New shocking details on Titan submarine tragedy revealed
Two days after its mother ship Polar Prince set off from Newfoundland, the Titan began its descent on June 18 in 2023.
An hour later, it lost communication, failing to resurface at its scheduled time of 3pm.
A large-scale search operation was launched before debris of the sub was found by the US Coast Guard several days later.
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Sky News AU
05-08-2025
- Sky News AU
Explosive new report blames OceanGate and its CEO Stockton Rush for 'preventable' Titan sub disaster
A damning new report on the Titan submersible disaster that killed five people has revealed that the tragedy was preventable, and the result of a flawed experimental design and ignored safety warnings — with particular culpability placed on OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush. The 335-page report by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the first full government post-mortem on the tragedy to date and the first official document to clearly assign blame to OceanGate, the now-defunct operators of the ill-fated vessel, and Rush. The report paints Rush as the architect of the submersible's failure who overruled engineers' warnings about the vessel's flawed design, which ultimately led to the vessel imploding near the Titanic wreck in the North Atlantic Ocean in 2023, resulting in the instantaneous death of all five occupants. Rush, who was piloting Titan when it imploded nearly 11,000 feet below the Atlantic Ocean, insisted on using a five-inch-thick carbon fiber hull despite failed model tests and industry opposition. The submersible's viewport was only rated for depths of 2,130 feet, far less than the 12,500 feet needed to reach the Titanic. "This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable," said Jason Neubauer, the USCG Titan Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) chair. "The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence." Previous reports focused on the technical cause of the Titan's implosion but stopped short of assigning blame. "Mr. Rush exerted full control over every facet of the company's operations and engineering decisions... His refusal to prioritize safety and his dominant leadership style created an environment where the Titan's eventual implosion became almost a certainty," the report found. The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan. Other factors included a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate, weak safety rules for deep-sea subs like Titan — especially those using new or experimental designs — and a broken system for protecting employees who tried to speak out. Titan suffered a catastrophic implosion due to structural failure of its carbon fiber composite pressure hull and the carbon fiber hull showed signs of fatigue and delamination in testing before the fatal dive. While OceanGate engineers and advisors raised serious concerns about its safety margin, they were ignored or sidelined by Rush, per the report. "Titan's carbon fiber hull design and construction, in terms of winding, curing, gluing, thickness of hull and manufacturing standards, introduced flaws that weakened the overall structural integrity of the Titan hull," the report reads. "The carbon fiber pressure hull suffered a full material collapse due to buckling on its final dive." Several red flags were raised in previous dives, but Rush continued operating Titan, dismissed internal warnings and concealed critical damage from crew and clients, the report found. For instance, more than 150 loud hull-cracking noises were heard in a 2019 dive, indicating progressive degradation. A four-foot crack was later found in the original hull, which was de-rated after pressure testing — prompting OceanGate to build a new one. However, throughout the development of both hulls, four one-third scale models were tested and all of them imploded under pressure, reinforcing that the carbon fiber design was unstable. Additionally, the forward dome of the Titan — a 3,500-pound pressure-bearing component — was designed to be secured with 18 bolts, but Rush only used four bolts, according to testimony from OceanGate's director of engineering at the time. During a 2021 Titanic dive, Titan's four securing bolts sheared off while being hoisted aboard the Horizon Arctic, causing the forward dome to detach and fall onto the Launch and Recovery System platform in a catastrophic mechanical failure that narrowly avoided injuring the crew. The report found OceanGate bypassed industry-standard certification, ignored its own Health, Safety, and Environmental (HSE) manual and fostered a culture that suppressed safety concerns. "Had OceanGate adhered to the safety standards outlined in its own HSE Manual and fostered a culture of transparency and accountability, this tragedy would likely have been averted with the final Titan hull removed from service well ahead of its implosion," the report states. "Encouraging employees to voice concerns without fear of retaliation and prioritizing safety over expediency could have prevented the sequence of events that led to the disaster. Instead, the company's systemic failures created an environment where risks were ignored, and consequences were inevitable." Along with Rush, U.K. billionaire Hamish Harding, French mariner Paul-Henri Nargeolet and father-son pair Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood also perished in the disaster. While the passengers signed waivers, they were not fully informed of the degree of experimental engineering involved or prior red flags, according to the report. Neubauer said stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts in deep-sea exploration. U.S. regulatory authorities like the USCG and NTSB lacked jurisdiction because the Titan operated in international waters and was registered in the Bahamas. The report called for new legislation to expand U.S. oversight authority over deep-sea commercial submersibles carrying American citizens. The MBI called for new international safety standards, a ban on unclassed passenger vessels at extreme depths, a national submersible registry and referred potential legal violations to the Justice Department. Originally published as Explosive new report blames OceanGate and its CEO Stockton Rush for 'preventable' Titan sub disaster
Sky News AU
05-08-2025
- Sky News AU
New shocking details on Titan submarine tragedy revealed
A report into the Titan submersible disaster, which killed five people, shows safety practices were 'critically flawed'. Two days after its mother ship Polar Prince set off from Newfoundland, the Titan began its descent on June 18 in 2023. An hour later, it lost communication, failing to resurface at its scheduled time of 3pm. A large-scale search operation was launched before debris of the sub was found by the US Coast Guard several days later.
West Australian
05-08-2025
- West Australian
OceanGate Titan submarine disaster report 2025: ‘Preventable' implosion, toxic workplace and safety negligence
The tour operator responsible for the Titan submersible, which fatally imploded near the wreckage of the Titanic, 'leveraged intimidation tactics' to 'evade regulatory scrutiny,' a US Coast Guard investigation report concludes. The disappearance of the Titan off Canada in June 2023 led to a search that grabbed worldwide attention. The incident resulted in the deaths of five people - including British adventurer Hamish Harding and father and son Shahzada and Suleman Dawood. The chief executive of tour operator OceanGate Expeditions, Stockton Rush, and French national Paul-Henri Nargeolet, were also killed in the incident. On Tuesday, the US Coast Guard published a 335-page report in which it identified eight 'primary causal factors' that led to the fatal implosion. The report said the implosion was 'preventable'. The report said OceanGate had a 'toxic workplace environment' and used the 'looming threat of being fired' to prevent staff from coming forward with safety concerns. It added that analysis revealed a 'disturbing pattern of misrepresentation and reckless disregard for safety'. The report criticised OceanGate's design and testing processes and the continued use of the Titan submersible despite 'a series of incidents that compromised the integrity of the hull and other critical components'. The tour operator's former director of engineering was reported by the US Coast Guard to have said the first hull used on the Titan submersible was akin to a 'high school project'. According to the report, a contractor hired by OceanGate in 2022 voiced 'numerous safety concerns' to a company director, before being told: 'You have a bad attitude, you don't have an explorer mindset, you know, we're innovative and we're cowboys, and a lot of people can't handle that'. Authored by lead investigator Thomas Whalen and marine board chairman Jason Neubauer, the report said that for several years preceding the incident, OceanGate 'leveraged intimidation tactics,' allowances for scientific operations, and 'the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny'. 'By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols, which had historically contributed to a strong safety record for commercial submersibles,' the report said. 'The lack of both third-party oversight and experienced OceanGate employees on staff during their 2023 Titan operations allowed OceanGate's chief executive officer to completely ignore vital inspections, data analyses, and preventative maintenance procedures, culminating in a catastrophic event.' The submersible disaster has led to lawsuits and calls for tighter regulation of the developing private deep-sea expedition industry. with AP
