. Our first focuses on signaling during the first 100 days of the Biden administration, a period when information flows between the two sides were low. Our second analyzes the Pelosi visit to Taiwan, covering both the lead-up beginning in April 2022 through August 2022, when then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. The Pelosi visit has been called the 'Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis' by some because the risk of escalation to military confrontation and conflict was very high given that Beijing viewed the visit as a significant provocation. The United States and China are not worlds apart in some facets of their signaling behavior. In practice, both sides message through informal and formal channels, demonstrations of military force, and non-actions to signal intent. In addition, both sides have difficulty interpreting each other's signals – misperceiving and misinterpreting them. Sometimes they miss a signal entirely. But there are also important differences in their signaling behavior. Some of these differences are rooted in structural factors, such as different political systems. China's centralized foreign and security policy apparatus and the party-military-state controlled nature of the media means that messaging through public channels is often remarkably consistent across different bureaucracies. Thus, a deviation from the chorus can constitute an important 'tell.' In contrast, the U.S. lacks the centralized control over messaging. Decentralized messaging in a crisis can send mixed signals. Administration policy itself may be consistent – as on the status of Taiwan – and policies coordinated at the cabinet level, but senior officials may deliver many public statements and off-the-cuff comments not intended as signals to a Chinese audience. For example, a U.S. president generally interacts directly with the media, sometimes leading to statements that may appear to be signals to the foreign country but may be aimed at a domestic audience. For example, some of President Biden's statements during the lead up to the Pelosi visit seem to reflect this. In addition, as did Pelosi herself, members of Congress may also choose to express their own views in official statements as well as in more impromptu responses to the media. Our research suggests other differences between the two sides' signaling. One is that China's signals seem calibrated while U.S. signals do not. Chinese signals escalated from bilateral diplomatic warnings to statements in international forums to underscore their importance –as in the case of Ambassador Zhang Jun's U.N. remarks – to military demonstrations and ultimately the suspension of bilateral cooperation in multiple areas, crippling military communication and global cooperation between the two sides. While contrasts between U.S. and Chinese signaling may be fundamentally structural, distinctions in the interpretation of signals may be attributable to different political cultures. The U.S. side appeared to tend to compartmentalize Chinese actions, seeing them as discrete moves rather than as part of a pattern or escalatory ladder. In contrast, the Chinese side seemed intent on discerning strategic intent behind American statements and actions, perhaps as a result of a view that U.S. behaviors as part of a pattern of increasing support for Taiwan's independence. Explain the role and relevance of U.S. and Chinese messengers and messaging. One contrast we've drawn between the U.S. and Chinese sides is that although many statements on the U.S. side are made by different messengers, on the Chinese side, many different messengers generally deliver the same basic message. But this is not always so. One example in the lead up to the Pelosi visit crisis was the incendiary tweet by Hu Xijin on July 29. Not only American interviewees but also Chinese interviewees were divided over whether the former Global Times editor-in-chief arguing that China's military would be justified to use military means to prevent Pelosi's plane from landing in Taipei was an authoritative signal. Certainly, the Pentagon took the threat seriously. It is also worth underscoring that although there is an expectation that messaging between leaders offers the greatest clarity in crises, sometimes even leader-level signals are hard to interpret. Our report showed that the Chinese side saw the call [between Presidents Biden and Xi in July 2022] as reflecting an agreement between Biden and Xi that Pelosi would not visit Taiwan. Some U.S. experts felt Biden made clear during the call that he would not do anything to stop Pelosi's visit. What did the 2022 Pelosi visit reveal about perception and assumption gaps between American and Chinese policymakers? One of the useful aspects of these reports is that they present different views of the same events by experts and policymakers from the two sides in their own words. This offers rare insights into the different perceptions and assumptions that shape each side's interpretations. What is clear is that there are significant gaps between the two sides in these areas that help suggest why the two sides tend to talk past each other. For example, the Chinese side appears to have underappreciated the degree to which domestic political considerations influenced and constrained Biden's ability and willingness to pressure Pelosi. Similarly, the U.S. side may have underestimated how the approaching 20th Party Congress may have affected Beijing's flexibility. Even more fundamentally, with the two sides each seeing the other as a strategic rival, the assumption is that each side is pursuing strategic goals. Thus, the Chinese side viewed the Pelosi visit as a move in a U.S. strategy to increase support for Taiwan independence. The U.S. side saw China's reaction to Pelosi's visit as disproportionate to a situation for which there was a precedent – 25 years before, then-U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich visited Taiwan. U.S. experts saw China use the Pelosi visit as an opportunity to advance its military closer to Taiwanese territory. Identify the components of effective policy signaling that could mitigate risk in U.S.-China misperceptions and miscalculations. The components of effective signaling are straightforward but the complexities lie in combining the right elements wrapped in sturdy packaging for delivery by a reputable mail carrier. Simply put, a clear message delivered by multiple authoritative messengers to a target audience works best. Of course, there are no guarantees since signals are prone to (mis)interpretation in a crisis, with each side tending to assume malevolence and deception on the part of the other. Assess the action-reaction dynamics of effective and ineffective signaling between U.S. and Chinese policymakers and interlocutors and its implications for bilateral communication more broadly. The difference between effective and ineffective signaling ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. That said, what can make a significant difference is sustaining trusted relationships between individuals on both sides through regular official talks and ongoing track two dialogues as well as developing and exercising designated channels of communication. If these elements are not in place before the precipitation of a crisis action-reaction dynamics tend to take on a life of their own with elevated escalation potential.
Borneo Post
21-06-2025
- Politics
- Borneo Post
Najib's DNAA another step in his political rehabilitation, says political analyst
Chin believes the DNAA in Najib's final criminal case involving SRC International Sdn Bhd funds amounting to RM27 million marks another step in his ongoing political rehabilitation. MIRI (June 21): The discharge not amounting to acquittal (DNAA) granted to former prime minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak came as no surprise, said political analyst Prof Dr James Chin. The professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania believes the DNAA in Najib's final criminal case involving SRC International Sdn Bhd funds amounting to RM27 million marks another step in his ongoing political rehabilitation. 'A lot of people who have been following this case are clearly not surprised he got a DNAA. The simple reason is the prosecutors have failed to move the case along for the past six years,' he told The Borneo Post when contacted. Chin said public perception of the decision is far more damning, with many interpreting the DNAA as a sign that Najib's rehabilitation is well underway and that the spirit of 'reformasi' (reformation) under Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim 'is dead'. He also questioned Anwar's role in the court outcome, saying the public had expected the Parti Keadilan Rakyat president to push through with the prosecution when he took over the helm as Prime Minister in 2022. 'The fact that he has done nothing and allowed this DNAA to move forward, for many people at least, they think there is a political deal and that Najib's political rehabilitation has begun,' he said. He further warned that this latest development could spell trouble for the Unity Government, particularly among Anwar's reform-minded supporters. 'This is a really bad omen for Anwar's government and it puts a lot of people who support him in a difficult position. They support him because they want the reforms, and rather than getting 'reformasi', they get 'reformati'.' 'Reformati' is a derogatory wordplay on Pakatan Harapan's 'reformasi' slogan, meant to suggest the agenda for reform is now dead, or 'mati'. Chin also noted that the DNAA could pave the way for Najib's return to frontline politics – depending on the outcome of GE17. On Friday, the Kuala Lumpur High Court granted Najib a DNAA in the SRC International Sdn Bhd case, with Judge K. Muniandy noted that the trial had stalled since 2019 with not a single witness being called to testify. The judge delivered the decision during a hearing on whether to set new trial dates or grant a DNAA, as previously applied by the defence. Judge Muniandy said the rule of law was applicable to prevent such a detrimental situation whereby an accused person is saddled with criminal charges with no outcome for an indefinite and indeterminate period. dnaa james chin lead Najib
Yahoo
01-03-2025
- Science
- Yahoo
Fortifications older than the Great Wall of China discovered in Chinese mountain pass
When you buy through links on our articles, Future and its syndication partners may earn a commission. Archaeologists in China have discovered a 2,800-year-old fortified wall that predates the country's first emperor. The wall, which runs through a narrow mountain pass in the eastern province of Shandong, was first constructed in around 800 B.C. At that time, it was about 33 feet (10 meters) wide. But it was expanded during the Warring States period (circa 475 to 221 B.C.) to be about 100 feet (30 m) wide, the Chinese news outlet Global Times reported. The archaeologists also found the remains of houses, roads and trenches nearby. The team discovered the wall's age by radiocarbon-dating animal bones and plant remains from the same layer. The Global Times, among others, said that this pushes back the construction of the Great Wall of China back by 300 years. However, experts that Live Science contacted disputed this. (Live Science reached out to the Global Times for comment, but it did not respond by the time of publication.) This newly found wall "is, of course, not 'the Great Wall of China,'" Gideon Shelach-Lavi, a professor of Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told Live Science in an email. The newfound wall was built at a time when China was divided into a number of different states that were often at war with each other. Shelach Lavi noted that the different states often constructed walls during these conflicts. One of these walls is called the "Great Wall of Qi," also known as the "Long Wall of Qi," which runs east-west through Shandong province, roughly from Pingyin county to the Pacific Ocean. The exact length of the wall is unclear, but it would have been more than 200 miles (322 km). Related: Ancient Chinese burials with swords and chariot cast light on violent 'Warring States' period But the newfound fortification is not part of the Great Wall of Qi, either, as that was built later, in around 441 B.C., Yuri Pines, a professor of Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told Live Science. Pines called the newly unearthed wall a "very important" discovery and noted that it is at a narrow mountain pass that could have been used to invade the state of Qi. The new find suggests that there was a permanent garrison at the pass, likely made up of Qi soldiers, and that they built a narrow wall to try to block the pass. "That the garrison tried to wall the narrow pass northward is indeed very interesting," Pines said. "But this is not a Long Wall, surely nothing on a par with the subsequent effort." While the newly discovered wall fortified a single narrow mountain pass, the Long Wall of Qi ran for more than 200 miles. Live Science contacted archaeologists who discovered the 2,800-year-old wall remains but has not heard back at time of publication. RELATED STORIES —Did the Great Wall of China work? —The Great Wall of China is being held together by 'biocrusts' —Dozens of centuries-old stone grenades from Ming dynasty discovered at Great Wall of China The Great Wall of Qi was built by Qi, a state that was based in northern China, Pines wrote in a 2018 paper published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society. The wall protected Qi from invasions by other states south of the wall. While its exact route is unclear it ran east-west through Shandong province. Construction of the Great Wall of China started during the reign of the first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang, who ruled from around 221 to 210 B.C. The wall was later modified and renovated during the Ming dynasty (1368 to 1644) UNESCO reports. It was built to protect China from nomadic groups that lived north of China. When he started construction of the Great Wall, the first emperor made use of earlier walls built by the different states — including the Great Wall of Qi — and connected parts of them together to help build the Great Wall of China, UNESCO notes.
